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Abstract
One of the unresolved puzzles in the civil resistance and contentious politics
literatures relates to the fact that some movements that begin as reformist (seeking
redress in a certain policy space) escalate to maximalist claims (demanding the ouster of
a national leader or the entire regime) – a process I call “demand escalation.” For
instance, in the summer of 2019, thousands took to the streets of Hong Kong to protest a
proposed extradition bill that would allow criminal suspects to be sent to mainland China
to face trial in courts controlled by the Communist Party. However, even after Hong
Kong’s leader Carrie Lam announced the formal withdrawal of the controversial bill,
protests continued with some calling for greater democracy and others demanding Lam’s
resignation. Existing literature has largely treated demands as fixed and focused on
different methods of resistance to pursue predefined ends. In contrast, I show that
demands can change as a result of the state-dissent interaction.
The core assumption of my argument is that demand escalation is not
predetermined, and the central finding is that demand escalation is equifinal. I develop a
dynamic theory of demand escalation, in which movement characteristics determine a
campaign’s escalatory potential and government response determines whether and how
the potential is triggered. I take a multi-method approach to test different aspects of the
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proposed theory – conducting a large-N analysis on a new dataset that catalogues both
reformist and maximalist opposition campaigns globally, qualitative comparative analysis
(QCA) on 78 reformist campaigns, as well as in-depth case studies on three mass
movements from Hong Kong. The findings largely support the claim that campaigns can
escalate demands both organically and strategically, and further illustrate how leader-led
and leader-less campaigns are differently positioned to find resolution.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

“Revolutions are not made: they come.”
Wendell Phillips

Not all revolutions demand revolutionary change from the start. Even the French
Revolution, one of the most written about events in Western history and a “watershed of
the modern era,” was not necessarily predetermined to be a revolution (Hunt 2004, 3).
Some of the earliest and the most significant events of the French Revolution were in fact
much more reformist 1 in nature than maximalist. 2 The high price and shortage of bread
0F

1F

are often cited as the “common grievance” of the French Revolution, and the March to
Versailles 3 on October 5, 1789, an early form of a mass mobilization campaign, was
2F

initiated by a group of women in the marketplace desperate for bread (Packham 2014).
While the French Revolution had both social and intellectual origins, 4 in the early phases,
3F

most people did not seem to have in mind the overthrow of the “Old Regime” but merely

“Reformist,” “limited,” and “single-issue” protests are used interchangeably to describe sustained mass
movements with demands that pertain to certain policy areas and do not call for a change in government
authority.
1

“Maximalist,” “regime change,” and “revolutionary” protests are used interchangeably to describe
sustained mass movements that demand change in government authority or territorial autonomy.
2

3

Also known as the October March, the October Days, or the Women’s March on Versailles.

4

For a synthesis on the social and intellectual origins of the French Revolution, see Tarrow (2012).

1

wanted assurances from the rulers that sustenance would be accessible and affordable
(Doyle 2018). The French would eventually abandon the monarchy and guillotine both
King Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette, but the people’s initial trust in the king and his
responsiveness (albeit reluctant) could be evidenced by the masses escorting the royal
family back to Paris in 1789.
230 years later, halfway across the globe, a similar phenomenon occurred. In the
summer of 2019, thousands took to the streets of Hong Kong to protest a proposed
extradition bill that would allow criminal suspects to be sent to mainland China to face
trial in courts controlled by the Communist Party. 5 However, even after Hong Kong’s
4F

leader Carrie Lam announced the formal withdrawal of the controversial bill, protests
continued with some calling for greater democracy and others demanding her resignation.
The slogan, “Liberate Hong Kong; revolution of our time,” 6 gained in popularity among
5F

protesters and came to encapsulate the fight between pro-democracy protesters in Hong
Kong and the Chinese government. These cases, far from being unique, are indicative of
an unresolved puzzle in the civil resistance and contentious politics literatures: why do
some movements that begin as reformist (seeking redress in a certain policy space)
escalate to maximalist claims (demanding the ouster of a national leader or systemic
change), while others do not?

Chan, Holmes. “In Pictures: 12,000 Hongkongers march in protest against ‘evil’ China extradition law,
organisers say,” Hong Kong Free Press, 31 March 2019.
<https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/03/31/pictures-12000-hongkongers-march-protest-evil-chinaextradition-law-organisers-say/>.
5

Hui, Mary. “A guide to the most important chants of Hong Kong’s protests,” Quartz, September 2, 2019.
<https://qz.com/1699119/chants-and-slogans-of-hong-kongs-protests-explained/>.
6

2

Campaigns calling for reformist or maximalist change have both been described
as “anti-regime.” 7 But while the two may be similar in form, they are fundamentally
6F

different in their political dynamics and implications. Inferring from their demands,
reformist protests assume that the incumbent government is capable of making changes to
improve the current situation, and the campaign in essence asks the government to prove
itself. Maximalist campaigns, on the other hand, neither desire nor offer the chance for
the regime to show that it can be responsive to the people’s needs. Posing a more direct
challenge to the incumbent’s rule, maximalist campaigns are essentially saying that any
other government would be better than the current leadership, despite all the discomfort
associated with uncertainty. So how do members of the citizenry come to seemingly lose
hope in state leadership? This research aims to get at the heart of what happens in the
transition from asking something of the government to demanding that it must go.
While the situational context (e.g., aggrieved society, regime type, economic
conditions) might offer clues for when demands escalate, I contend that structural and
societal conditions have limited explanatory power. In contrast, I argue that demand
escalation is a multi-causal dynamic process dependent on movement characteristics and
government response. I focus on the state-movement interaction to theorize multiple
paths to demand escalation. Whether or not a movement will escalate its demands and
which path it will take is a function of the movement’s characteristics as well as the
government’s response to the initial reformist campaign. I argue that movements are not

7

For example, the Mass Mobilization in Autocracies Database (version 3.0) takes a broad approach to
“anti-government” protest as not only including demands for the resignation of the central government but
also protesting actions made or sanctioned by it.

3

homogenous entities and simple binary descriptors (such as centralized versus
decentralized) do not capture the essence of different campaign orientations. Rather, the
role of leadership, the cohesiveness around strategies and goals, along with the
composition of the participants are important factors that can either facilitate or prevent
demand escalation. These movement characteristics, in conjunction with whether the
government represses and, or, offers concessions determine whether a reformist
campaign will demobilize or redouble its efforts.
The core assumption of my argument is that demand escalation is not
predetermined, and the central finding is that demand escalation is equifinal. I take three
campaigns from Hong Kong to show how the 2012 protests against Chinese patriotism
classes could have escalated into a maximalist campaign but ended with the acceptance
of government concessions, while the 2014 Umbrella Movement escalated demands
without concessions, and the 2019 anti-extradition campaign escalated demands despite
concessions. I also conduct qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) on 78 reformist
campaigns (half of which escalated demands) to assess the limitations and
generalizability of my theory. Calls for reform may be genuine or masking deeper desires
for regime change, but the motive does not necessarily determine whether demands will
escalate. If demand escalation is like catching fire, government response is the spark to a
movement configuration that may or may not have the fuel and oxygen necessary to turn
it into a flame.

4

1.1 Defining Demand Escalation
Escalation in the context of social movements and protest activity has primarily
been thought of as “phase shift,” a change from peaceful to violent techniques (Salehyan
et al. 2012, Shellman, Levey, and Young 2013, O'Brien and Li 2006). The strategic logic
of tactical escalation has emphasized the ability for movements to regain momentum
through change when current techniques of protest fail to create the sense of crises and
excitement they once did. In this regard, most of the existing literature has focused on
enterprising activists turning to more disruptive acts to demonstrate their commitment
(Gamson 1990, Tarrow 2011, Koopmans and Statham 1998), mobilizing larger numbers
of participants (Rasler 1996), or at times appealing to higher levels of authority (O'Brien
and Li 2006). These studies have largely assumed goals to be fixed and the focus on
methods of resistance have been framed as strategies to pursue predefined ends.
In contrast, this research considers how mass campaigns asserting reformist
claims can escalate into mass civil unrest calling for a change in government or territorial
independence. Hundreds of protests occur every year over wages, corruption, inflation,
and other regulations, and the reformist roots of many recent maximalist anti-government
movements (such as Algeria 2019, Hong Kong 2019, France 2018, Nicaragua 2018, and
Sudan 2018, among others) suggest the need to study this particular path of unscheduled
government change. 8
7F

8

Many maximalist protests have a reformist spark or trigger that catalyzes mobilization, but this study
differentiates between protests that escalate their demands from reformist to maximalist and protests that
call for resignation from the beginning (e.g., 2017 Serbian protests against President Aleksandar Vucic,
2017 protests in Turkey against President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and the 2017 Togolese protests against
President Faure Gnassingbe are all campaigns that were maximalist from onset).

5

The commonality in all cases of demand escalation is the presence of a reformist
campaign that temporally precedes a maximalist campaign, and sufficient evidence that
the two are related. A stylized example is a gradual buildup in which a group of
individuals asks the government to address limited grievances before they begin to
challenge the legitimacy of the incumbent. But the buildup can take a myriad of forms.
Some are more straightforward with a group increasingly gaining power, as was the case
in the Bolivian Anti-Juntas campaign (MEC ID: 28/2767) where pro-labor strikes won
the legal recognition of the Bolivian Workers’ Union (Central Obrera Boliviana or COB),
and the COB then took the lead in calling mass marches and general strikes to usher out
General Guido Vildoso and the military junta in 1982. But momentum can also build
from disparate groups coming together over shared concerns or a common enemy.
An example of uniting over shared grievances is the Benin Anti-Kérékou
campaign (MEC ID: 27/2756). The sub-maximalist campaign centered around economic
troubles with a series of teacher’s strikes, student’s strikes, and civil servants strikes
separately demanding their arrears in salaries and student grants before coming together
to call for democratization and the overthrow of President Mathieu Kérékou in December
1989. An example of an unlikely coalition forming against a common enemy is the AntiSerrano campaign (MEC ID: 111/2751) in Guatemala. Student protests over governmentissued identification cards, which were seen as a form of military control to track student
leaders, united with local protests against high electricity prices. Concerns over President
Jorge Serrano Elias’ autogolpe further increased public opposition and brought together

6

businessmen, indigenous leaders, human rights activists, and other groups all in an
alliance to call for Serrano’s ouster in 1993. 9
8F

However, other cases are less straightforward with a reformist campaign
functioning as one of many precursors to a maximalist campaign. In Argentina, the
origins of the pro-democracy movement (MEC ID: 14/1898) are rooted in social
campaigns that began in the mid-1970s, such as the mothers of the Plaza de Mayo
(Mothers of the Disappeared), but was also affected by Argentina’s loss in the Falklands
War. Although the Mothers of the Disappeared did not directly escalate their demands
against President Reynaldo Bignone, it is considered the sub-maximalist precursor
because their focus on the regime’s brutality was foundational to eventual calls for a
return to civilian rule. This is also an instance in which reformist demands continued
alongside maximalist ones, as when massive protests broke out against the military
government there were continued calls for accountability of the forced disappearances.
The phenomenon of demand escalation can also be differentiated by the time it
takes to escalate demands. If we conceive of “speed” as the number of days between the
start of a reformist campaign and when demands notably escalate to encompass leader
removal or regime change, the speed of demand escalation ranges from 7 10 to 2527 days
9F

Scott, David. “Public Demands Lead to Reforms in Guatemala,” The Christian Science Monitor, March
16, 1994. <https://www.csmonitor.com/1994/0316/16041.html>.
9

10

This is an artifact of the coding criteria, as a reformist campaign must last longer than a week to qualify
as a reformist campaign. Additionally, because of the coding rules, there is not a complete synchronization
between how reformist campaigns are coded in MEC and how those same reformist campaigns are coded
as a precursor to a maximalist campaign in EMEC. For example, the 2011 Food Riots (MEC ID: 2248) is a
harbinger to the Anti-Bouteflika Campaign (MEC ID: 10). MEC codes the food riots as primarily an
economic campaign around high food prices and unemployment, in coding the reformist roots of the AntiBouteflika Campaign, we identified electoral, economic, as well as political grievances. So, while the 2011

7

with a median of 286 and a mean of 498 days (see Figure 1). While the majority of
reformist campaigns escalated demands in less than two years, if they escalated at all, it
took nearly 7 years for the Zambian Civil Rights Campaign to evolve into the Zambian
Independence Movement (MEC ID: 402/2755). In 1953, the newly formed Northern
Rhodesia African National Congress (NRANC) made a national call for noncooperation
with the federal government, and for several years challenged the racist discrimination
policies against the black majority in Northern Rhodesia. In 1958, popular support for
NRANC was revived and the United National Independence Party was formed in late
1959 with a renewed vision of creating an independent Zambia that would be free of
British colonial rule.

Figure 1. Temporal Variation in the Speed of Demand Escalation

Food Riots are coded as escalating to the Anti-Bouteflika Campaign, the escalated campaign is coded as
having three reformist claims.

8

These examples show that there is no standard transition between a reformist
campaign and a maximalist one. I plan to explore the question of timing and the
configuration of demand escalation in future projects, but the focus here is on why. Even
among these diverse set of cases in which calls for limited change precede bigger asks of
the government, I argue that looking at movement characteristics and how the state
chooses to engage with the movement helps answer this question in a systematic way.

1.2 Possible Explanations for Demand Escalation
Although the question of why some protest campaigns escalate their claims has
not been asked in the literature, a few competing hypotheses may be inferred from the
mobilization and civil conflict sub-fields. I highlight three plausible drivers of demand
escalation from the literature before proposing the dynamic theory of demand escalation
which focuses on movement characteristics and government response.
First, grievance-based arguments loom large in the study of civil unrest and the
unequal distribution of power or wealth in society has been significant in explaining the
onset of rebellion (Gurr 1970), social conflict (Esteban and Ray 1999), civil wars
(Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug 2013), as well as social movements (Tilly 2003). The
argument emphasizes injustice and points to feelings of “relative deprivation” motivating
individuals to collectively organize against incumbent regimes. By this logic, a limited
campaign that seeks redress for one specific group of people may be a trigger that
catalyzes others to join and escalate demands for change. The linkage of various issues

9

can constitute a spillover of both membership and collaboration between different
coalitions seeking to affect politics together (Giugni, McAdam, and Tilly 1999, Meyer
and Whittier 1994). For example, the spark for the 2018 protests in Iraq was a health
crisis in Basra, but grievances over access to jobs and corruption are thought to have
intensified the unrest. 11
10F

Second, the political opportunity structure afforded by different settings provides
a more nuanced alternative explanation. The institutional features of the political system
coupled with the economic context can play a decisive role in the movements’ activity
through creating a favorable, or less favorable, opportunity structure (Giugni, McAdam,
and Tilly 1999, Meyer 2004). Weakly democratic states and authoritarian regimes,
therefore, may be more prone to being targeted with escalating protests in cases where
the economy is not performing well because the people are likely to blame the incumbent
regime for their dissatisfaction regarding the economy (Brancati 2014). In these
instances, economic grievances may escalate beyond leader removal to regime
transformation, such as calling for democracy, the regime type “most likely to maximize
the people’s economic welfare” (Brancati 2014, 1507). This argument plausibly explains
the Sudanese Revolution that started over the price of bread, escalated to unseat President
Omar al-Bashir from power, and continued to demand a civilian government.
Third, political entrepreneurs, opposition elites in particular, may play a
significant role in shaping the protests to achieve political gain. In the ethnic conflict

Robin-D’Cruz, Benedict. “How violent protests in Iraq could escalate,” The Washington Post. 11
September 2018. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/09/11/how-violentprotests-in-iraq-could-escalate/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9815e5b355be>.
11

10

literature, politicians and elites are given a lot of agency in being able to magnify, distort,
and manipulate contentious events for “external use in wider political arenas” (Brass
1997, 178). “Ethnic activists and political entrepreneurs” can build on the fears of
insecurity and polarize society to magnify anxieties; and as groups are driven further
apart, a “toxic brew of distrust and suspicion” can explode along ethnic lines (Lake and
Rothchild 1996, 41). Applying the insight more broadly, demand escalation could be a
function of opportunistic opposition members trying to politicize legitimate grievances to
bring down the incumbent government. In December 2018, President Omar al-Bashir of
Sudan arrested dozens from the opposition coalition on these grounds, charging them for
“crimes of sabotage” and accusing them of hijacking protests that started off with
legitimate demands. 12
1F

Taking these insights from the existing literature, one can expect that limited
demands might be more likely to escalate into maximalist ones when there are multiple
grievances among the population, there is an organized opposition ready to capitalize on
the people’s feelings of deprivation, and the context is a non-democracy facing an
economic crisis (Brancati 2016). In Chapter 4, I introduce truth tables and use qualitative
comparative analysis (QCA) to test these hypotheses derived from the literature.
Ultimately, I show that none of these conditions are necessary or sufficient in
understanding demand escalation and an additive approach to the literature-derived
variables fails to explain this phenomenon.

“Sudan police disperse protesters with tear gas on sixth day of unrest,” Reuters, December 24, 2018.
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-sudan-protests/sudan-police-disperse-protesters-with-tear-gas-onsixth-day-of-unrest-idUSKCN1ON11Q>.
12

11

1.3 A Dynamic Theory of Demand Escalation
To better explain when and why demand escalation occurs, I develop a dynamic
theory with two parts: the first identifies the factors that increase the likelihood of
demands escalating, and the second identifies ways that the escalatory potential can be
triggered.
When we relax the assumption of a unitary campaign, campaigns can be
described in a number of different ways. I consider three dimensions that provide
campaigns with their “shape.” First, the diversity of participants in the campaign matters
to the extent that the campaign is seen as legitimate and representative of the society at
large. Second, the overall cohesion and agreement around desired goals and strategies is
important for capturing divergent interests and assessing the potential for unified action.
Third, the presence of identifiable leaders is important not only in terms of the direction
and discipline it can provide the movement, but also because it offers the governments
someone to engage with. The escalatory potential is determined by the first two
movement characteristics: whether a campaign is broadly or narrowly composed and
whether a campaign is largely cohesive or internally fragmented.
Figure 2 shows that these two characteristics provide four different combinations
of movement configurations. The most discriminating factor between reformist
campaigns that escalate and those that do not pertains to the campaign’s ability to attract
diverse participants to rally for its cause. I argue that reformist campaigns that have
limited public appeal have little chance of escalating demands because it has little interest
or incentive to do so. The second movement characteristic that matters is the campaign’s
12

level of fragmentation. Campaigns that are cohesive have a higher escalatory potential
because they are better able to maintain a unified front to fuel continued contestation.

Figure 2. Campaign Configurations and their Escalatory Potential

Cohesive

High Escalatory
Potential

Fragmented

Medium Escalatory
Potential

Cohesive

Low Escalatory
Potential

Fragmented

Low Escalatory
Potential

Broad
Anatomy of a
reformist
campaign
Narrow

The potential for escalation is largely determined by the movement’s
configuration, but whether and how escalation is triggered depends on the interaction of
movement leadership and government response. In terms of state response, I argue that
regime violence elevates the escalatory potential (while its absence deactivates it), and
government concessions determine the escalatory path.
Taking the demands of a reformist campaign at face value, there is an underlying
trust in the government and hope that its leaders will enact or retract policies to meet the
people’s request. If the government then responds to these largely unarmed reformist
campaigns with disproportionate force, participants and observers of the campaign are
likely to question the allegiance of the incumbent regime and lose faith in the
government’s willingness to act on behalf of the people’s interests. Similar to tactical
13

escalation, I argue that demand escalation is another way that state repression can
backfire on the regime. On the other hand, when states do not violently repress a
reformist campaign, any escalatory potential it might have had is neutralized.
The dynamic component of my theory pertains to campaign leadership and
government concessions. The fundamental difference between leaderless and leader-led
movements is that movements with clear leadership provide the state an opportunity to
engage productively to negotiate a settlement. If the state invites representatives of the
movement to dialogue and adequately responds to some of their demands, the leaders
have made the protest participants better off, and are likely to call off future protests.
However, if the state dismisses the campaign and refuses to engage with the
movement in any meaningful way, the campaign’s leadership may consider a variety of
strategies to get the government’s attention. Doing more of the same or lowering
demands are not likely options, since the government signaled its refusal to engage with
the initial set of demands and the movement’s leaders face a reputational cost if it fails to
deliver on mobilization promises. Already fueled by state repression, in the absence of
state accommodation, protest leaders are more likely to escalate demands as part of a
bargaining strategy with the goal of getting the government to engage. If successful,
escalating demands will allow greater scope for negotiating the outcomes the movement
initially wanted.
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Figure 3. State Response and Escalatory Paths
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Leaderless campaigns differ on several fronts. First, as protesters self-mobilize
over a reformist cause, they are not fully aware of their potential bargaining power. If the
government chooses to ignore their limited demands, individuals are likely to think that
they do not have enough leverage to contend with the government. Lacking a central
figure to encourage continued mobilization, the movement may dissolve over time.
However, if the government decides to accommodate some of the movement’s requests
out of fear or seeing them as legitimate, the masses are likely to feel empowered to
demand more. Because the government has no individual or organization to negotiate
with when faced with de-centralized movements, whatever concession the government
makes is a unilateral decision meant to appease the protesters. The government may think
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that offering a concession will quell the masses, but there is no mediator or movement
leadership to translate the government’s thinking to meet them halfway. Information is
revealed through concessions, and the mass-led protesters have the newfound knowledge
of their bargaining power – they will not be ignored.

1.4 Overview
Chapter 2 takes a step back and sets up the context for this dissertation, clarifying
terms and concepts and introducing a new dataset that will be referenced in the remainder
of the dissertation. In Chapter 3, I build the dynamic theory of demand escalation
introducing the relevant movement characteristics and government responses that serve to
both predict the occurrence of demand escalation and the pathways by which it is likely
to occur. In Chapter 4, I test my theory against competing hypotheses using truth tables
and QCA, and in Chapter 5, I tests the theory on three Hong Kong case studies. Chapter 6
offers concluding thoughts and policy implications, along with the limitations of this
research and future questions to be explored.
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Chapter 2: Weapons of Mass Mobilization

2019 has been called “the year of the street protester,” 13 with an unprecedented
12F

“tsunami of protests” 14 sweeping across six continents affecting both democracies and
13F

autocracies, advanced and developing economies, alike. In countries as diverse as
Algeria, Argentina, Chile, the Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Georgia, Honduras,
Hong Kong (China), Iraq, Lebanon, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, and Sudan,
people took to the streets often with little warning and with much anticipation. 2020,
despite a global pandemic that imposed severe restrictions on mobilization, continued the
trajectory with the United States seeing the largest movement in America’s history 15 and
14F

contentious activity erupting all over the world over old and new grievances (e.g.,
Argentinians protesting the government’s handling of COVID-19, deepening economic

Diehl, Jackson. “From Hong Kong to Chile, 2019 is the year of the street protester. But why?” The
Washington Post, October 27, 2019. < https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/fromhong-kong-to-chile-2019-is-the-year-of-the-street-protester-but-why/2019/10/27/9f79f4c6-f667-11e9-8cf04cc99f74d127_story.html>.
13

Wright, Robin. “The story of 2019: Protests in every corner of the globe.” The New Yorker, December
30, 2019. <https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-story-of-2019-protests-in-every-cornerof-the-globe>.
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Buchanan, Larry, Quoctrung Bui and Jugal K. Patel. “Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest Movement
in U.S. History,” The New York Times, July 3, 2020.
<https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html>.
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crises, and plans for judicial reform 16) in common and novel ways (e.g., through physical,
15F

virtual, and hybrid actions 17). What’s more, seven 18 of these mass mobilization
16F

17F

campaigns in 2018 and 2019 started as protests against limited reform before escalating
demands to call for leader removal or greater systemic change.

Figure 4. Map of Countries with Campaigns that Escalated Demands in 2018 and 2019

This recent surge, not just in the last few years but in the last decade, has revealed
the limits of our knowledge regarding these weapons of mass mobilization. In this

Lister, Tim and Stefano Pozzebon. “Protests across Latin America reflect a toxic cocktail of pandemic
and recession,” CNN – World, August 20, 2020. <https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/20/americas/latam-covid19-protests-intl/index.html>.
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Chenoweth, Erica, Austin Choi-Fitzpatrick, Jeremy Pressman, Felipe G. Santos, and Jay Ulfelder. “The
global pandemic has spawned new forms of activism – and they’re flourishing,” The Guardian, April 20,
2020. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/apr/20/the-global-pandemic-has-spawned-newforms-of-activism-and-theyre-flourishing>.
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Chile 2019, Ecuador 2019, France 2018, Haiti 2018, Hong Kong 2019, Nicaragua 2018, and Sudan 2018.
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chapter, I will clarify what I mean by mass mobilization in the context of this research
and unpack three dimensions of these contentious campaigns, examining what we know
and do not know about their triggers, their structures, and their goals.

2.1 Varieties of Mobilization
Mass mobilization efforts have played a significant role in fundamentally
changing the social and political structures in many parts of the world. For scholars, this
has provided an essential justification for the study of movements and contentious
campaigns, and for many activists, this has fueled their hope to even put their lives at risk
in pursuit of such change. Political movements, social movements, popular protests, civic
activism, civil resistance, people power movements, opposition campaigns, rebellions,
uprisings, dissident action, contentious political challenges, domestic political unrest,
among others, are terms that have been used interchangeably at times and selectively at
other times to describe large segments of ordinary people coming together for a social or
political cause.
The specific forms of collective action such as strikes, demonstrations, rallies,
public meetings, marches, occupations, blockades, among others, become a campaign or
a movement when it extends beyond one-time events, often incorporating multiple forms
of public action. All varieties of mobilization can be considered a part of the “broader
universe of contentious politics,” which spans from institutional politics to revolutions
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and uses disruptive techniques to change government policy or make a political point
(Tarrow 2011, 7). 19
18F

While contentious politics goes back to the dawn of history, “mounting,
coordinating, and sustaining” mass movements against powerful opponents is an
“invention of the modern age and an accompaniment of the rise of the modern state”
(Tarrow 2011). Mass mobilization campaigns are now a major feature of global politics,
but the emergence of these types of social movements was a new approach that
developed in the West after 1750 (Tilly 2004). It was during the course of
democratization in Europe that types of political contention evolved from being
“parochial, particular, and bifurcated,” 20 to “cosmopolitan, modular, and autonomous” 21
19F

20F

forms of action with more leverage and staying power than its predecessors (Tilly 2010,
54). Particularly in Great Britain between the 1750s and 1830s, ordinary British people
developed various repertoires of contention that engendered mass participation in
national politics (Tilly 1995, 41).
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While the government can also apply mass mobilization techniques to win support for policies favorable
to the regime, such as President Richard Nixon organizing counter protests in favor of the Vietnam War,
the majority of cases of mass mobilization are anti-government in nature and will be the focus of this
research.
“parochial in concentrating on local target, and basing themselves on local groupings rather than local
segments of regional and national groupings; particular in having highly differentiated forms of action for
different groups, situations, and localities; and bifurcated in dividing between direct action with respect to
nearby objects of claims and action mediated by dignitaries and powerful people with respect to distant
objects of claims” (Tilly 2010, 51-52)
20

“cosmopolitan because they facilitate making claims on scales far larger than the locality… “Modular”
means that the performances in the repertoires transferred easily from place to place, issue to issue, group
to group… “autonomous” calls attention to the greatly diminished roles of patrons and intermediary
authorities in making claims; the people involved spoke directly to the objects of their claims, including
national authorities” (Tilly 2010, 51-52)
21

20

There are many ways to categorize mass movements – including by scope
(limited vs. comprehensive), type of desired change (progressive vs. conservative), target
(governments vs. non-government actors), tactics used (violent vs. nonviolent), among
others. While acts of resistance need not be overt and organized – there are everyday acts
of resistance that are more subtle and covert, such as feigning ignorance or deference,
slander and sabotage, false compliance (Scott 1985, 1990) – the focus of this research is
on observable acts of mass contention where everyday people come together in sustained
interaction against opponents, particularly the government. The unit of analysis here is a
“contentious campaign” defined as sustained mobilization involving over a thousand
participants and lasting longer than a week. 22 While the selection criteria is agnostic to
21F

the demands of a campaign, the scope is limited in such a way as to differentiate between
crowds (or isolated instances of a riot or a mob) versus more systematic gatherings, and
the analysis is further limited to mobilization efforts that target a government to make all
campaigns more directly comparable. 23
2F

Movements referred to as ‘revolutionary’ and ‘social’ have historically been
treated as a distinct phenomenon, with revolutions being studied “in comparison with
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This definition is taken from the Major Episodes of Contention dataset (Chenoweth, Kang, Moore, in
progress)
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It is worth noting that contentious campaigns or opposition movements are not discrete things that exists
in the world. Some movements and notable events have come to be known by a common name (e.g., the
Umbrella Movement, Athens Polytechnic uprising, etc.) because an analyst, journalist, a government, or
actual participants gave the collective action a name. Because MEC uses a more systematic coding scheme
to identify “campaigns,” the campaigns of contention identified here will often overlap but not be identical
to movements identified elsewhere. For example, the Wikipedia entry of the “Umbrella Movement” lists its
start and end dates to be September 28, 2014 and December 15, 2014. In MEC, the start and end dates of
the “Hong Kong pro-democracy (Umbrella Movement)” campaign is coded as starting on September 22,
2014 and ongoing as of December 31, 2018.
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other revolutions… and almost never compared with the cycles of protest that it in some
ways resembles” (Tarrow 2011, 7). I draw on the works of social movement scholars in
the sociological tradition and the research program on civil resistance and conflict studies
to conceptualize all contentious collective action as falling along a spectrum that warrants
internal comparison (Goldstone 1998, Tarrow 2011, McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald
1996). Because the focus of this research is on the evolution of civil conflict, I consider a
broad array of relevant actors that participate in a campaign – from civil society groups
and student organizations to rebel groups and warlords – and the campaigns of contention
considered are made up of general strikes to armed struggles, and everything in between.

2.2 Beyond Free-Riding
When we see mass mobilization in action, people have somehow solved the
collective action problem (also known as the free-rider problem), which some consider to
be one of the most troubling dilemmas of social science (Olson 2009). The dilemma is
that while a collective act (such as voting or joining a protest) may be desirable or
effective for the group, individuals have little incentive to participate because personal
gains are minimal and the chance for affecting the outcome are slim. So, what can
explain the global rise of mass protests, particularly those calling for an incumbent’s
ouster?
For one, the fact that collective action is often difficult to bring about is a
statement describing its relative occurrence, not a law of the social world. In many
situations and against so many odds, collective action has occurred and continues to
occur among people with limited resources and power (Lichbach 1995). Reasons may
22

range from “the desire of young people to flaunt authority all the way to the vicious
instincts of the mob,” but a common theme among many campaigns, historically and
globally, has been to mount a shared claim against authorities (Tarrow 2011, 10-11). It
may seem rather intuitive that a common purpose unites and spurs people to engage in
contentious politics, but the specific demands, desires, or grievances that mass campaigns
have mobilized over have often been conflated or assumed, and not fully categorized or
analyzed.
If we consider just the recent wave of maximalist movements, the triggers of the
contentious campaigns were as varied as a government tax on WhatsApp (Lebanon),
increase in transportation fares (Chile), and the proposal of a controversial bill (Hong
Kong). People have united over many different issues and grievances in the past and the
list of reasons will likely increase over time. It is impossible to predict which event (e.g.,
policy change, an abuse of power, tragedy, etc.) will serve as a trigger for mobilization,
but this project assesses whether certain types of reformist campaigns are more likely to
increase claims and what combination of factors heightens the probability that demands
will escalate. In so doing, it also addresses whether the rise in maximalist campaigns
could partly be attributed to governments mishandling reformist campaigns that then
escalate to challenge the incumbent regime more directly.
Beneath the proximate claims of contentious campaigns are often decades of
corruption, inequality, decline in political freedoms, mismanagement of public goods and
expectations, and betrayals of public trust. Sometimes maximalist campaigns are not
preceded by a reformist campaign, but “protests erupt in dramatic fashion when both an
immediate trigger and longer-term frustrations are powerfully present and interlock with
23

each other” (Youngs 2019, 150). The rise of inequality and the decline in social mobility
globally may have ripened many societies for a spark to catalyze the masses to push for
deeper change.
Other factors that may be contributing to the rise of contentious campaigns are the
contagion effect and the role of social media. Contagion of political conflict has been
theorized to occur through a process of social learning, and proximity is not necessarily
the determinant of contagion. A society is not likely to “catch” outside civil strife unless a
group is already “disaffected, has at least a latent sense of collective identity and has
considered the possibility of taking political action” (Hill and Rothchild 1986, 720).
Seeing groups of people in other societies organize and engage in contentious behavior
can heighten a sense of collective identity and inspire action, thereby spreading modes of
confrontation – revolutionary (Beissinger 2007) or nonviolent (Gleditsch and Rivera
2017) – in contexts where it otherwise would have been unlikely.
Similar to the underlying conditions necessary for triggers, the receptivity to
outside political conflict may be heightened for countries with a recent history of
domestic strife and if the society is polarized among just a few contending groups (Hill
and Rothchild 1986). The contagion effect and emulative contention (Weyland 2014,
2012) partly explains how mass campaigns can occur in waves – including the Atlantic
Revolutions at the end of the 18th century, the 1848 Spring of Nations and the 1917-1919
waves in Europe, the 1968 student movements, 1989 anti-communist protests, and the
2011 revolutions of the Arab Spring, among others.
The current wave, however, is far wider geographically than any previous
clustering of protest events, and the increased role of the Internet and social media cannot
24

be overlooked when considering the breadth of these contentious campaigns. Scholars
have long found a significant link between mass media, collective protest, and conflict in
society (Hill and Rothchild 1986), and certain regimes are known to censor news
coverage as a way to limit potential threats to their power. Within countries, social media
allows protesters to share information and organize in unique and unprecedented ways.
Across countries, social media can draw attention to politically salient issues and
facilitate the spread of a tactic or methodology of a prominent protest, violent or peaceful.
While demonstrations, boycotts, and protests are long established political tools that
people do not need to be shown how to use, information about innovations and new
forms of mobilization and resistance can be shared from one civil society to another and
serve as a form of inspiration.
Additionally, collective action is often thought of as a problem to overcome in the
standard consequentialist logic but participating in mass action could be rational and even
moral, if “rationality” is not limited to self-regarding instrumental behavior. The
framework of distributed effectivity explains participation that is “materially costly but
personally rewarding,” and rationalizes participating in collective action that could
benefit the interests of demographic, ethnic, and/or social groups with which an
individual identifies (Gintis 2016, 47). The risks and costs of engaging in collective
action remain, but they do not always outweigh the incentives, such as rewarding people
to collectively strive for the public policy that they believe in (Hirschman 1982).
In this reading, the barrier to participating in collective action is not all that high,
even when the chance for victory is slim. One 27-year-old Hong Kongese protester noted
his willing participation in the civil disobedience campaign in 2019, despite
25

acknowledging that the campaign has maybe a “1 percent chance to win.” 24 Other
23F

protesters echoed similar sentiments about the grim prospect for success, even while
choosing to show up and risk their lives. 25 What is noteworthy is that the typical hurdles
24F

of collective action coupled with the increased use of violence by security forces were not
enough to keep the protesters at home. The Hong Kong protests grew throughout 2019,
not because the chance of success increased, but arguably because joining the movement
gave the participants satisfaction and fulfillment in knowing that they were fighting for a
cause that they believed in with likeminded citizens.
Ultimately, there is no formula to predict when people will mobilize, and I do not
seek to explain why the first protestor takes to the street. I have merely surveyed a few of
the drivers that may be contributing to the rise in mass civil action across the world,
where conflicts between challengers and authorities increasingly appear to be “a normal
part of society” and not an “aberration” (Tarrow 1998, 11). Underlying grievances,
proximate triggers, contagion effects, the rise of social media, and the benefits of
collectively fighting for something on principle can operate as “clues for when
contentious politics will emerge” and set in motion a sequence of events that may lead to
sustained confrontation with authorities and result in unscheduled regime change (Tarrow
2011, 33).

Mahtani, Shibani and Tiffany Liang. “Why Hong Kong protesters rage on, even though they cannot
win.” The Washington Post, 3 July 2019. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/why-hongkong-protesters-rage-on-even-though-they-cannot-win/2019/07/03/0c738850-9cd9-11e9-83e345fded8e8d2e_story.html>.
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Kirby, Jen. “6 Hongkongers on how the protests have transformed their lives and their city,” Vox, 28
August 2019. <https://www.vox.com/2019/8/28/20799049/hong-kong-protests-first-person>.
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2.3 Harnessing the Power of the People
Early theorists of social and political mobilization efforts looked to the French
and Industrial Revolutions to derive a rather negative portrayal of mass movements as
extreme, violent, and disorganized (Durkheim 1951). Some may still hold these views,
but many more increasingly consider popular contention to be rather orderly, rooted in
“collective challenges, based on common purposes and social solidarities” (Tilly 1986,
Tarrow 2011). Over time, people have come together to fight for better wages,
corruption, inflation, environmental issues, women’s rights, racial justice, and indigenous
rights, among other reasons.
Historically, the most common source of contention were “food riots and grain
seizures that accompanied times of dearth and increases in the price of food” (Tarrow
2011, 42). Many of these campaigns had a triggering event that became closely related to
their demand, such as an increase in the price of bread prompting calls for the reduction
in the bread price, but other times a trigger merely functioned as a catalyst for greater
anti-regime mobilization. In either case, previous studies of movements largely assume
that demands are fixed from the beginning, and how a movement’s goals shift during the
course of a campaign is not well understood.
While contentious campaigns take up a wide variety of goals, the quantitative
civil resistance literature has focused on only a subset of these campaigns with
“maximalist” demands (i.e. those seeking the ouster of the incumbent leader, the entire
regime, or territorial independence) (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Works like Why
Civil Resistance Works remain foundational to the study of nonviolent resistance and
27

effectively compared nonviolent civil unrest to violent civil wars, but the broader
literature that overlooks the vast majority of contentious campaigns that have nonmaximalist demands 26 has left a gap that I hope to fill. Reformist campaigns matter
25F

because they occur much more frequently and because they can transform into a mass
uprising, and sometimes a violent insurgency. Understanding the strategic and organic
mechanisms behind why protest movements escalate their demands can help identify
avenues for intervention that allow people’s needs to be met without violence, death, or
destruction.
There are undoubtedly cases where a reformist campaign expands to include more
and more reformist demands, such as in Brazil in 2013 when street demonstrations over
the increase in transportation fare grew to become a march against corruption, poor
public services, and the government’s excessive spending in hosting the World Cup. 27
26F

However, I use the term “demand escalation” to specifically mean going from reformist
demands to maximalist ones, thereby crossing a threshold.
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Some datasets that look at a wider range of social unrest include the Social Conflict in Africa Database
(SCAD) and the Mass Mobilization (MM) data project, but both of these are at the event-level and not
directly comparable to larger campaigns. William Gamson’s Strategy of Social Protest does provide
systematic data to analyze the characteristics of protest groups but the data is limited to 53 protests groups
active in America between 1800 and 1945, and he suggests that the findings are not entirely applicable to
the post-1945 era. See (Frey, Dietz, and Kalof 1992) for a discussion of the criticisms of Gamson (1975,
1990) on methodological and theoretical grounds.
Watts, Jonathan. “Brazil erupts in protest: more than a million on the streets,” The Guardian, June 21,
2013. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/21/brazil-police-crowds-rio-protest>.
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2.4 Introducing the Enhanced Major Episodes of Contention (EMEC) Dataset
Previous work on civil resistance has assessed predominantly maximalist
campaigns, largely because it focused on violent and nonviolent forms of regime change
in comparing civil resistance to civil war. The Major Episodes of Contention (MEC)
database (Chenoweth, Kang, and Moore in progress) broadened the scope of antigovernment campaigns to include contentious activity below the threshold of regime
change but above isolated events, and identified a larger universe of sustained mass
action challenging the government in some form.
The fundamental difference between reformist and maximalist campaigns is that
the former pressures the existing government to enact or reverse some sort of policy
measure, while the latter calls for a change in leadership or governance structure. In
MEC, maximalist campaigns include self-determination movements, secessionist
movements, and movements seeking leader removal or regime change, and the five
categories of reformist claims include Economic, Electoral, Political, Social, and Other. 28
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Extending the coding from MEC, 29 I identified a total of 2101 campaigns 30 targeting their
28F

29F

own government 31 between 1955-2018, of which 1640 (78%) were reformist campaigns
30F

and 461 (22%) maximalist.
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See the codebook for a more detailed explanation and examples within each category.

29

Numbers are slightly different from MEC because of differing coding criteria.

Following MEC, a “campaign” is defined as “multiple contentious events with more than 1,000 observed
participants” that last longer than a week (MEC codebook).
30

The options for “target” include one’s own government, foreign government, or a non-government entity
(not mutually exclusive). Self-determination and secession campaigns are coded as targeting their own
government as well as a foreign government.
31
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In trying to understand why demands escalate from reformist to maximalist
claims, two new variables were coded for each maximalist campaign – “reformist
trigger” and “reformist campaign.” 32 “Reformist trigger” is a dichotomous variable that
31F

indicates whether there was an identifiable event of reformist nature (e.g., changes in the
cost of bread or fuel, alleged corruption, etc.) that precipitated the maximalist campaign,
and “reformist campaign” is a dichotomous variable that indicates whether the reformist
trigger led to sustained mass action over the reformist demand. 33 To differentiate between
32F

maximalist campaigns with different precursors, I use the term “tripartite,” “bipartite,”
and “unipartite” to describe the number of stages in a given campaign (see Figure 5). A
tripartite maximalist campaign has three parts: a reformist trigger, a reformist campaign
over that trigger, and then a maximalist campaign; a bipartite maximalist campaign has
two parts: a reformist trigger that quickly escalates into a maximalist campaign; and a
unipartite maximalist campaign are cases in which there is no clear reformist precursor
and the campaign makes maximalist demands from the onset of mobilization.
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Ideally, I would have gone through the 1,641 reformist campaigns to see whether there was an escalation
in demand, but to make the project more feasible I started with the 460 maximalist campaigns to identify
the presence or absence of reformist triggers.
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In cases where a maximalist campaign is coded as being preceded by a reformist campaign, there was no
time criteria; the duration between the start of a reformist campaign and time of escalation varies between 7
and 2527 days.
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Figure 5. A Typology of Different Maximalist Campaigns

Tripartite maximalist campaign: A reformist trigger results in sustained mass
mobilization against reformist measure(s) before escalating demands.

Reformist Trigger

Reformist Campaign

Maximalist campaign

Example: In 2018, angry Sudanese first mobilized against rising bread prices in
January following austerity measures. In December, the Sudanese government
again phased out wheat and fuel subsidies, resulting in tripling the cost of bread,
and the so-called “bread riots” continued. By the end of December, protesters
demanded the resignation of President Omar Al-Bashir.

Bipartite maximalist campaign: A reformist trigger leads to a sustained opposition
campaign against the incumbent leader or regime, without first seeking reformist
change.

Reformist Trigger

Maximalist campaign

Example: In April 2017, South African President Jacob Zuma’s cabinet reshuffle
and sacking of a respected finance minister sparked immediate anti-government
protests calling for Zuma to step down.

Unipartite maximalist campaign: A maximalist campaign occurs without a clear
reformist trigger

Maximalist campaign (maximalist from onset, no reformist trigger)
Example: In August 2017, thousands of Togolese took to the streets against the 50year rule of the Gnassingbe family, calling for political reforms ahead of the next
election and demanding the resignation of President Faure Gnassingbe.
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Identifying the reformist campaigns associated with maximalist movements
resulted in linking 13 existing reformist campaigns to their respective maximalist
campaigns and adding 26 new reformist campaigns to the database. 34 In the updated
3F

database, out of 460 maximalist campaigns, 223 (48%) had some sort of a reformist
trigger (either bipartite or tripartite), and among these, 39 (18%) had an associated
reformist campaign (tripartite). Put another way, out of 1641 reformist campaigns
seeking limited change for longer than a week, 39 (2.4%) escalated demands to become
maximalist campaigns. The EMEC dataset will be further elaborated upon and referred to
in subsequent chapters, but it was introduced early on to act as a backdrop in
differentiating escalated (tripartite) campaigns from other episodes of contention.
Tripartite maximalist campaigns are the focus of this research as they provide the space
to interrogate what happens in the interim of seeking something from the government to
challenging its authority.
Figure 6 plots all escalated campaigns by its start year, polity score of the country
in which it occurred, and region. There are no observable association, suggesting that
demand escalation is a phenomenon not limited to a certain era, regime type, or
geographical location.
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See Appendix B for the list of newly added reformist campaigns.
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Figure 6. Plot of Campaigns with Escalated Demands 35
34F
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Four points are missing as they do not have polity scores for the associated country-year.
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Chapter 3: Dynamic Theory of Demand Escalation

Why is it that tens of thousands of students took to the streets to protest
controversial laws 36 in both Indonesia and Hong Kong in 2019, and only Hong Kong
35F

experienced an escalation in demands to include the resignation of Hong Kong’s chief
executive, Carrie Lam? The answer to this puzzle becomes clearer when we disaggregate
the internal characteristics of the movements as well as state response. First, I introduce
campaign-related variables in EMEC to show that leadership, hierarchy, and cohesion are
distinct elements of a campaign that should not be conflated. Then, I incorporate a
discussion on the role of government responses to build the dynamic theory of demand
escalation.

3.1 Disaggregating Movement Structure
It goes without saying that no two campaigns are alike, and the characteristics of a
campaign can change over time. While movements and campaigns are often made up of
different factions with varying organizational structures, many scholars have treated
movement as unitary actors in applying a bargaining framework to analyze the interaction
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In Indonesia the protests were against new legislation that weakened the authority of the Corruption
Eradication Commission and a proposed criminal code that discriminated against minorities; in Hong Kong
the protests started over a proposed legislation of the 2019 Hong Kong extradition bill.
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of nonstate actors with states in ways similar to interstate conflict. 37 Recent works have
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started to challenge this assumption and taken disaggregation seriously; Cunningham
(2011, 280), for example, found that among a sample of campaigns making selfdetermination demands, “only 37% remained unified during most of their interaction
against the state.”
Whether the fissures occur along ethnic lines or the moderate-extreme spectrum,
most non-state parties in civil conflicts are often “shifting coalitions of groups with
malleable allegiances and at times divergent interests” (Pearlman and Cunningham 2012,
4). Not only is understanding internal structures important because most movements are
not unitary, but recent studies have found the internal structure of movements to be an
important dimension affecting conflict behavior (Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour
2012), intragroup competition and outbidding (Bloom 2004), defection and sideswitching (Staniland 2012), government response and dispute settlement (Cunningham
2011), peace negotiations and settlement (Kydd and Walter 2002, De Mesquita 2005,
Pearlman 2009), and post-war peacebuilding (Driscoll 2012), among others. I contend
that movement structure is also a crucial factor in demand escalation.
If movements are not homogenous entities, we can better conceive of contentious
campaigns as “strings of more or less connected events, scattered across time and
space…with various levels of formalizations, linked in patterns of interaction which run
from the fairly centralized to the totally decentralized, from the cooperative to the
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Fearon (1995) first introduced bargaining theory to the study of war and Walter (2009) has looked at the
bargaining failures that could occur in civil wars.
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explicitly hostile” (Diani 2003, 1). Among studies that prioritize disaggregation,
centralized-decentralized, cohesive-fragmented, hierarchical-flat are commonly used
spectrums along which organizational structures are conceptualized.
Centralized, cohesive, hierarchical movements are generally associated with
strong leadership and seen to have “the organizational power to mobilize mass
participation, enforce strategic discipline, and contain disruptive dissent” while
decentralized, fragmented, and flat campaigns lack “the leadership, institutions, and
collective purpose to coordinate and constrain its members (Pearlman 2011, 2). However,
I speculate that the presence or absence of leadership, hierarchy, and cohesiveness are
distinct characteristics of a movement that warrant individual and joint considerations.
Differentiating between these attributes matters all the more when trying to understand
the increasingly prominent type of “leaderless” campaigns that are often treated as
residuals of one or more of these characteristics.
In EMEC, I trained two research assistants to code several different movement
characteristics. 38 If these variables related to movement structure are highly correlated,
37F

then they may be describing the same feature of a movement and having distinct terms
would be redundant. However, after coding movement characteristics of the 233 bipartite
and tripartite maximalist campaigns, Figure 6 shows that having identifiable leaders, a
hierarchical structure, and movement cohesion are not all highly correlated. Having a
centralized or hierarchical structure is a feature of campaigns with leadership (no
campaign is coded as having a hierarchical structure without also having clear leaders),
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See Appendix A for the codebook.
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but not all campaigns with leaders are organized hierarchically, and campaigns need not
have leaders to be cohesive.
For example, under the organization of the Human Rights Consultative
Committee (HRCC) chaired by Undule Mwakasungula, Malawians formalized a 15-page
petition including a list of 20 reformist demands for President Bingu wa Mutharika to
address in 2011. Although the campaign had clear identifiable leadership, the campaign
was de-centralized and not hierarchical, as the HRCC operated as a loose confederation
of pre-existing organizations. Furthermore, it was incohesive, as evidenced by various
groups pursuing divergent campaign strategies particularly in the aftermath of extreme
state repression.
In contrast, the 2008 anti-US beef protests in South Korea started on university
campuses and quickly drew the support of the public. It lacked identifiable leadership,
but the campaign remained cohesive in its demands for the resumption of the ban on US
beef imports and later for President Lee Myung-bak’s resignation. Thus, disaggregation
of movement characteristics matters and when we conflate them, we miss out on
understanding which dimension is important for what function. For example, Ives and
Lewis (2020) argue that when protesters are “loosely connected” and lack an identifiable
hierarchy, they are more likely to break out into violence. But the degree to which group
cohesion, organizational structure, or leadership is doing the work is unclear.
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Figure 7. Correlation Plot of Movement Characteristics among Bipartite and Tripartite
Maximalist Campaigns

For the dynamic theory of demand escalation, I consider three dimensions that
provide campaigns with their “shape”. First, the diversity of participants in the campaign
matters to the extent that the campaign is seen as legitimate and representative of the
society at large (broad vs. narrow composition). Second, the overall cohesion and
agreement around desired goals and strategies is important for capturing divergent
interests and assessing the potential for unified action (cohesive vs. fragmented). Third,
the presence of identifiable leaders is important not only in terms of the direction and
discipline it can provide the movement, but also because it offers the opposition (i.e. the
government) someone to engage with (leader-led vs. leaderless).
Figure 8 (previously introduced in Chapter 1) shows that campaign composition
and internal cohesion provide four different movement configurations that determine a
movement’s escalatory potential. Among the combinations, I argue that campaigns that
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have a more diverse array of participants (are more representative of the general public)
have a higher potential to challenge the government because public support is crucial in
any opposition campaign (Stephan and Chenoweth 2008).
Movements derive power from a large and diverse base “because the more people
who are mobilized, the more the legitimacy of the authorities and their policies is called
into question” (Koopmans 1993, 653). In contrast, reformist campaigns that are only able
to draw a specific group of people to its cause have little chance of escalating demands
because it has little interest or incentive to do so. A narrowly composed campaign lacks
leverage in terms of popular support, and the government is not likely to take the
campaign more seriously if it escalated demands without broader appeal. Thus, the most
discriminating factor between reformist campaigns that escalate and those that do not
pertains to the campaign’s ability to attract broad segments of society to rally for its
cause.

Figure 8. Campaign Configurations and their Escalatory Potential
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However, among broadly comprised campaigns, I expect that campaigns that are
cohesive (vs. fragmented) will have higher escalatory potential, given their ability to
maintain a unified front. From gangs to armed rebel groups, factionalism and
fragmentation have consequences for any group that acts in the pursuit of a collective
interest, particularly if internal factions find themselves in a “dual contest” – competing
against the state they challenge but also struggling with in-group factions over political
relevance (Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour 2012). Infighting can divert “groups from
the aims for which they claim to be fighting,” and a lack of cohesion can undermine
“their potential for collective action” by redirecting energy inwards (Bakke, Cunningham,
and Seymour 2012).
The fragmentation research program has largely focused on nonstate actors in
armed conflicts and the effect of fragmentation has centered around violence, but ingroup fragmentation could be similarly debilitating for mass movements in non-violent
contexts. It is hard enough to sustain any mass campaign, and a fragmented one has an
added challenge of preventing each sub-group from going its own way. Therefore,
cohesive campaigns are likely to have an edge over fragmented ones in terms of having
the unity and energy needed to elevate their challenge on the state through escalating
demands. Having clear leadership is often associated with movement cohesion, but plenty
of leaderless movements are also cohesive, and this disaggregation allows the focus to be
put on the outward-facing role of leaders in representing and negotiating on behalf of the
movement at the next stage.
The potential for escalation is largely determined by the movement’s
configuration, but whether and how escalation is triggered depends on the interaction of
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movement leadership and government response. In terms of state responses, I argue that
regime violence elevates the escalatory potential (while its absence deactivates it), and
government concessions determine the escalatory path.

3.2 How Regime Response Elevates the Escalatory Potential
Escalation generally suggests an increase in intensity or severity, and it has been
conceptualized in a few different ways in the civil resistance and social movements
literature. Escalation can occur quantitatively to focus on numbers, size, and frequency
(e.g., incorporating greater numbers of participants, more diverse groups of participants,
longer duration of confrontation/engagement, and broader geographical coverage) or
qualitatively (Sørensen and Johansen 2016). If the starting point is unarmed civil
disobedience, qualitative escalation can remain nonviolent through the innovation of a
new method, creating a dilemma for the opponent, provocation, and persistence
(Sørensen and Johansen 2016, McAdam 1983), but escalation to violence, also known as
tactical escalation, has received the preponderance of analytical attention (Ron 2001,
O'Brien and Deng 2015, Hess and Martin 2006, Ryckman 2020).
In this section, I first survey the literature on tactical escalation to juxtapose it
with demand escalation. Similar to tactical escalation, I show that demand escalation is
more likely when the state responds to initial nonviolent action with disproportionate
force. But different from tactical escalation, demand escalation does not necessarily
emerge from a failure in the pre-escalation approach. I then describe the role of state
concessions and theorize how state attempts to accommodate a movement can also
backfire and facilitate demand escalation.
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3.2.1 Dissent-Repression Nexus
When people come together to challenge the government on some grounds, policy
or otherwise, opposing forces often try to stop them. State or pro-government agents can
use a number of different techniques to undermine burgeoning movements – such as
through limiting the flow of resources available to organizers, raising the cost of
participation, defiling the movement’s public image, instigating internal conflict, and
damaging morale, among others (Marx 1979). However, historically, the state’s preferred
method to counter or eliminate the behavioral threat has been to employ some form of
repressive action and this regularity has been termed the “law of coercive
responsiveness” – that is, dissent 39 increases repression 40 (Davenport 2007). 41
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State coercion can take many forms (e.g., bans, arrests, torture, harassment,
surveillance/spying, and mass killing) and regime violence can be actual or threatened,
but I focus on repression that is “observable” and directed against an opposition
campaign by state agents (Earl 2003). In general, repressive behavior can be thought of as
the application of state power that violates “First Amendment-type rights, due process in
the enforcement and adjudication of law, and personal integrity or security” (Davenport

39

Dissent, domestic conflict, opposition campaigns, resistance movements, anti-government campaigns,
and contentious activity, are used interchangeably to minimize redundancy.
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Repression, repressive behavior, state coercion, state violence, and regime violence, are used
interchangeably to minimize redundancy.
Some have started to challenge this “law-like” regularity, arguing that dissent and state repression are
endogenous and once empirical models are corrected for this endogeneity, the strong positive relationship
disappears (Ritter and Conrad 2016), or finding that the modal response of government to dissent is to
ignore it (Klein and Regan 2018).
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2007, 2), and these acts are often justified in the name of some political or military
objective – most notably, regime survival. Research on state repression has been built on
the assumption of rationality, with state violence often targeting “persons or
organizations viewed as presenting a fundamental challenge to existing power
relationships or key governmental policies, because of their perceived political beliefs”
(Goldstein 2001, xxviii).
The logic of state repression on mass movements is that as dissidents are met
with “paroxysms of state violence,” this dispels the immediate dissent by imposing costs
for further mobilization as well as deterring future dissident behavior through a
demonstration effect (Regan and Henderson 2002, 123, Tilly 1978, 100-102). Thus,
governments that exercise their monopoly on the use of force to minimize domestic
dissent do so largely through fear, using explicit and perceived threats of intimidation to
quiet actual and potential challengers, both in the present and the future.

3.2.2 When Repression Backfires
But repression is risky, and harming civilians, particularly those that are unarmed,
violates human rights and social norms which can solicit condemnation (Sutton, Butcher,
and Svensson 2014). To ensure that repression has its intended effect of reducing “the
internal threat to the regime’s rule” and allowing the state to maintain control
(Cingranelli and Richards 1999, 517), the state often couples its coercive actions with
strategies to diminish the likelihood and, or, the severity of backlash. These “methods of
inhibiting outrage” from the public include covering up their actions, devaluing the
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targets of the abuse, reinterpreting events for mass consumption, using official channels
to sound authoritative, as well as using intimidation and bribery (Hess and Martin 2006).
States often have the upper hand in the “credibility battle” 42 in which different
41F

sides attempt to portray and establish as truth their version of the facts of the repressive
event. But when an issue or incident “begins to escape elite definition and control” (Hess
and Martin 2006) and the state cannot credibly convince the public of their status as
defenders of law and order, state repression can become counterproductive. In such cases,
regime repression can backfire and fuel greater mobilization (McAdam, Tarrow, and
Tilly 2001, 69), leading to various negative outcomes for the regimes (Martin 2007,
Martin, Varney, and Vickers 2001, Nepstad 2011).
Backfire 43 is “an action that recoils against its originators,” and the outcome is not
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only worse than anticipated, but worse than having done nothing (Martin 2007). While
not all repressive acts backfire, state coercion meant to stifle dissent can paradoxically
empower a movement and weaken a regime if it is viewed as excessive and information
about repression is “communicated effectively to receptive audiences that are substantial
enough that authorities must take their outrage into consideration” (Hess and Martin
2006, 451). Movements can weaken the effectiveness of repression by mobilizing
backlash protests and using adaptive tactics to elude subsequent repression (Francisco
2004), and additional strategies for dissidents to increase the likelihood of backfire

Credibility refers to “the believability of claims and claims-makers” and more specifically, the “capacity
of claims-makers to enroll supporters behind their arguments, legitimate those arguments as authoritative
knowledge, and present themselves as the sort of people who can voice the truth” (Epstein 1996, 3).
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Backfire is also known as “moral jiu-jitsu” (Richard Gregg), “political jiu-jitsu” (Gene Sharp), and the
“paradox of repression” (Kurtz & Smithey).
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include articulating grievances in apolitical terms, “building clear lines of leadership
succession, and bridging social distance between a movement’s participants and domestic
and international groups” (Ackerman and Merriman 2014).
There are several different mechanisms at play in the backfire dynamic, but one
can think of the state and the opposition movement as being trapped in a zero-sum game
of fixed legitimacy. When a government uses violence against its own citizens, this can
be seen as arbitrary and “lower the government’s legitimacy and raise the society’s
revolutionary potential” (Greene 1974, 112). Gregg (1934) called this “moral ju-jitsu” to
signify the moral advantage that nonviolent actors have to throw powerful opponents off
balance, while Sharp (1973) renamed the dynamic “political ju-jitsu” to emphasize the
pragmatic advantages of nonviolent discipline in being able to make supporters of
uncommitted third parties, cause splits among the regime’s allies, and mobilize support
from members of the grievance group. Thus, repressive events may become
transformative for social movements to gain the upper hand (Hess and Martin 2006).
In addition to legitimizing the opposition and de-legitimizing the regime,
excessive government repression of nonviolent activities has been found to increase
violent activities (Lichbach 1987, Francisco 1995). As state agents follow a policy of
coercion, the policy itself may become the target of dissent, and the apathetic could
“become polarized, the reformers become radicalized, and the revolutionaries redouble
their efforts” (Lichbach 1987, 269). For example, when governments suppress nonviolent
movements, particularly those targeting vulnerable citizens such as the elderly, this can
produce a “protest spectacle” that draws in onlookers and new participants or supporters
to the movement; the result is greater mobilization and a noticeable radicalization of
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tactics on the part of the movement as they feel supported and empowered by the increase
in solidarity (O'Brien and Deng 2015).
Tactical escalation has been noted to take the form of terrorist violence (Tarrow
1989), political insurgency (White 1989), or armed conflict (Regan and Norton 2005),
and previous research has considered how the organizational capacity of opposition
movements can facilitate the transition of repressed dissent to civil wars, particularly in
ethnonational politics (Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch 2011, Cederman, Wimmer,
and Min 2010). However, tactical escalation may not be the only way that state violence
intensifies domestic dissent. I argue that demand escalation is another example of
repression backfire and I use a large-N analysis to test my hypotheses in the next section.

3.2.3 Testing the Link between State Repression and Demand Escalation
Taking the demands of a reformist campaign at face value, there is an underlying
trust in the government and hope that its leaders will enact or retract policies to meet their
demands. If the government then responds to these unarmed reformist campaigns with
disproportionate force, participants and observers of the campaign are likely to question
the allegiance of the incumbent regime and lose faith in the government’s willingness to
act on behalf of the people’s interests. As a result, a reformist campaign is likely to
escalate its claims from asking something of the government to demanding that it must
go.
Hypothesis 1: Contentious campaigns making reformist demands are more
likely to escalate their demands to maximalist claims when targeted with state
repression
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If demand escalation and tactical escalation are both triggered by state repression,
they can be considered alternatives. However, I hypothesize that they are not pure
substitutes as campaigns with violent flanks are less likely to escalate demands for two
reasons: because regime repression is less likely to backfire if a campaign has a
simultaneous violent flank, and because campaigns with violent flanks are more likely to
escalate tactically. Violent flanks, or contemporaneous armed challengers, have been
theorized to both help and hurt popular movements achieve maximalist change.
One reason why a violent flank might undermine the potential of maximalist
unarmed uprisings is because “nonviolent discipline among challengers is an important
requirement for backfire to occur” (Chenoweth and Schock 2015, 429). Repression
backfire hinges on outrage, and “outrage is maximized when the injustice is clear-cut”
(Hess and Martin 2006). When dissidents use violence, it contributes to the perception
that force is needed to restore order (Nepstad 2013). If potential third-party supporters of
the campaign perceive state repression to be legitimate, then they will not experience the
outrage needed to stand in solidarity with the campaign and regimes will have the tacit
approval to repress without repercussion.
Second, campaigns with violent flanks may escalate into armed conflicts for a few
reasons. In a campaign comprised of both moderate (nonviolent) and militant elements,
the more moderate elements tend to drop out first in a prolonged struggle, which could
shift “the balance of the core” and lead to violent radicalization of contention (Tarrow
2011, 206). Additionally, campaigns with violence wielding groups are better equipped to
withstand repression and are more likely to confront the state militarily given their
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capacity for violence (Ryckman 2020). Particularly when progress seems lacking using
nonviolent means, violence-wielding groups may take over and transform the movement
into a violent campaign (Ryckman 2020). Therefore, I expect that reformist campaigns
with violent flanks will be more prone to escalating with violence, and less likely to
escalate with demands; while reformist campaigns without violent flanks are more likely
to escalate through demands while remaining largely nonviolent.
Hypothesis 2: Reformist contentious campaigns with violent flanks are less
likely to escalate their demands to maximalist claims

To test these hypotheses, I conduct a regression analysis using the Enhanced
Major Episodes of Contention (EMEC) dataset. The unit of observation is a contentious
campaign defined as a series of events involving over a thousand participants and lasting
longer than a week. The universe of cases are all reformist campaigns from 1955-2018
that directed some or all demands to their own government. 44 I use the Penalized
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Maximum Likelihood Estimation (Firth method) as well as the Bias Correction method
(rare events logit) (King and Zeng 2001), as the dependent variable involves rare events
and low frequency data. I also include a non-penalized logit model, as some argue that
logistic regression models are suitable even for extremely rare events (Westphal 2013).
The outcome variable is a dichotomous variable “Escalated” coded as “1” if the
reformist campaign escalated to a maximalist campaign. The main independent variables
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If not otherwise specified, all variables are coded using historic newspapers and databases (i.e. NexisUni,
ProQuest, Global Nonviolent Action Database).
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pertain to regime violence and violent flanks, and both are also dichotomous variables.
“Regime Violence” (REGVIOL) is coded as “1” if the reformist campaign experiences
any kind of government repression, and “Violent Flank” (VIOLFLANK) indicates
whether a nonviolent reformist campaign had a radical (violent) flank.
Nineteen campaigns are coded as “missing” the violent flank variable as there are
19 violent reformist campaigns, and violent flanks only pertain to nonviolent
movements. 45 Political, Economic, Social, Electoral, and Other, are types of reformist
4F

demands. Each of these categories are dichotomous variables and most campaigns are
coded as having one dominant type of demand. 46 These demand types are included as
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control variables in the regression, as certain categories of reformist demands are
plausibly more likely to escalate to maximalist claims than others. For example, electoral
fraud has been found to be a particularly motivating trigger for citizens to mobilize
around, especially in oppressive societies, and campaigns pertaining to election results or
election laws could have a higher likelihood of escalating demands (Tucker 2007).
“Democracy” indicates whether the country in which the campaign occurred was
a democracy one year prior to campaign onset (as determined by a score of 6 or greater
on the Polity revised combined score (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2014)). This dummy
variable also serves as a control because political institutions have been found to
influence the risk of civil conflict, albeit with mixed evidence. For example, democracies
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These are excluded from the regression.
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However, the types of reformist demands are not mutually exclusive and some campaigns do have
multiple demands.
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have been noted to facilitate more extreme non-state action, such as terrorist violence, as
compared to authoritarian regimes (Tarrow 1989, Chenoweth 2013, Eubank and
Weinberg 2001, Li 2005, Chenoweth 2010, Findley and Young 2011, Young and Dugan
2011); but evidence for well-established democracies being safe from terrorism (Eyerman
1998) and failed states attracting terrorism (Piazza 2008) exist as well.
Although regime type has been found to condition different dynamics of the statedissent nexus, such as affecting the propensity to use state repression as well as to offer
concessions (Carey 2006), there is no theoretical prior for speculating how different
institutional settings are likely to influence demand escalation. Two other variables are
used as controls in the regression: the population of the country one year prior to
campaign onset (based on World Bank Development Indicators), and the number of
participants at the peak of the campaign. 47 Below is a summary table of all the variables
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included in the regression:

Table 1. Dichotomous Variables from EMEC
Variable
Escalated
Regime Violence
Political
Economic
Social
Electoral
Other
Violent Flank

Coded “0”
1601
1019
1230
764
1442
1537
1302
1149
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Coded “1”
39
621
410
876
198
103
338
472

Missing (NA)
-------19

The population and number of participants are collapsed into a single variable (participation/population)
and logged.
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Democracy

535

1060
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Table 2. Numeric Variables from EMEC
Total
Population
Number of
participants

Min.
175,600

Median
30,800,000

Mean
165,100,000

Max.
Missing
1,357,000,000 148

1,000

10,000

186,863

50,000,000

0

Across all three models, demand escalation is positively and significantly
correlated with regime violence (REGVIOL), and negatively and significantly correlated
with violent flanks (VIOLFLANK). Based on the standard logistic regression, the
likelihood of demand escalation is almost eight times higher 48 if a reformist campaign is
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violently repressed by the state. However, reformist campaigns with violent flanks are
61% 49 less likely to escalate demands, as compared to reformist campaigns without
48F

violent flanks.

Table 3. Model Estimates of the Likelihood of Demand Escalation
VARIABLES
REGVIOL
VIOLFLANK

(1)
(2)
(3)
Firth Method Rare Events Logit Logistic Regression
2.077***
(0.478)
-0.897**
(0.412)

2.077***
(0.515)
-0.897**
(0.421)

2.148***
(0.494)
-0.936**
(0.424)

48

The odds of a campaign escalating demands when it is repressed by the state: exp (2.148) = 8.57.
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The odds of a campaign escalating demands when it has a violent flank: exp (-0.936) = 0.39.
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POLITICAL
ECONOMIC
SOCIAL
ELECTORAL
OTHER
Log(PARTICIPANTS
/ POPULATION)
DEMOCRACY
Constant

Observations

0.925**
(0.400)
0.565
(0.417)
1.165**
(0.460)
1.002*
(0.524)
-0.655
(0.586)
0.097

0.929**
(0.415)
0.570
(0.449)
1.174**
(0.489)
1.013*
(0.590)
-0.636
(0.612)
0.097

0.936**
(0.414)
0.588
(0.434)
1.144**
(0.482)
0.960*
(0.554)
-0.796
(0.634)
0.100

(0.079)
-0.590
(0.375)
-3.455***
(0.955)

(0.084)
-0.588
(0.402)
-3.451***
(1.008)

(0.080)
-0.612
(0.384)
-3.556***
(0.981)

1,449
1,449
Standard errors in parentheses

1,449

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Based on the standard logistic model, the predicted probabilities of demand
escalation are as follows: 0.8% among reformist campaigns that do not have violent
flanks and are not repressed, 0.3% among reformist campaigns that have violent flanks
and are not repressed, 6% among reformist campaigns that do not have violent flanks and
are repressed, and 2.6% among reformist campaigns that have violent flanks and are
repressed. All else being equal, reformist campaigns are more likely to escalate demands
if they are violently repressed by the state, but reformist campaigns with violent flanks
are proportionately less likely to escalate demands, as compared to campaigns without
violent flanks.
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Figure 9. Predictive Probabilities of Demand Escalation

Given that state repression is not intended to fuel conflict, demand escalation is
another way that regime violence can backfire. The negative relationship between
reformist campaigns with violent flanks and escalating demands is expected because
backfire is less likely when a campaign fails to maintain nonviolent discipline, and
campaigns with violence wielding groups have a greater likelihood of escalating
tactically. A reformist campaign could also escalate demands and tactics concurrently,
but only five nonviolent reformist campaigns escalated to becoming a violent maximalist
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campaign (three of which had violent flanks) 50 and there seems to be a lot more tactical
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homogeneity over time than is often argued in the literature. Future research can address
the degree to which demand and tactical escalation are alternative strategies that a
movement can take when faced with state repression.
It is also worth noting that having reformist demands that are political, social, or
electoral in nature are also significantly and positively correlated to demand escalation
(political and social claims at an alpha of 0.05 and electoral claims at an alpha of 0.1);
ceteris paribus, reformist campaigns that seek economic redress or “other” 51 goals are
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less likely to escalate demands. One reason for this might be that the criterion for
economic demands is too broad and inclusive.
According to the codebook, there are four different sub-types in the “economic”
category: demands related to price or tax increases, economic corruption, labor or wage
disputes, and land tenure. While the categories are justifiable in that they all relate to the
production, consumption, or distribution of goods and services, some economic-based
grievances are much more threatening to people’s livelihoods than others. For example,
civil servants demanding a wage increase is fundamentally different from people
protesting the high cost of living because they cannot afford bread for their families

1967-72 Northern Ireland Nationalist campaign for equality → IRA/Irish Nationalists Campaign, 201617 Lawyers and Teacher’s Anglophone Strikes → Anglophone Crisis (Cameroon), 1988 Protests over
Declining Economy → Islamic Salvation Front (Algeria), 2011 Libyan Housing Protests → Libyan Civil
War, 1969-1971 East Pakistan Rights Campaign → Bengalis Campaign (Pakistan).
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“Other” claims are those that could not be categorized as “Electoral,” “Social,” “Economic,” or
“Political,” goals and are typically public policy concerns that are idiosyncratic or highly context specific.
Examples include issues related to spending on the World Cup (Brazil in 2014), privatization of water
(Bolivia in 2000), and unfunded prisons (France in 2018), among others.
51
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anymore. So, although plenty of maximalist campaigns have economic roots, the lack of
significant correlation between reformist economic claims and demand escalations could
be because most reformist campaigns with economic demands are not related to matters
of subsistence and not repressed by the state. Among all reformist campaigns, there are
876 campaigns that had economic claims and of these 241 campaigns (24%) were
repressed, while there were 410 campaigns that had political claims and of these 213
campaigns (52%) were repressed. 52
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Figure 10. Breakdown of Demands Among All Reformist Campaigns
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One caveat is that some campaigns had both political and economic claims; among 1640 total reformist
campaigns, 73 campaigns (4%) had both political and economic claims.
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Despite the similarities between demand and tactical escalation, however, there is
a noteworthy difference. In theorizing tactical escalation as a response to state coercion,
there is an assumption that nonviolence was not producing the desired results and the
opposition needed to do something else to regain momentum and leverage. 53 Ryckman
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(2019) more explicitly argues that slow or no progress encourages the turn to violence by
convincing the participants that nonviolence cannot achieve meaningful concessions. The
case of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) is often cited to show that their turn to violence
in the 1970s happened only after peaceful protests were violently repressed by British
troops (White 1989, 1993). White argues that the people’s support for violence develops
when they see peaceful protest as futile, and we can see this dynamic having occurred in
Hong Kong 2019 when protesters graffitied “it was you who taught me peaceful marches
did not work” in the Legislative Council. 54
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Demand escalation, on the other hand, does not necessarily follow from failure in
seeking reformist claims. Put another way, reformist campaigns can escalate to becoming
maximalist ones after receiving concessions from the government as well as when the
government refuses to accommodate the reformist claims. Of the 39 reformist campaigns
that escalated, 18 did so after failing to achieve any of its goals, but 15 escalated after
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Limited research has found that concessions can also lead to breakdown in nonviolent discipline, but this
was noted among campaigns active during periods of non-democratic rule in 14 specific countries from
1991-2012, of which nonviolent action was accommodated only 2.5% of the time (Pinckney 2016). Given
the limited generalizability, Pinckney admits to the inability to “offer specific suggestions why this might
be the case,” although he provides plausible mechanisms, such as concessions causing nonviolent
campaigns to lose focus, causing divisions and a breakdown in discipline, or splitting the movement among
moderates willing to be accommodated and those that want to pursue more radical goals by violent means
(39).
“Hong Kong protest: What LegCo graffiti tells us,” BBC News, July 2, 2019.
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-48836048 >.
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finding limited success (some concessions) from the government, and another 5 escalated
even after fully attaining their stated demands. The next section will unpack the logic of
state concessions and theorize how that too can backfire and embolden movements to
escalate demands.

3.2.4 The Role of State Concessions
In addition to the state’s monopoly on the use of force, the state also has
distributive power to allocate resources and the ability to meet the demands of most
campaigns. Scholars frequently interpret state concessions or accommodation as success
or partial success for an opposition movement. However, concessions are not just the
outcome of a dispute but rather “part of the strategic bargaining process” (Cunningham
2011, 276), and similar to repression, state concessions can also theoretically embolden
or weaken subsequent protest actions. I define concessions broadly to include any
government response that can be interpreted as “a measure of success” for the movement
(Thomas 2014, 806). Concessions go beyond a government’s willingness to engage and
negotiate, and include a leader admitting fault, certain members of the regime resigning
(by will or by force) to take the blame, and any other government response meant to
appease the movement and stop further mobilization. 55
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Concessions are by no means the modal response of the governments in dealing
with dissent, but the literature shows that the likelihood of governments accommodating

Others have also defined “state accommodation” broadly to encompass both low-intensity action (e.g.,
agreement to talk with the opposition) as well as high-intensity action (e.g., ending civil war) (Carey 2006).
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the demands of an anti-government campaign are also not negligible. In a study of seven
Latin American countries from 1981-1995, about 20% of protest events were
accommodated, in comparison to 30% that were met with repression (Franklin 2009). In
a study of nine African and Latin American countries (disaggregated into 18 sets) from
the late 1970s to the early 1990s, government accommodation followed protests in one
third of the sets, irrespective of regime type (Carey 2006). Governments also offered
concessions during the 1994-2003 Zapatista protests in Mexico (Inclán 2009) as well as
the Iranian Revolution in 1979 (Rasler 1996).
In deciding whether or not to make concessions to an ongoing campaign, the state
is likely to think strategically about how to minimize the costs put on them by the
ongoing dispute, 56 and concede as little as possible because there is also a cost to making
5F

the concession. The cost of concession could entail economic or political costs associated
with instituting or reverting a policy change, as well as a reputational cost that might
make future movements more likely to expect accommodation. Depending on state
resources, a state may enact or propose a variety of actions to appease a campaign.
Ryckman (2016) lists a range of available concessions to include: firing state officials,
reshuffling cabinets, promising reform, creating various committees, lowering the cost of
foodstuffs or giving financial benefits to individuals, scheduling elections, drafting new
constitutions, and lifting emergency law.

As mentioned in a footnote in Cunningham (2011): “these costs can be diverse, including loss of life and
resources devoted to fighting, diverted productivity from work stoppages, policing of protest activities, and
diminished political support” (276).
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The paradox of concessions is that the government is trying to offer the
movement something it wants in order to get them to stop mobilizing, but doing so could
embolden more dissent because individuals may be more likely to participate in
collective action if they perceive it as a way to obtain their desired outcome
(Klandermans 1984, Muller and Opp 1986). Prior studies have found support for
government concessions drawing more people to the streets based on this valueexpectancy model (Rasler 1996), and through the logic that government accommodations
could signal weakness “that is to be taken advantage of in the form of popular dissent”
(Carey 2006). In the case of Iran in 1977 and 1978, concessions by the Shah had a direct
effect in increasing both violent and nonviolent protest activity, the frequency of strikes,
and the geographical spread of contentious action (Rasler 1996).
Alexis de Tocqueville more broadly conjectured that reforming governments had
the greatest risk of facing a revolution because as conditions improve, frustration grows
more quickly (De Tocqueville 1955). Finkel and Gehlbach (2018) argued that this was
because the conditions for rebellion are facilitated when there is a discrepancy between
“what citizens expect and what they receive… when the complexity of reform
overwhelms the capacity of the state to carry it out, the implementation of reform will
typically fall short of its promise, producing feelings of loss that encourage rebellion
against those responsible.” While unfulfilled promises may play a role in turning the
people against the regime, there does not seem to be anything inherently dangerous about
government concessions.
Quite often, reformist campaigns are satisfied after the state gives them some or
all of what they want. In EMEC, among 1640 reformist campaigns, 772 achieved partial
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or complete success in terms of getting their stated demands, and 752 (97%) of these
campaigns did not further escalate their demands. So, when are movements likely to be
appeased by concessions versus emboldened to ask for more?

3.3 How Movement Leadership and Government Concessions Interact
The dynamic component of my theory pertains to campaign leadership and
government concessions and extends previous scholarship that shows how dissidents and
the state react to one another – sometimes escalating and other times deescalating conflict
(Moore 1998). As states try to minimize disruptions to the status quo while mass
movements strive to channel popular discontent into political and social change, the
resulting political order is likely to be the result of a bargaining process. The state-dissent
interaction has been conceptualized as a “bargaining situation in which either side, if
adequately disciplined and organized, can deny most of what the other wants” (Schelling
1968, 304).
In the strategic interplay between movement activists and the power holders
(Klein and Regan 2018), much of the maneuvering happens outside of direct engagement.
But in key moments of the bargaining process, one side can initiate direct contact.
Governments may be more willing to engage with nonviolent mass campaigns, because
“they do not threaten the lives or well-beings of members of the target regime” and they
appear more amenable to negotiation than their violent campaigns (Stephan and
Chenoweth 2008, 13). However, not all movements afford the state a chance at
negotiating settlement and this hinges on whether the movement has individuals who are
willing and able to represent the interests of the campaign.
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3.3.1 The Primacy of Leadership
Given the challenges associated with collective action, it is often assumed that
some sort of centralized leadership is required to coordinate mass action. Tarrow (1998,
3) stressed the importance of “organizers” who “use contention to exploit political
opportunities, create collective identities, bring people together in organizations, and
mobilize them against more powerful opponents.” Leaders have also been identified to
play crucial roles of defining goals, advancing strategies, and forging coalitions to
advance a group’s cause (Nepstad and Bob 2006). Some have argued that a unified
leadership system that is responsive to changing circumstances is what ultimately
determines the effectiveness of a movement (Selbin 2018), and Ives and Lewis (2020)
theorized how protest leaders exercise social controls to increase the efficacy of protests
towards success.
But there are also liabilities associated with having clear leadership. First, leaders
must have “sufficient credibility and authority so that their decisions do not generate
divisions that could undermine a movement’s capacity to act” (Nepstad 2011, 6). Clear
but factionalized leadership increases the likelihood of movement fragmentation and the
likelihood of infighting and “spoilers” when settlement is proposed (Pearlman and
Cunningham 2012). Additionally, campaigns with clear leadership are susceptible to
more attacks from the government, either in the form of lethal repression as governments
often target a movement’s leadership in an attempt to annihilate a movement altogether
(Bob and Nepstad 2007), or through informational warfare as governments try to create
divisions within the movement and tarnish the leaders’ credibility (Nepstad 2011, 17).
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Leaders can also have “incentives independent of the groups they represent,”
(Prorok 2016), and state actors may try to use inducements to co-opt leaders of
opposition groups (Gamson 1990, 32-33), in an attempt to “satisfy the greed and reduce
the grievance of politically restive groups” (Le Billon 2003, 420). Furthermore, among
self-determination campaigns, leadership has been deemed a necessary criteria 57 to
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maintain nonviolent discipline (Stephan 2006), but a strong, unified leadership can also
lead the movement into greater violence if the leadership itself is not “clearly and
consistently committed to maintaining a purely nonviolent strategy” (Pinckney 2016, 73).
Whether and what kind of leadership a movement has is an empirical question. In
focusing on the role of leaders, I am not adjudicating whether or not a campaign
definitively lacks leaders or leadership. I also do not argue that one if preferrable to
another. The “leader-led” and “leader-less” labels I use here are merely descriptive and
predicated on the identifiable presence of an individual or organization that is providing
strategy and leadership to a campaign.
In civil wars, the vast majority of rebel groups have been found to have
identifiable central leadership (Prorok 2016), and maximalist resistance campaigns are
expected to have discernible leadership that allows organized and coordinated action
(Stephan and Chenoweth 2008, 16). But having a “clear and uncontested leader” who can
make commitments about the future behavior of a movement is in no way a foregone
conclusion for opposition campaigns at large (Cunningham 2013, 664). In EMEC, out of
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Along with training and communication.
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223 maximalist campaigns with reformist triggers (bipartite and tripartite campaigns),
130 campaigns (58%) had identifiable leadership while 93 campaigns (42%) did not. 58
57F

In my theory, the fundamental difference between leaderless and leader-led
movements is that movements with clear, identifiable leadership provide the state an
opportunity to engage productively to negotiate a settlement. If the state invites
representatives of the movement to dialogue and adequately responds to some of their
demands, the leaders have made the protest participants better off, and both sides can
mutually adhere to the “fundamental bargain of civil resistance” and call off future
protests in exchange for political concessions (Wanis-St. John and Rosen 2017, 6).
However, if the state dismisses the campaign and refuses to engage with the
movement in any meaningful way, the protest leaders may consider a variety of strategies
to get the government’s attention. Doing more of the same or lowering demands are not
likely options, since the government signaled its refusal to engage with the initial set of
demands and the movement’s leaders face a reputational cost if it fails to deliver on
mobilization promises. 59 Existing research has shown that maximalist demands can
58F

increase the chance of achieving policy concessions (Ryckman 2016) and stronger
demands have the ability to impose higher costs on the state (Klein and Regan 2018).

There are two caveats in the “leadership” variable. First, the presence or absence of leadership does not
take into consideration factions. Multiple leaders (for multiple factions within a campaign) are
undifferentiated from a singular leader, as fragmentation is accounted for in the “cohesion” variable.
Second, the coding is heavily affected by reporting bias. Many more campaigns could have had identifiable
leaders in reality, but if that information was not reported in the news and not verifiable, then a campaign
was coded as lacking identifiable leadership.
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See Prorok (2016) for incentives that leaders have, outside of shared group interests, such as “incentives
to avoid punishments such as loss of power, exile, imprisonment, or death.”
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Therefore, campaign leaders may be more likely to escalate demands as part of a
bargaining strategy with the goal of getting the government to engage.

Figure 11. State Response and Escalatory Paths
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Leaderless campaigns differ on several fronts. First, as protesters self-mobilize
over a reformist cause, they are not fully aware of their potential bargaining power. The
modal response of any government to protest activity is to disregard them (Klein and
Regan 2018, Franklin 2009), and if the government ignores the people’s limited demands
and tolerates resistance (Cai 2010), individuals are likely to think that they do not have
enough leverage to contend with the government and lower their expectation of success
(Franklin 2009). If the government further uses “tactics of attrition” to nonviolently wear
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out and increase the cost of protests (e.g., through maintaining elite cohesion, mobilizing
counter-movements, and leveraging legal interventions) (Yuen and Cheng 2017), the
movement is likely to weaken and dissolve over time without a central figure to
encourage continued mobilization.
However, if the government decides to accommodate some of the movement’s
requests out of fear or seeing them as legitimate, the masses are likely to feel empowered
to demand more, thus triggering concession backfire. Because the government has no
individual or organization to negotiate with when faced with de-centralized movements,
whatever concession the government makes is a unilateral decision meant to appease the
protesters. Based on prior experience, governments may assume that political concessions
will quell the masses and mitigate direct action (Wanis-St. John and Rosen 2017, 6), but
there is no mediator or movement leadership to translate the government’s thinking to
meet them half way.
A few different mechanisms (as referenced in “The Role of State Concessions”
section) link government concessions to demand escalation – 1. protest participants may
feel emboldened by their own success in extracting concessions from the government and
ask for even more; 2. protest observers may feel emboldened by the success of the
people’s movement and facilitate escalation through mobilization; and 3. concessions
may be interpreted as a sign that the government lacks resolve, thereby providing a
potential political opportunity to further fracture and divide the government by
demanding leader removal.
In a leaderless campaign, individuals are likely to perceive participating in a mass
movement to be “rational” if it is seen as an effective “way to obtain desired outcomes”
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(Klandermans 1984). Because people’s expectations are based on experience, the logical
response to limited concessions from the government would not be to demobilize, but to
continue asking for more. This logic extends beyond the participants of the reformist
campaign to bystanders who observe the dynamic. Government concessions to highly
visible campaigns can enhance their perceived influence, causing previous observers to
join them for future mass action (Muller and Opp 1986). When there is no dialogue
between the government and the campaign, information can only be inferred from action.
When a leaderless movement receives concessions from the state, they have newfound
knowledge of their bargaining power – they will not be ignored.
The disaggregation used here puts emphasis on the presence or absence of
individuals who have the external and internal legitimacy to represent the movement at
large. While there are meaningful differences between protests that have clear leadership
and those that do not, this project takes for granted that their escalatory potential and
ability to draw concessions from the government are not predefined. The comparability
of the two types can be noted by their interchangeability – some movements that start out
centralized can fracture as the campaign progresses, and similarly, some movements that
start out de-centralized can coalesce around clear leadership over time.
What is crucial for my theory is whether or not movement leadership exists at the
moment when the government desires to address the opposition’s demands and at the
moment when the movement’s demands change from being reformist to maximalist.
Leaders are motivated to achieve something and face a heavy reputational cost if they do
not “win” anything for the group that they claim to represent. Therefore, movements with
clear leadership are more likely to settle when the government offers concessions, and
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more likely to escalate demands when the government ignores their reformist agenda
(through strategic calculation). In contrast, movements without identifiable leaders are
both unable and unwilling to compromise and are more likely to go big or go home.
Therefore, leaderless movements are more likely to escalate demands when the
government offers concession (through organic exacerbation), and more likely to dissolve
over time if they are ignored.

3.3.2 Example of Demands Escalating through Strategic Calculation
In Malawi 2011, what started out as protests for various reforms ranging from
electoral changes, economic development, and anti-corruption measures, 60 eventually
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escalated to calling for President Bingu wa Mutharika’s resignation. When the protests
started in June 2011, calling for leader removal was not predetermined or inevitable. The
Malawians just wanted their concerns addressed and even Malawi’s Vice-President Joyce
Banda recognized this and “called on the government to open up to more constructive
and positive dialogue so that Malawians could amicably solve their problems and achieve
long-lasting and mutually beneficial results.” 61 However, the protests were severely
60F

repressed from the outset, with the Malawi police using “unnecessary lethal force against

“July 20 Protesters Demands,” Malawi Today, July 22, 2011.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20141222161648/http://www.malawitoday.com/news/896-july-20-protestersdemands>.
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Silwamba, Chibaula. “Malawi’s V/President backs protests,” The Post Online – Zambia, July 24, 2011.
<https://web.archive.org/web/20120911073627/http://www.postzambia.com/postread_article.php?articleId=22220>.
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initially peaceful protests.” 62 Far from acknowledging the people’s grievances, Mutharika
61F

accused the protesters of “working for Satan” 63 and vowed to “use any measure [he
62F

could] think of” to quell the demonstrations. 64
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The campaign had an identifiable leader and organizer, the Human Rights
Consultative Committee (HRCC), a group of 80 human rights and civil society
organizations chaired by Undule Mwakasungula. There were multiple leaders in the
campaign and they all received death threats and many went into hiding “for their
personal safety and that of their family’s after the president said he would arrest them,”
according to a rights activist and protest organizer, Moses Mkandawire. 65 Harsh
64F

repression had a polarizing effect for the campaign.
The movement was comprised of many members of civil society ranging from
university students, academics, workers, and members of religious institutions, but it was
not very cohesive. 66 Government repression was successful in forcing a change in
65F

opposition strategy and fracturing the HRCC coalition, as certain groups attempted to
negotiate with the government rather than risk more repression. Fueled by the lack of

“Malawi: Use Restraint in Upcoming Protests,” Human Rights Watch, August 17, 2011.
<https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/08/17/malawi-use-restraint-upcoming-protests>.
62

63

Ibid.

“Malawi army deployed over anti-Mutharika protests,” BBC News, July 21, 2011.
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14231251>.
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“Malawi president given ultimatum,” Al Jazeera, July 26, 2011.
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/7/26/malawi-president-given-ultimatum>.
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engagement and continued indifference to the people’s plight, campaign leaders
announced an ultimatum for Mutharika to address their grievances or face more
protests. 67
6F

For the segment of the campaign that wanted to escalate demands, it is
noteworthy that the case for continued protests was not the original 20-point petition that
was demanded of the government. Rather, it was Mutharika’s strong hand and his
inattention of the reformist campaign that became the target of further action. Macdonald
Kadawati, head of the Public Affairs Committee, an umbrella group of Christian and
Muslim activists said, “should government continue to harass people for no proper
reasons, another demonstration will be inevitable.” 68 When the national dialogue
67F

facilitated by the United Nations failed to address the people’s grievances, 69 the Public
68F

Affairs Committee (PAC) asked President Mutharika to resign or face more civil
disobedience. 70
69F

3.3.3 Example of Demands Escalating through Organic Exacerbation
In contrast, the Anti-Kérékou Campaign in Benin (MEC ID: 27/2756) is an
example of organic exacerbation. First, the campaign attracted broad public support with
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students, teachers, civil servants, and opposition party members all taking part in strikes
related to the failing economy. The government responded early on with repression,
taking away jobs of protesters and threatening to defeat the demonstrators with force,
thus meeting the necessary conditions of demand escalation. 71 The campaign as a whole
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had broad appeal but it was also leaderless and fragmented. Different groups essentially
represented themselves and negotiating with one segment (students, teachers, or civil
servants) could not control the behavior of other parts of the movement. The government
started offering major concessions in August, when President Mathieu Kérékou reformed
the government and an amnesty law was passed which released around 100 members of
the banned Communist Party of Dahomey from prison (Bierschenk 2009, 3). However,
there is no evidence that these measures were negotiated outcomes and thus they did not
have the intended effect of appeasing the campaign.
Evidence of growing grievances can be noted in the teachers’ letter to President
Kérékou at the end of August, which reiterated demands for the payment of salary arrears
as well as “repatriate[ing] money invested in other countries and identify[ing] people who
had tortured and killed demonstrators earlier in the year.” 72 The growing demands
71F

reflected displeasure towards the government’s heavy hand on the initial reformist protest
and the people’s growing distrust towards the regime. On November 30, Kérékou gave
his usual annual keynote address, which contained vague promises of reform (Bierschenk

“Beninese campaign for economic justice and democracy, 1989-90.” Global Nonviolent Action
Database. <https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/beninese-campaign-economic-justice-anddemocracy-1989-90>.
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2009), and on December 7, the government renounced its Marxist-Leninist ideology and
announced political reforms for the new year. But instead of calming the situation, both
concessions backfired, provoking major demonstrations in many of the country’s cities
on December 2, and stimulating 40,000 strong demonstrations against the government on
December 11. 73
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3.4 Repression-Concession Ricochet?
It could be that concessions have a general reactive effect in fueling demand
escalation when government concessions come in the heels of brutal repression,
irrespective of movement leadership. Lichbach (1987, 287) argued that inconsistent
government policies increased dissent and described many prerevolutionary regimes
“incoherently mix[ing] reform (accommodation) and reaction (repression)” to weaken the
regime and facilitate revolution.
Lichbach anchored his argument in a rational choice model with the opposition
group weighing the costs and benefits of violent and nonviolent tactics. Others have
similarly argued that “when state behavior is erratic, it sends a noisy signal to dissidents,
making it hard to assess the likely costs of their actions” (Cunningham and Beaulieu
2010, 179). 74 While my argument has less to do with dissidents opting for the less costly
73F

action, the observable implication is the same: when governments mix and match
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However, not all studies argue that inconsistent government actions advantages movements. Inclán
(2009) finds that the inconsistent use of repressive threats and procedural concessions contributed to the
Zapatista movement’s relative weakness
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repression and concession on the same movement there will likely be a change in
approach, in this case, in the form of escalated demands.
In my argument, the focus is on what happens when reformist campaigns are first
repressed then tried to be appeased. As described previously, state repression elevates the
level of people’s grievance against the regime and increases the escalatory potential.
While early efforts at accommodation might have turned away wrath, offering
concessions when distrust and disdain toward the government are mounting is likely to
anger the opposition and fuel more confrontation. People cannot be expected to check
their emotions in challenging the state, and rather than dismiss them as too amorphous,
emotions should be recognized for the role it can play in coordinating “motivations and
effectively point[ing] a legion of individuals in one particular direction” (Petersen 2002,
3).
Emotional mechanisms – particularly those of fear, hatred, resentment, and rage –
have been used to explain ethnic violence, and here I focus on the role of anger and
disappointment as additional emotional mechanisms that can coordinate political
behavior – particularly in leaderless mass action. Thus, when state response leads with
the fist, delayed concessions are not likely to be seen as acts of good will and the
campaign is unlikely to be appeased by them. Once the people lose trust in the incumbent
regime, government concessions are more likely to be interpreted as acts of weakness or
desperation that the emboldened movement uses to push for greater change. In this way,
repression douses a campaign in fuel and concessions either provide the trigger for
demands to escalate or fans the flames of an already escalated campaign.
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For example, on April 22, 2018, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega cancelled
the welfare reform package that set off days of deadly protests, 75 but the very next day
74F

saw the largest anti-government mobilization against the Ortega government. 76
75F

Cancelling the welfare-overhaul initiative did little to appease the demonstrators whose
anti-regime sentiments were already inflamed by the state’s use of violence on the largely
nonviolent campaign. 77 Contrary to government intention, the concession served as a
76F

catalyst for demands to grow and encompass the release of jailed protesters in addition to
Ortega’s resignation.
The qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) in the next chapter will assess the
degree to which the movement leadership matters in this repression-concession ricochet.

3.5 Conclusion
A campaign’s configuration and a government’s response both matter in
understanding demand escalation. The potential for escalation is largely determined by
the movement’s characteristics and whether the state responds to the initial reformist
campaign with excessive force. The escalatory path then depends on government
concessions and campaign leadership. This chapter has argued that demand escalation is
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another variant of escalation that is triggered by state repression. However, demand
escalation differs from tactical escalation in that the former can occur after winning
government concessions, whereas the latter is largely premised on unfruitful government
engagement.
In terms of the concession-dissent nexus, I balance the existing literature that
shows how governments strategically use concessions to divide movements
(Cunningham 2011) to argue that movements can also use concessions to further mass
action. When a government tries to accommodate a campaign unilaterally, concessions
can backfire and act as a catalyst for demands to escalate if state repression has already
turned the people’s hearts away from the government. In this sense, not all maximalist
campaigns are predetermined, and it matters how a government chooses to engage with a
reformist campaign to temper broader criticism of the regime.
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Chapter 4: Theory Testing using Truth Tables and Qualitative Comparative Analysis

In this chapter I evaluate my proposed theory with competing hypotheses derived
from the literature through the use of truth tables and qualitative comparative analysis
(QCA). A truth table lists all possible combinations of conditions (akin to dichotomously
coded independent variables) to indicate the presence or absence of plausible causal
factors. QCA is a methodology that bridges the qualitative and quantitative divide in
social science research and uses a Boolean algorithm to identify minimal causal
configurations to explain a particular phenomenon. This methodology provides a way to
test all possible causal combinations and eliminate irrelevant factors by way of logical
deduction, and further allows relevant factors to be differentiated between necessary and
sufficient conditions in producing the outcome of interest. The method of QCA has been
successfully used in conflict research where context dependence and the interaction
between different conditions matters (Ide 2015, Ide et al. 2020, Ide, Kristensen, and
Bartusevičius 2021).
Perhaps the most important advantage of the QCA approach is its ability to
embrace equifinality: this methodology is suitable even when multiple causal factors and
mechanisms produce the same outcome and helps identify factors that may be
substitutable. For example, a toddler could throw a temper tantrum, lie to her parents, or
refuse to eat dinner to be put in timeout. Each behavior is enough to get her in trouble,
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but in the regression approach, the expectation is that the more each behavior is present,
the more likely the toddler will be put in timeout. Additionally, if there is
multicollinearity among the independent variables, relevant factors are likely to be
deemed irrelevant, based on a regression output. In contrast, QCA would conclude that
the three conditions in the hypothetical example are causally equivalent. The focus is on
the presence or absence of conditions, rather than frequency or severity, and the aim is to
examine cases configurationally.
In QCA, set membership is calibrated using empirical evidence and here, all data
is derived from EMEC, which uses contemporaneous news reports, historical accounts,
and global datasets to code whether a campaign is observed to have each of the
conditions in question. If a reader disagrees with how certain campaigns are coded, one
can easily determine whether the analysis results are subject to change after
recalibration. 78 While partial or fuzzy set memberships are also possible, I use a “crisp7F

set” QCA in which all conditions are binary because when the relevant outcome is
dichotomous (e.g., whether or not a reformist campaign escalated demands), fuzzy-set
analysis is mathematically infeasible (Ragin 2009).
EMEC lists 39 instances of demand escalation between 1955 and 2018. Although
there is both a reformist and a maximalist campaign associated with demand escalation,
here, the reformist campaign is treated as the unit of observation to assess the conditions
of demand escalation hypothesized in the last section. I first analyze the literatureinformed variables using a truth table to show their limitation in explaining demand
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escalation. I then conduct a more comprehensive analysis to compare the determinants of
campaigns that escalated with those that did not escalate.

4.1 Testing Competing Hypotheses
Table 4 lists the countries in which escalated campaigns occurred, the start and
end years of the reformist campaign, and the variables that the literature suggests may be
important to explaining demand escalation: whether the reformist campaign presented
multiple demands for the state to address, whether an opposition political party played a
leading role in the reformist campaign, whether the state in which the reformist campaign
occurred was a democracy, 79 and whether the state had a poorly functioning economy. 80
78F
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The expectation is that reformist campaigns escalate into maximalist ones when there are
multiple grievances, an opposition party takes the lead, and the country is a nondemocracy facing an economic crisis.
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VDEM (Coppedge et al. 2020).
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Table 4. Reformist Campaigns that Escalated Demands between 1955-2018, with Literature-Derived Variables

Country
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1. Algeria
2. Algeria
3. Argentina
4. Bangladesh
5. Benin
6. Bolivia
7. Bolivia
8. Brazil
9. Burkina Faso
10. Cameroon
11. China
12. Colombia
13. Ecuador
14. Ecuador
15. Egypt
16. Estonia
17. France
18. Greece
19. Guatemala
20. Guinea

Start Year End Year Multiple
Demands?
1988
1988
Yes
2011
2011
Yes
1977
1983
Yes
1972
1975
No
1989
1989
No
1981
1981
Yes
1983
1985
No
2014
2015
No
2014
2014
No
2016
2017
No
1989
1989
Yes
1958
1964
No
1997
1997
No
2005
2005
Yes
2002
2004
No
1987
1988
No
2018
2018
No
1973
1973
No
1993
1993
Yes
2007
2007
No
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Opposition
Led?
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes

Democracy? Poor
Economy?
No
No
No
No
No
No
-Yes
No
Yes
No
-Yes
-Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes

Combination
ABcd
Abcd
ABcd
-aBcD
--aBCd
aBcD
abcD
AbcD
aBCd
abCD
AbCD
abcd
abcd
abCd
abcd
AbcD
aBcD
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21. Haiti
22. Hong Kong
23. Japan
24. Libya
25. Malawi
26. Malawi
27. Moldova
28. Nicaragua
29. N. Ireland
30. Pakistan
31. Serbia
32. South Korea
33. Sudan
34. Thailand
35. Turkey
36. Venezuela
37. Yugoslavia
38. Yugoslavia
39. Zambia

2018
2014
1959
2011
1955
2011
2015
2018
1967
1969
2017
2006
2018
1991
2013
1991
1988
1990
1955

2018
2014
1960
2011
1957
2012
2016
2018
1972
1971
2017
2012
2018
1992
2013
1992
1990
1990
1960

No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes

No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
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No
No
Yes
No
-Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
--

No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
-No
No
No

abcd
abcD
abCd
Abcd
-AbCD
AbCD
abCd
AbCd
aBcD
ABCd
abCd
abcd
aBcd
ABCd
-Abcd
abcd
--

Table 5. Truth Table of Literature-Derived Conditions (only for Escalated Campaigns) 81
80F

80
81

A: Multiple
Demands
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Conditions
B: Opposition-led C. Democracy D: Poor
Economy
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
1
0
1
1
1
0
1
1
1

No. of nonescalated cases
-

No. of
escalated cases
6
2
4
1
1
4
2
0
3
2
1
3
2
0
2
0

Outcome Code
1
1

1

1

1

Campaigns that had missing values are excluded from the truth table (6 campaigns had democracy levels or economic conditions that could not be ascertained).

80

Following convention, an upper-case letter indicates the presence of a condition
and a lower-case letter indicates its absence. Among the literature-derived conditions, A
= multiple demands, B = led by an opposition party, C = occurring in a democracy, and D
= occurring in poor-economic conditions. From Tables 4 and 5, the most common
combination is “No-No-No-No” or “abcd”: not having multiple demand, not led by an
opposition party, and occurring in a non-democracy that did not have poor economic
conditions. Six campaigns 82 had this combination of factors.
81F

Other common combinations include: four instances of abCd (single demand, not
led by an opposition party, occurring in a democracy that did not have poor economic
conditions), four instances of aBcD (single demand, led by an opposition party, occurring
in a non-democracy with poor economic conditions), three instances of Abcd (multiple
demands, not led by an opposition party, occurring in a non-democracy that did not have
poor economic conditions), and three instances of AbCD (multiple demands, not led by
an opposition party, occurring in a democracy with poor economic conditions). The
combinations which occur three or more times are stated in Equation 1 and simplified in
Equation 2. 83
82F

Demand escalation (lit. variables) = abcd + abCd + aBcD + Abcd + AbCD (1)
Demand escalation (lit. variables) = abd + bcd + aBcD + AbCD

(2)

82

Egypt 2002-2004, Estonia 1987-1988, Greece 1973-1973, Haiti 2018-2018, Sudan 2018-2018,
Yugoslavia 1990-1990
83

Although all occurring combinations could be included in the analysis, discounting categories with
infrequent occurrences is a way to introduce “a more demanding standard” for accepting the conditions
causing the outcome of interest (Chan 2003). This threshold is applied for all subsequent analysis.
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Looking at the dominant combination (“abcd”), only one factor among the
theoretical expectations derived from the literature is salient – occurring in a nondemocracy. However, in conjunction with other combinations that also produced
escalated demands, “abcd” and “abCd” can be simplified to “abd” which makes “C”
(whether the campaign occurred in a democracy) irrelevant. A campaign is likely to
escalate demands if it has a single reformist demand, is not led by an opposition party,
and occurs in a country that does not have poor economic conditions. Similarly, “abcd”
and “Abcd” can be simplified to “bcd” which makes “A” (whether the campaign had
multiple demands) irrelevant; a campaign is likely to escalate when it is not led by an
opposition party and occurs in a non-democracy without poor economic conditions,
regardless of how many demands it starts with.
Thus, the literature derived variables do not help us understand demand
escalation, at least not in the way of validating expected hypotheses. Not only is there no
instance of “ABcD,” which the literature suggests would be most likely to bring about
demand escalation, the fact that “abd” (a combination that goes directly against
expectations derived from the literature) accounts for two of the most commonly
occurring combination of demand escalation (ten campaigns) shows evidence of its
limitations.
The case that best matches the theoretical expectations might be the campaign in
Benin 1989, which had a combination of “aBcD”, exhibiting three of the four
characteristics derived from the literature. In early 1989, Benin faced growing economic
troubles with the government failing to pay many public servants, which prompted a
series of strikes. Although the grievances were singular in type, demanding payment of
82

salaries and grants, 84 discontent was widespread with a teachers’ strike followed by a
83F

students’ strike, and then a civil servants’ strike. The labor unions and the Communist
Party of Benin played pivotal roles in mobilizing the movement through circulating
leaflets and eventually calling for the democratization of the government and the
overthrow of President Kérékou. However, focusing on the opposition party, the regime
type, and the poor economic context leaves much to be desired in terms of understanding
why and how demands escalated.

4.2 Testing the Dynamic Theory of Demand Escalation
Table 6 lists the same 39 campaigns as above, but with variables about movement
configuration and government response that are related to the dynamic theory of demand
escalation: whether the reformist campaign had identifiable leadership, whether the
campaign had broad membership (i.e. composed of more than four specific groups of
people or evidence of general public involvement), whether the campaign was cohesive,
and whether the government offered concessions and/or responded with repression to the
reformist campaign.

84

“Beninese campaign for economic justice and democracy, 1989-90.”
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Table 6. Reformist Campaigns that Escalated Demands between 1955-2018, with Variables from the Dynamic Theory of Demand
Escalation

Country

84

Start
Year
1. Algeria
1988
2. Algeria
2011
3. Argentina
1977
4. Bangladesh
1972
5. Benin
1989
6. Bolivia
1981
7. Bolivia
1983
8. Brazil
2014
9. Burkina Faso 2014
10. Cameroon
2016
11. China
1989
12. Colombia
1958
13. Ecuador
1997
14. Ecuador
2005
15. Egypt
2002
16. Estonia
1987
17. France
2018
18. Greece
1973
19. Guatemala
1993

End
Year
1988
2011
1983
1975
1989
1981
1985
2015
2014
2017
1989
1964
1997
2005
2004
1988
2018
1973
1993

Clear
Leader?
Yes
No
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No

Broad
Comp?
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

84

Cohesive? Gov.
Concession?
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Gov.
Repression?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Combination
AbcDE
aBcDE
aBCDE
ABCdE
aBcDE
ABCDE
AbCDe
aBCDE
ABCDE
ABCDE
abCdE
AbCdE
ABCDE
ABCdE
aBCdE
ABCDE
aBcdE
abCDE
aBCDE
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20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Guinea
Haiti
Hong Kong
Japan
Libya
Malawi
Malawi
Moldova
Nicaragua
N. Ireland
Pakistan
Serbia
S. Korea
Sudan
Thailand
Turkey
Venezuela
Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia
Zambia

2007
2018
2014
1959
2011
1955
2011
2015
2018
1967
1969
2017
2006
2018
1991
2013
1991
1988
1990
1955

2007
2018
2014
1960
2011
1957
2012
2016
2018
1972
1971
2017
2012
2018
1992
2013
1992
1990
1990
1960

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
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No
No
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

AbCdE
ABcdE
ABCdE
ABCdE
ABCDE
ABcdE
ABcdE
aBcDe
ABCDE
ABCDE
ABcDE
aBCde
aBCDE
aBCdE
aBCDe
aBCDE
aBcDE
ABCdE
ABCDE
ABcDE

Table 7. Truth Table of Conditions from the Dynamic Theory of Demand Escalation (only for Escalated Campaigns)

A: Leader

86

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1

B: Broad
Composition
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0

Conditions
C. Cohesion
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0

D: Gov.
Concession
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
86

E. Gov.
Repression
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0

No. of nonescalated cases
-

No. of
escalated cases
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
1
1
3
1
2
1
5
0
0
0

Outcome
Code

1

1

87

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1

1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1

1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1

87

-

1
0
2
1
0
0
3
0
2
0
5
0
9

1

1
1

I conduct two different analyses to test the dynamic theory of demand escalation.
First, similar to the literature-derived variables, I consider all common combinations of
demand escalation to evaluate the different ways in which demand escalation has
occurred. Then, I compare the combinations of campaigns that escalated demands with
those that did not to note their similarities and differences in identifying the combinations
more likely to escalate demands.
In Tables 6 and 7, A = campaign had an identifiable leader, B = campaign had
broad membership among the public, C = campaign was largely cohesive, D =
government offered concessions to the campaign, and E = government responded to the
movement with targeted or widespread repression. The combinations associated with
three or more campaigns that escalated demand escalations are stated in Equation 3 and
simplified in Equations 4 and 5.
Demand escalation = aBcDE + aBCDE + ABcdE + ABCdE + ABCDE

(3)

Demand escalation = BE(acD + aCD + Acd + ACd +ACD)

(4)

Demand escalation = BE(aD + Ad +AC+CD)

(5)

Among my variables, the most common combination is “Yes-Yes-Yes-Yes-Yes”
or “ABCDE”: having an identifiable leader, having broad membership among the public,
being cohesive, receiving concessions from the government, and being repressed by the
government. Nine campaigns 85 had this combination of factors. Other common
84F
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Bolivia 1981-1981, Burkina Faso 2014-2014, Cameroon 2016-2017, Ecuador 1997-1997, Estonia 19871988, Libya 2011-2011, Nicaragua 2018-2018, N. Ireland 1967-1972, Yugoslavia 1990-1990
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combinations include: five instances of aBCDE and ABCdE, and three instances of
aBcDE and ABcdE. Each combination of demand escalation had “B” and “E” in
common, which shows that these are the two necessary conditions for demand escalation:
a broadly comprised movement (“B”) and the violent repression of the reformist
campaign (“E”).
Equation 5 shows that there are four predominant paths to demand escalation.
While “B” and “E” are necessary conditions, they are not sufficient to bring about
demand escalation. In addition to the movement having broad public appeal and
experiencing disproportionate state repression, in order for a reformist campaign to
escalate demands, the campaign must also be leaderless and receive concessions from the
state, be leader-led and not receive any concessions, be leader-led and cohesive, or be
cohesive and receive concessions from the government. In this sense, aD, Ad, AC, and
CD are causally equivalent when combined with B and E to bring about demand
escalation. To check that these combinations are not common across all reformist
campaigns and specific to campaigns that escalated demands, I compare the conditions of
campaigns that escalated demands with those that did not escalate in the next section.

4.2.1 Comparing Campaigns that Escalated Demands with Non-Escalated Campaigns
To conduct a comparative analysis, I matched each escalated campaign with a
reformist campaign that did not escalate. The selection for matching included identifying
the closest reformist campaign (occurring before or after a corresponding escalated
campaign) in the same country that had either similar demands and/or had similar
numbers of peak participation. If there was more than a 30-year difference between an
89

escalated campaign and the next closest reformist campaign in the same country, another
campaign in a different country (but in the same region) was selected that had similar
onset years and claim type(s). Table 8 lists the 39 escalated campaigns with matched
campaigns that did not escalate demands.
Table 9 presents the truth table for both the escalated and non-escalated
campaigns, which lists all 32 combinations of the five factors hypothesized to influence
demand escalation. It indicates the number of campaigns that occurred under each
combination of factors for 39 reformist campaigns that escalated demands along with 39
matched reformist campaigns that did not escalate demands. Some combinations are not
associated with any reformist campaigns, and some combinations are associated with
both campaigns that escalated demands and those that did not escalate demands.
The last column of Table 9 codes the outcome according to the preponderance of
evidence; it is coded “1” when three or more 86 campaigns escalated demands and this
85F

exceeds the number of campaigns that did not escalate, “0” when three or more
campaigns did not escalate demands and this exceeds the number of campaigns that did,
and the column is left blank when there are two or fewer historical instances of these
combinations. Table 10 is a simplified truth table of Table 9 that shows only observed
combinations with three or more instances of either escalated or non-escalated
campaigns.

86

I discount the combinations with infrequent occurrences to set a more demanding standard for accepting
conditions causing demand escalation (see Chan (2003, 61) for this suggestion).
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Table 8. List of Escalated Reformist Campaigns with Matched Campaigns that did not Escalate
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Country
(Escalated)
1. Algeria
2. Algeria
3. Argentina
4. Bangladesh
5. Benin
6. Bolivia
7. Bolivia
8. Brazil
9. Burkina Faso
10. Cameroon
11. China
12. Colombia
13. Ecuador
14. Ecuador
15. Egypt
16. Estonia
17. France
18. Greece
19. Guatemala
20. Guinea
21. Haiti
22. Hong Kong

Start
Year
1988
2011
1977
1972
1989
1981
1983
2014
2014
2016
1989
1958
1997
2005
2002
1987
2018
1973
1993
2007
2018
2014

End
Year
1988
2011
1983
1975
1989
1981
1985
2015
2014
2017
1989
1964
1997
2005
2004
1988
2018
1973
1993
2007
2018
2014

Initial Claim

Country
(Not escalated)
Algeria
Algeria
Argentina
Bangladesh
Benin
Bolivia
Bolivia
Brazil
Burkina Faso
Cameroon
China
Colombia
Ecuador
Ecuador
Egypt
France
France
Greece
Guatemala
Guinea
Costa Rica
Hong Kong

Economic
Economic
Political
Social
Economic
Economic
Economic
Political
Political
Economic/ Social
Social/ Political
Economic
Economic
Political
Political
Social
Economic
Social
Economic/ Other
Economic
Political
Electoral
91

Start
Year
1997
2017
1984
1991
1998
1977
1994
2013
2011
2002
2000
1959
1993
2006
2007
1986
2017
1979
2012
2006
2018
2012

End
Year
1997
2018
1989
1991
1998
1978
1994
2013
2011
2002
2002
1959
1993
2006
2007
1986
2017
1980
2012
2006
2018
2012

Initial Claim
Electoral
Economic
Economic
Economic
Economic
Political
Economic
Economic/ Political
Economic/ Political
Economic
Economic
Economic
Economic
Economic/ Social
Electoral/ Political
Other
Economic
Economic
Economic
Economic
Economic
Social

23. Japan

1959

1960

24. Libya

2011

2011

25. Malawi
26. Malawi

1955
2011

1957
2012

2015
2018

2016
2018

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

1967
1969
2017
2006
2018
1991
2013
1991
1988
1990

1972
1971
2017
2012
2018
1992
2013
1992
1990
1990

1955

1960
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27. Moldova
28. Nicaragua

N. Ireland
Pakistan
Serbia
South Korea
Sudan
Thailand
Turkey
Venezuela
Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia

39. Zambia

Political/ Other
Economic/
Political
Political
Economic/
Electoral/ Social/
Political/ Other
Electoral/
Political/ Other
Economic
Economic/
Electoral/ Political
Social
Electoral
Political
Economic
Political
Social/ Political
Economic
Social
Social
Economic/
Electoral/ Social/
Political
92

Japan
Libya

1958
2014

1958
2014

Political
Political

Uganda

1958

1959

Malawi

2002

2003

Economic/ Social/
Political
Political

Moldova

2016

2016

Electoral/ Other

Nicaragua
United
Kingdom
Pakistan
Serbia
South Korea
Sudan
Thailand
Turkey
Venezuela
Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia
Sierra Leone

1998
1974

1998
1974

Economic
Political

1972
2016
2004
1979
1996
2017
2007
1968
1987
1955

1972
2016
2006
1979
1997
2017
2007
1968
1987
1955

Social
Political
Political
Economic
Economic/ Social
Political
Political
Other
Economic
Economic

Table 9. Truth Table for Escalated and Non-escalated Campaigns 87
86F

Conditions
A:
B:
Leader Broad
Comp.

C.
D:
E.
No. of nonCohesion Gov.
Gov.
escalated
Concession Repression cases

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1

0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1

No. of
escalated
cases

Outcome
Code

1

5
2
4

1

0

1

0

6

1
1
3
1
2
1
5

1

1

1
3
6

2
1

1
1
1

1

* 88
87F

0
0

For QCA, it is a best practice to code the conditions in the correct “direction” such that their presence is
theoretically expected to be associated with a positive outcome (Rihoux and De Meur 2008, 42) . However,
I cannot do this with my theory since the presence of movement leadership and absence of government
concessions is expected to result in demand escalation as well as the absence of movement leadership and
the presence of government concessions.
87

This is a “contradictory configuration” with the same conditions producing demand escalation in 5 cases
but non-escalation in 6 cases; this configuration is excluded in the analysis below as suggested by Rihoux
and De Meur (2008, 44).
88
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1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1

0
0
1
1
0
0
1
1

0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1

3

1

2
2
1
2
2

5

1

9

1

Table 10. Simplified Truth Table for Escalated and Non-escalated Campaigns

Conditions
A:
Leader

B:
Broad
Comp.

C.
D:
E.
No. of
Cohesion Gov.
Gov.
nonConcession Repression escalated
cases

0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1

0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1

1
1
0
1
1
0
1
1

0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1

1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1

No. of
escalated
cases

5
4
3
3
6
3
5
9

Outcome
Code

0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1

The combinations associated with three or more campaigns that escalated
demands are stated in Equation 6 and simplified in Equations 7 and 8; the combinations
associated with three or more campaigns that did not escalate demands are stated in
Equation 9 and simplified in Equations 10 and 11.
Demand escalation = aBcDE + ABcdE + ABCdE + ABCDE

(6)

Demand escalation = BE(acD + Acd + ACd + ACD)

(7)
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Demand escalation = BE(acD + Ad + AC)

(8)

No escalation = abCdE + abCDE + AbCDe + AbCDE

(9)

No escalation = bC(adE + aDE + ADe + ADE)

(10)

No escalation = bC(aE + AD + DE)

(11)

From Tables 9 and 10, one can see that reformist campaigns that escalated
demands and those that did not have largely different combinations of factors. 89 The
8F

necessary conditions of broad composition and regime repression remain a fixture of
campaigns that escalated, but there is a qualification in the leaderless path to demand
escalation. When looking just at escalated campaigns previously, there seemed to be four
paths toward demand escalation: aD + Ad + AC + CD (assuming “B” and “E”). Here,
adding non-escalated campaigns into the analysis resulted in three: acD + Ad + AC
(again, assuming “B” and “E”). The comparative analysis largely validates the dynamic
theory of demand escalation, but also introduces some qualifications. Among broadly
comprised campaigns that are repressed, “strategic calculation” remains a pathway in
which leader-led campaigns that do not receive concessions (“Ad”) escalate demands.
“Organic exacerbation,” previously theorized as a pathway in which leader-less
campaigns that receive concessions escalate demands, is qualified by the condition of

89

Although the conditions that do not produce demand escalation can technically be all such combinations
that do not result in demand escalation (including the combinations that have zero observations), I have
narrowed the analysis to combinations that have historical precedence to minimize bias in terms of raising
the threshold for accepting conditions that have been hypothesized to escalate demands. Setting unobserved
combinations to 0 would assume that all unobserved conditions do not result in demand escalation and the
analysis would give the conditions under which demand escalation has been observed to occur; while
setting missing observations to 1 (given that I have no information that demand escalation cannot occur in
these combinations) would show the possible conditions under which demands can escalate.
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lacking cohesion (“acD”). The absence of cohesion suggests that when demands escalate
via organic exacerbation, only a segment of the leader-less reformist campaign is
aggravated by the concession while some groups within the campaign might be appeased.
Additionally, the effect of cohesion seems to differ depending on whether or not
the campaign has identifiable leaders. Different from leaderless campaigns, leader-led
campaigns that are cohesive (“AC”) can escalate demands irrespective of state
concessions. I initially theorized cohesion to elevate the escalatory potential for any
campaign, but it seems that only leader-led campaigns are afforded the platform for
unified action that comes with campaign cohesion. I call this newly identified pathway
“preemptive consolidation.”
But the role of cohesiveness is further complicated by the fact that campaign
cohesion is also a common condition among campaigns that do not escalate demands. It
could be that reformist campaigns that do not escalate tend to be mobilized around singleissues and are narrowly composed, and therefore better able to maintain unity and
cohesion. Without conducting a comparative analysis, I might have mislabeled “CD” (in
conjunction with “B” and “E”) to be a fourth pathway of demand escalation. However,
comparing campaigns that escalated with those that did not provides a fuller picture of
their differences and clarifies the importance of combinations, and not individual
conditions.
The simultaneous presence of multiple conditions determine a campaign’s
escalatory potential and the use of truth tables helped detect these complex causal
relations with “conjunctural causation” (Schneider and Wagemann 2012). Figure 12
shows a Venn diagram of the simplified truth table and visually reinforces the notion that
96

demand escalation is a result of a complex interaction of several factors. The areas in
green are associated with demand escalation, yellow with non-escalation, blue with
contradictory combinations, and white areas are unobserved combinations.

Figure 12. Venn Diagram of Simplified Truth Table

Performing the classical Quine-McCluskey (QMC) and the enhanced QuineMcCluskey (eQMC) minimization function on the simplified truth table resulted in the
identification of the same pathways highlighted above, with additional information. The
QCA algorithms take the cases where the outcome is present and performs the necessary
minimizations to generate the simplest prime implicants. The consistency score of 1.00
97

indicates that the solution is free of contradictions – all cases where the combination of
conditions is present, the outcome is present as well.
The QCA identified three sufficient pathways for the onset of demand escalation
as shown in Table 11, and the resulting solution formula is the same as the simplified
equation of demand escalation (Equation 8) listed above. The consistency (1.00) and
coverage (0.8) values of the solution formula are above the established thresholds 90 for
89F

sufficient analysis in QCA (Schneider and Wagemann 2010).
The following three pathways all have in common a broad campaign composition
and state repression: the “strategic calculation” pathway (leader-led and no concession)
has a raw coverage of 0.32, meaning that 32% of the escalated campaigns are explained
by this pathway, and a unique coverage of 0.12, meaning that 12% of all covered cases
are uniquely explained by this pathway; the “organic exacerbation” pathway (leaderless,
fragmented, and receiving concessions) explains 12% of the escalated campaigns and
12% of all cases are uniquely explained by this pathway; and the “preemptive
consolidation” pathway (leader-led and cohesive) accounts for 56% of all escalated
campaigns and uniquely explains 36% of the cases.

Table 11. Results of the QCA using the Simplified Truth Table

causal
pathway

90

leader*broad*
~concession*repression
-> escalate

~leader*broad*
~cohesive*concession*
repression
-> escalate

The conventional threshold is 0.8 for consistency and 0.6 for coverage
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leader*broad*
cohesive*repression
-> escalate

consistency
raw coverage
unique
coverage
solution
formula
solution
consistency
solution
coverage
cases not
covered 91

1.000
0.320
0.120

1.000
0.120
0.120

1.000
0.560
0.360

broad*repression*
(leader*~concession+~leader*~cohesive*concession+leader*cohesive) ->
escalate
1.000
0.800

(~E): South Korea 2004, Burkina Faso 2011, Brazil 2013, Benin 1998,
Cameroon 2002, Serbia 2016, Guinea 2006, Algeria 2017, Algeria 1997,
Turkey 2017, Uganda 1958, Moldova 2016, Thailand 1996, Japan 1958,
Ecuador 2006
(E): China 1989, Greece 1973, France 2018, Moldova 2015, Serbia 2017,
Sudan 2018, Egypt 2002, Thailand 1991, Algeria 1988, Colombia 1958,
Guinea 2007, Bolivia 1983, Zambia 1955, Pakistan 1969
contradictory (~E): Venezuela 2007, Bolivia 1977, Sierra Leone 1955, Malawi 2002, Libya
cases 92
2014, Pakistan 1972
(E): Guatemala 1993, Brazil 2014, Argentina 1977, Turkey 2013, South
Korea 2006
* = and
+ = or
~ = absence of
-> = sufficient for
90F

91F

4.2.2 Analysis of Necessity and Sufficiency
While all conditions in a complex causal configuration have an impact, some
conditions are more important than others such that the outcome does not happen in their
absence. Although my argument centers around configurations and the different
combinations of factors that come together to make demand escalation more or less
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These are campaigns that were dropped as a result of discounting the combinations with infrequent
occurrences mentioned above: 15 non-escalated (~E) campaigns and 14 escalated (E) campaigns. The
country and the year in which these reformist campaign began are listed here for reference.
These are campaigns that had the contradictory configuration of “aBCDE” mentioned above: 6 nonescalated (~E) campaigns and 5 escalated (E) campaigns.
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likely, I conduct an analysis of necessity and sufficiency to compare how the two
necessary conditions of demand escalation – having broad composition and experiencing
state repression – differ in terms of their coverage and relevance.
Necessary conditions do not trigger an outcome on their own, but a causal
combination always contains those necessary conditions. Braumoeller and Goertz (2000,
846) present two complementary definitions about necessity: “X is a necessary condition
for Y if X is always present when Y occurs,” and “X is a necessary condition for Y if Y
does not occur in the absence of X.” The conditions of a campaign having a broad
composition and experiencing state repression were theorized to elevate the escalatory
potential of any campaign and are largely validated in the truth tables above, but
necessary conditions can differ in terms of their relevance. For example, oxygen is
necessary for fire but is largely “an irrelevant necessary condition” because fire cannot be
started from the mere presence of oxygen and there are many situations when air is
present without a fire (Duşa 2018).
In QCA, a consistency score ranges from 0 to 1 and this measures the degree to
which “one set is included by another” (Thiem and Dusa 2013). A condition is commonly
considered “necessary” if its consistency score is 0.9 or higher (Schneider and
Wagemann 2010). As expected, having broad composition, and being repressed by the
state both have a score of 1.0 (see Figure 24) and are perfect necessary conditions, as all
cases of demand escalation have these features. However, “coverage” measures how
trivial or relevant a necessary condition is for the outcome. The “necessity coverage” or
“raw coverage” calculates the proportion of a condition covered by its intersection with
the outcome, and a small proportion means that there are many cases in which a condition
100

is present without the outcome present; 80.6% of broad composition overlaps with
demand escalation while only 54.3% of state repression is covered by demand escalation.
This shows that having a broad composition is a more relevant condition for demand
escalation than experiencing state repression, as many campaigns that do not escalate
demands also experience repression.
The “relevance of necessity” further tests the relevance of a condition with low
relevance scores indicating the trivialness and high values indicating the relevance of
each condition (Schneider and Wagemann 2012); a higher score indicates bigger relative
importance of that condition as a necessary condition (Duşa 2018). With a relevance
score of 0.750 for broad composition and 0.125 for state repression, this validates the
relative importance of having broad composition over experiencing state repression for
understanding demand escalation. Alternatively, in understanding the absence of demand
escalation, the only condition that meets the threshold to qualify as a necessary condition
is campaign cohesion with a consistency score of 1.0 (see Figure 25). But with a raw
coverage of 55.8% and relevance score of 0.240, it is not a highly relevant condition, as
many campaigns that escalate are also cohesive.

Table 12. Analysis of Necessity Among Condition for Demand Escalation

Clear Leader
Broad Composition
Campaign Cohesion
State Concession

Inclusion score
for necessity
0.680
1.000
0.760
0.680

Relevance of
Necessity
0.719
0.750
0.200
0.406
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Raw Coverage
0.654
0.806
0.442
0.472

State Repression

1.000

0.125

0.543

Table 13. Analysis of Necessity Among Condition for Non-Demand Escalation

Clear Leader
Broad Composition
Campaign Cohesion
State Concession
State Repression

Inclusion score
for necessity
0.375
0.250
1.000
0.792
0.875

Relevance of
Necessity
0.575
0.419
0.240
0.433
0.107

Raw Coverage
0.346
0.194
0.558
0.528
0.457

Lastly, I further analyze the feature of having a broad composition for explaining
demand escalation to see if this necessary condition qualifies as a sufficient condition.
Inclusion and consistency both refer to the same thing in QCA – if the inclusion of X
(condition) into Y (outcome) is high, then X is highly consistent, or X has a high
consistency score (Duşa 2018). From Table 14, having a broad composition has a high
sufficiency inclusion score with 0.806, which can be understood as the probability of
demands escalating given a broad composition. With the highest score being 1, Duşa
(2018) notes that a sufficiency inclusion score above 0.8 can be considered high enough
to conclude that a condition is sufficient, “or at least an important part of an expression
that is sufficient for the outcome.”
The proportional reduction in inconsistency (PRI) score takes into account the
negation of the outcome as well as its presence (as there could be logically contradictory
cases in which having a condition results in both the presence and the absence of the
outcome of interest). Seeing that having a “broad composition” has a low sufficiency
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inclusion score and a low PRI score among non-escalated campaigns (see Table 14), I
can conclude that having a broad composition qualifies as a sufficient condition for
demand escalation. As initially hypothesized, having a broad composition (versus
narrow) is the most discriminating factor between reformist campaigns that escalate
demands and those that do not.

Table 14. Analysis of Sufficiency Among Condition for Demand Escalation

Clear Leader
Broad Composition
Campaign Cohesion
State Concession
State Repression

Inclusion
score for
sufficiency
0.654
0.806
0.442
0.472
0.543

Proportional
Reduction in
Inconsistency (PRI)
0.654
0.806
0.442
0.472
0.543

covS (raw
coverage)
0.680
1.000
0.760
0.680
1.000

covU
(unique
coverage)
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

Table 15. Analysis of Sufficiency Among Condition for Non-Demand Escalation

Clear Leader
Broad Composition
Campaign Cohesion
State Concession
State Repression

Inclusion
score for
sufficiency
0.346
0.194
0.558
0.528
0.457

Proportional
Reduction in
Inconsistency (PRI)
0.346
0.194
0.558
0.528
0.457
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covS (raw
coverage)
0.375
0.250
1.000
0.792
0.875

covU
(unique
coverage)
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000

4.3 Conclusion
The use of truth tables and QCA provided evidence for the two theorized
pathways of demand escalation (strategic calculation and organic retaliation) and
uncovered an additional pathway (preemptive consolidation). Campaigns having a broad
composition and experiencing state repression are part of all pathways to demand
escalation, but having a broad composition is the more discerning of the two conditions
as many campaigns that do not escalate demands also experience disproportionate state
violence.
Statistical methods try to explain an outcome using a single model for both the
presence and absence (or high and low values) of the dependent variable, but QCA finds
multiple causal combinations that lead to the same outcome with causal asymmetry – that
is, the joint conditions causing a certain outcome are not necessarily the mirror image of
those conditions causing the absence of the outcome (Ide 2015). This is very much in line
with studies of peace and conflict that do not treat the presence and absence of violent
conflict as binary oppositions (Chenoweth and Cunningham 2013). Accordingly, the
failure to escalate demands is not explained by campaigns having a narrow composition
and not experiencing state repression. Rather, the necessary condition for the absence of
demand escalation is movement cohesion, albeit not a highly relevant condition as many
campaigns that do escalate demands are also cohesive.
Lastly, the use of truth tables and QCA also exposed the limits of the dynamic
theory of demand escalation. In addition to the unclear role of movement cohesion, a
noteworthy “contradictory configuration” of “aBCDE” emerged from the analysis. If I
had only focused on campaigns that escalated demands, this combination could have lent
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additional support for the “organic exacerbation” pathway, but among campaigns that are
leaderless, have a broad composition, are cohesive, receive government concessions, and
face state repression, six did not escalate their demands while five did, and all campaigns
with this combination were excluded from the analysis (Rihoux and De Meur 2008, 44).
Although it is regrettable that 11 out of 78 campaigns (14%) could not be accounted for
with the dynamic theory of demand escalation, it is “perfectly normal to detect
contradictory configurations” (Rihoux and De Meur 2008, 48), and seeking the resolution
of these contradictions could be the basis of future research projects.
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Chapter 5: Theory Testing through Hong Kong Case Studies

In this chapter, I apply the dynamic theory of demand escalation to three reformist
campaigns in Hong Kong using the spirit of the most similar systems design (or Mill’s
Method of Difference). This method typically compares similar cases which only differ
in the dependent variable and one independent variable that explains the variation in
outcome, however, my theory of demand escalation does not fit neatly into this
comparative approach. The dynamic theory of demand escalation takes two factors
(movement characteristic and government response) to explain how demands escalate,
and I argue that different combinations can result in the outcome of interest. Therefore, I
chose the following three reformist campaigns, two of which escalated and one that did
not, because it allows me to compare the different escalatory paths with each other, as
well as compare the conditions of escalation with those of non-escalation while
controlling for country-level and decade-level differences.
Hong Kong is unique in many respects and is not the average state with modal
state-society relations. However, I posit that these differences are not fundamentally
important for my argument and Hong Kong’s idiosyncrasies make it a critical case in
which if the dynamics of demand escalation can be observed here then it is likely to occur
anywhere (Patton 1990). Additionally, the comparison of three mass campaigns within
Hong Kong highlight vital information that may not have been gleaned in other settings
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and its hybrid context allows for lessons that can generalize to both democracies and
autocracies.

5.1 The Case for Hong Kong
Since its handover from the United Kingdom in 1997, the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region (HKSAR) has been under Chinese sovereignty but self-governed
by the formula of “One Country, Two Systems.” Relying on its free-market institutions
and economic freedoms, HKSAR developed into a global economic powerhouse and has
largely enjoyed enviable growth and basic social stability. However, parallel to this
narrative of success is a less triumphal story, “one punctuated by episodes of mass
protests that aimed to reveal deepening social inequalities and to challenge the
governance and legitimacy of the SAR government” (Yuen and Cheng 2018, 7). The first
notable episode in the counter-narrative goes back to July 2003 when hundreds of
thousands of Hong Kongers marched to the Hong Kong government (HKG) headquarters
to oppose the proposed national security law, the very same ones that took effect in
2020. 93
92F

While annual marches commemorated the 1997 handover of Hong Kong on July
1 (also known as HKSAR establishment day), 2003 was unique in galvanizing half a
million people to take to the streets to oppose the legislation of Basic Law Article 23,
which would prohibit acts of treason, secession, sedition, and subversion against the

93

After the massive demonstrations on July 1, 2003, James Tien resigned from the Executive Council and
the bill was withdrawn and shelved indefinitely – until 2020.
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Chinese government. The Hong Kong people worried that it would infringe on their
rights and freedoms as these crimes carried maximum life prison sentences, and legal
experts criticized it for lacking “clarity in specifying what acts are criminal, and whether
they must be conducted with intention or some state of mind.” 94 In response to the largest
93F

protest seen in Hong Kong since the handover, the Liberal Party withdrew support of the
bill and the government shelved it without enough support to pass it in the Legislative
Council. 95
94F

This was a “bipartite maximalist” campaign in my categorization. There was a
reformist trigger (proposed anti-subversion laws) but calls for Chief Executive Tung
Chee-hwa’s resignation were heard alongside opposition to the bill from the beginning on
July 1. 96 As Hong Kong’s first chief executive, Tung was handpicked by Beijing to head
95F

the HKG and was frequently perceived to be more interested in pleasing China than
representing the Hong Kong people. Thus, anger towards the controversial bill were
“fueled by a broader frustration with Mr. Tung’s government itself,” particularly over the
poor handling of the slumping economy and the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
(SARS) outbreak. 97 Tung seemed to recognize the public’s sentiment and publicly
96F

Tong, Elson. “Reviving Article 23 (Part I): The rise and fall of Hong Kong’s 2003 national security bill,”
Hong Kong Free Press, February 17, 2018. <https://hongkongfp.com/2018/02/17/reviving-article-23-part-irise-fall-hong-kongs-2003-national-security-bill/>.
94

Gunia, Amy. “A Brief history of Protest in Post-Handover Hong Kong,” Time, June 20, 2019.
<https://time.com/5606212/hong-kong-history-mass-demonstrations-protest/>.
95

“Huge protest fills HK streets,” CNN, July 2, 2003.
<https://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/07/01/hk.protest/>.
96

“Hong Kong to Delay Controversial Bill – 2003-07-07,” VOA, October 30, 2009.
<https://www.voanews.com/archive/hong-kong-delay-controversial-bill-2003-07-07>.
97

108

acknowledged the people’s “dissatisfaction over government policies and over [his]
governance in particular,” when he agreed to soften the bill that he subsequently tabled. 98
97F

This campaign did not result in the immediate resignation of Mr. Tung, but it was seen as
indirectly contributing to his early departure two years later. 99
98F

The 2003 protests “proved to be a watershed moment” that dramatically increased
activism from Hong Kong civil society groups seeking to participate in policy-making
processes (Dapiran 2017). The three case studies that follow have this “successful
campaign” 100 to look back on, which was largely remembered as a spectacular failure on
9F

the part of the Hong Kong leadership. 101 However, only two of the campaigns that follow
10F

escalated their demands from reformist to maximalist, which discounts a possible
alternative explanation that the success of the 2003 campaign, or the reputation of the
government established by its past concessions (Walter 2006), is what is driving
subsequent campaigns to escalate demands.
Another set of alternative hypotheses pertain to the Hong Kong people’s
relationship with the HKG as well as China. It could be that a campaign’s tendency to

Pan, Philip. “Hong Kong’s Top Leader Softens Controversial Bill,” Washington Post, July 6, 2003.
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2003/07/06/hong-kongs-top-leader-softenscontroversial-bill/2a07bbed-f0db-4207-b0b3-5db16059e099/>.
98

Reuters. “Hong Kong chief executive ‘quits’.” Al Jazeera, 2 March 2005.
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2005/3/2/hong-kong-chief-executive-quits>.
99
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The campaign technically achieved partial success, since it stopped the enactment of Article 23 but did
not bring about the immediate resignation of Mr. Tung.
Kang-chung, Ng. “Fear and loathing: which way forward for Article 23 national security law in face of
still opposition in Hong Kong?” South China Morning Post, November 22, 2017.
<https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/2121035/fear-and-loathing-which-way-forwardarticle-23-national>.
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escalate demands is a reflection of the people’s distrust in their government and
skepticism toward the mainland, in the case of Hong Kong. When looking at public
opinion polls as a proxy for state-society relations, Figure 13 shows that the Hong Kong
public was generally dissatisfied with the HKG in the last decade. Similarly, Figure 14
shows that the Hong Kong people had more distrust than trust toward the mainland in the
last decade. In both figures, the blue boxes indicate the timeframe of the three campaigns
that will be explored in the next section. Satisfaction with the HKG drops significantly in
2019 and distrust of Beijing peaks during the course of all three campaigns, but there
does not seem to be a clear association between these trends and when demands escalate.
So, while anti-government and anti-Chinese sentiment existed for each campaign to
leverage, not all campaigns tapped into this potential to ask more from the government
than initially sought.

110

Figure 13. Public Opinion Poll Assessing Satisfaction with HKG 102
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Data from Hong Kong Public Opinion Research Institute (PORI). <https://pori.hk/poppoll/hksarg/h001>
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Figure 14. Public Opinion Poll Assessing Satisfaction with China 103
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On the whole, do you trust the Beijing Central Government?
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While I can largely dismiss the legacy of prior success, the Hong Kong public’s
dissatisfaction of the HKG, and Hong Kong’s distrust towards the mainland as alternate
explanations for why demands escalate, there are still limitations to my case selection
strategy. For one, timing may be seen as a key challenge to external validity. Because the
three campaigns occur a few years apart and some participants are likely to have been
involved in multiple campaigns, later campaign inevitably learned from earlier
campaigns in ways that the older campaigns could not learn from the more recent ones;
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Ibid.
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the 2019 anti-extradition campaign explicitly did things as a result of lessons derived
from the 2014 Umbrella Movement.
However, this limitation does not necessarily jeopardize my argument because the
HKG did not have a predefined way of dealing with different campaigns, such as only
offering concessions to movements with clear leadership. Hence, the people’s adaptations
to make subsequent campaign “more effective” result in variation of campaign
configuration while not necessarily affecting the government’s response. For example, a
lesson from 2003 and 2012 was that if you push hard enough, the government will give
in 104 – but the government did no such thing in 2014 while offering concessions again in
103F

2019. In this way, movement characteristics and government responses are not
endogenous, and the case studies add value in allowing me to more specifically consider
the mechanisms of demand escalation in ways that the quantitative analyses and the QCA
could not.
The following case studies were developed through triangulating information
from academic articles, media reports, and in-depth interviews. 105 I focus on movement
104F

characteristics and government responses to assess whether and how the pathways of
strategic calculation, organic exacerbation, and preemptive consolidation shed light on
why the 2012 campaign against Chinese patriotism classes ended with the acceptance of
government concessions, while the 2014 Umbrella Movement escalated demands without
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Interviewee 9
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Interviewees were selected through snowball sampling, in which I asked my initial contacts for
recommendations on others to interview. See Appendix E for the list and description of interviewees.
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concessions, and the 2019 anti-extradition campaign escalated demands despite
government attempts at accommodation.

Table 16. Different Characteristics in the Hong Kong Case Studies

Campaign Name
Hong
Kong
case
studies

2012 Patriotism Class
Movement
2014 Umbrella Movement
2019 Anti-Extradition
Campaign

Movement
Leadership
Yes

Government Demand
Response
Escalation?
Concession
No

Yes
No

Repression
Yes
Concession
Yes
& Repression

5.2 2012 Patriotism Class Movement
In March 2012, an elite committee of 1,200 prominent Hong Kong residents
(which included many Beijing allies) appointed a new leader Leung Chun-ying (C.Y.
Leung) as Hong Kong's next Chief Executive. Soon thereafter, the HKG announced plans
to implement “moral and national education” in public schools to foster a sense of
national pride and belonging. A group of secondary school students, led by then 15-yearold Joshua Wong, formed a group called Scholarism to fight the proposal they saw as an
attempt at indoctrination. On July 29, the campaign against the curriculum changes
brought tens of thousands of people together who feared that the classes would brainwash
the students into supporting China’s Communist Party (CCP).
Initially, the government dismissed such fears and stood firm on its plans to make
the curriculum compulsory in primary schools starting in 2015 and in secondary schools
the year after. But after dozens of activists began hunger strikes and “impassioned but
114

well-organized and peaceful student-led demonstrations” drew a broad cross section of
the population to the streets, the HKG backed down. 106 On September 8, C.Y. Leung
105F

abandoned the 2015 deadline for the introduction of the compulsory patriotism classes
and announced that he would give schools discretion on whether to implement the
curriculum.
During the campaign, the placard and banners specifically called for the
government to withdraw its plans to introduce the Moral and National Education
curriculum but there were deeper issues at play. The protests were described as “the latest
sign of growing discontent in Hong Kong” over China’s increasing influence, stoked by
growing economic inequality and stunted democratic development. 107 Additionally, most
106F

of the Hong Kong people were excluded from the process of choosing their own leader
earlier in the year, and they faced growing concerns over eroding media freedoms as well
as increasing visibility of mainland Chinese in Hong Kong life. 108 The reformist
107F

campaign therefore had high escalatory potential in terms of the growing grievances
against the government and the extent of the general public supporting the reformist
cause. 109
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Ko, Vanessa. “Why Hong Kong Wants Nothing to Do with ‘Patriotism’ for Now,” Time, September 10,
2012. <https://world.time.com/2012/09/10/why-hong-kong-wants-nothing-to-do-with-patriotism-fornow/>.
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AP. “Thousands in HK protest China patriotism classes,” Yahoo News, July 29, 2012.
<https://news.yahoo.com/news/thousands-hk-protest-china-patriotism-classes-102106600.html>.
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This view was corroborated by Interviewee 10, who noted that this campaign had a good chance to
escalate demands.
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What prevented escalation was an effective government response – namely, a
compromised concession without repression. It is important to note that the major
concession came in the heels of a 120,000-strong rally outside the central government
offices, but the concession was not a one-sided appeal to demobilize the campaign. There
was a senior official in government, Anna Wu, who played a key role in defusing the
tension. 110 Wu, a progressive on the Executive Council (a top advisory body for the Chief
109F

Executive), was tasked with leading a government review committee for the contentious
national education curriculum. 111
10F

Although I could not find public evidence of Wu meeting or negotiating with the
leaders of the campaign, she did suggest that prior engagement with the public had been
inadequate and encouraged the government to “adopt a more innovative approach in
public engagement.” 112 According to Interviewee 10, Wu had been in communication
1F

with the movement during the time she convinced the Chief Executive to back down, and
a government source said Leung would meet with the protest leaders following his
announcement. 113 The fact that the government decided to accommodate the movement
12F

Cheung, Gary. “Leung ‘caught off guard’ by national education row, Wu says,” South China Morning
Post, October 20, 2012. https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1065283/leung-caught-guardnational-education-row-wu-says>.
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“Anna Wu: The absurdities of HK politics and how to fix them,” Hong Kong Economic Journal, March
6, 2017. <https://www.ejinsight.com/eji/article/id/1505818/20170306-Anna-Wu-the-absurdities-of-HKpolitics-and-how-to-fix-them>.
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Lau, Stuart and Amy Nip. 2012. "Leung's 11th Hour u-Turn on Education Victory for Protesters
Besieging the Government Headquarters, as Chief Executive Axes Mandatory National Education Lessons
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through engagement, as opposed to a unilateral decision, is crucial because this ensured a
reciprocal response from the campaign – namely, demobilization. The day after Leung
announced the concession, Scholarism said they would end the Admiralty protest. 114
13F

Another key aspect preventing escalation was the lack of state sanctioned
violence. In contrast to the campaigns in 2014 and 2019, there were no instances of
police brutality or regime repression to fuel the people’s anger or distrust in the HKG. It
is noteworthy that while not everyone was satisfied with Leung’s accommodation and
smaller class boycotts and hunger strikes continued to press the government to scrap the
proposal entirely, demands did not escalate. 115 Following the victory, Scholarism
14F

remained active, supporting other political and social causes, and the group would come
to play a key role in the Umbrella Movement as well (Dapiran 2017).

5.3 2014 Umbrella Movement
Article 45 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law says: “The ultimate aim is the selection of
the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative
nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures.” 116 Beijing ruled out
15F

the potential for universal suffrage in Hong Kong for the first three chief executive
elections, then in December 2013, the HKG started a 5-month public consultations for a
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Chan, Thomas. 'CityU appeal for support for hunger strike Staff association hopes hundreds will sign up
for strike against national education', South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), 20 Sep, p. 03, (online
NewsBank).
“The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China.”
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constitutional reform regarding the election of the Chief Executive in 2017. 117 Under the
16F

method put in place in 2012, candidates were elected by a committee of 1,200
representatives composed predominantly of pro-Beijing politicians and business elites,
and as a result, the most powerful figure in Hong Kong did not have “any popular
mandate from the broader citizenry” (Dapiran 2017).
Universal suffrage would give all Hong Kongers the right to vote for the chief
executive, but at the heart of the issue was the question of how the candidates for the
election would be nominated. Many pan-democrat politicians and pro-democracy
activists strongly pushed for a mechanism of civil nomination. In this vein, Occupy
Central with Love and Peace (OCLP), a pro-democracy activist group led by two
academics Benny Tai and Chan Kin-man, and a Baptist minister, Reverend Chu Yiuming, announced early on that there would be peaceful civil disobedience in the streets if
the electoral reforms did not meet the Hong Kong people’s expectations. 118
17F

In June 2014, as the time neared for Beijing to announce its official decision on
the chief executive election process, China published a white paper stating the Chinese
Communist Party’s “comprehensive jurisdiction” over Hong Kong. 119 This was the first
18F

official document since the 1997 handover that set out Beijing’s authority over the
territory, and was seen by many as a warning to pro-democracy activists pushing for the
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introduction of universal suffrage by 2017. 120 The white paper emphasized “One
19F

Country” over the “Two Systems” and created “an atmosphere of mistrust and discontent
with the Mainland” (Dapiran 2017).
There were two notable responses to China’s strongly worded publication. On
June 20, OCLP organized an unofficial city-wide referendum asking voters how they
wanted to reform the city’s election process. To China’s chagrin, 787,767 ballots were
cast with 42% favoring a proposal from the Alliance for True Democracy in which
candidates for the chief executive position would be nominated by the public, without
conditions. 121 Second, the annual pro-democracy march on July 1 commemorating the
120F

1997 handover, drew a larger than usual turnout with half a million protesters marching
to demand full electoral freedom. 122 Prominent leaders pushing for genuine universal
12F

suffrage included the OCLP trio, Alex Chow and Lester Shum of the Hong Kong
Federation of Students (HKFS), an alliance of university student unions, and Joshua
Wong of Scholarism. 123
12F
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On August 31, 2014, the National People’s Congress, China’s parliament,
announced its official decision on universal suffrage for the selection of Hong Kong’s
Chief Executive. 124 Hong Kong’s Chief Executive, C.Y. Leung, called it a step in the
123F

right direction, saying that the majority of Hong Kong citizens “will be able to cast their
votes to select the chief executive.” 125 However, Beijing had brushed aside the people’s
124F

demands for a fully open election by only allowing the option to vote among candidates
vetted by Beijing, namely those who “love [China] and love Hong Kong.” 126 Pro125F

democracy segments of society called the proposed framework a farce, and maintained
that “genuine universal suffrage includes both the rights to elect and to be elected” and
continued to push for elections in which any candidate could run for chief executive. 127
126F

In response to the disappointing decision, protests continued to mount and on
September 3, hundreds of demonstrators were arrested at a peaceful pro-democracy rally
drawing around 100,000 participants. 128 HKFS and Scholarism subsequently organized
127F

class boycotts and mobilized sit-ins in public spaces (Cheng and Chan 2017). The rallies
throughout September were largely a show of defiance against Beijing’s vision for Hong
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Kong’s political future and efforts to pressure Beijing into allowing genuine universal
suffrage in Hong Kong continued. Thus, the Umbrella Movement “unfolded and diffused
from structural, conjunctural and endogenous conditions in Hong Kong’s democratic
movement,” and the intended civil disobedience action meant to last a few days was
substituted by a resilient occupation that would last 79 days (Cheng and Chan 2017, 3).
Although C. Y. Leung’s approval ratings were already very low, calls to remove
him from office were not yet pervasive. In late September, after weeks of continued
contention, the Hong Kong police used pepper spray and tear gas to dispel thousands of
pro-democracy protesters near the government complex while protesters used umbrellas
and face masks to protect themselves. 129 Riot police fired a total of 87 canisters of
128F

teargas, and images of police brutality quickly spread through social media and television
(Cheng and Chan 2017, 7). As expected with repression backfire (Hess and Martin 2006),
this level of police violence not seen in Hong Kong since the 1967 riots (Dapiran 2017)
outraged the public and served as a catalyst for greater mobilization as well as demand
escalation.
Shortly after this clash between the police and the unarmed protesters, Chan Kinman, a leader of OCLP, was asked how the crisis might be resolved, to which he
answered: “Leung Chun-ying must step down.” 130 The campaign’s leadership structure
129F
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was becoming increasingly complicated with OCLP being sidelined by the students and
tensions forming between recognized leadership and informal leaders. 131 The fragmented
130F

leadership would later be seen as a weakness contributing to the campaign’s eventual
demise, 132 but the infighting had minimal impact on the escalation of demands. The
13F

maximalist demand was soon taken up by the campaign at large, and the student leaders
announced four key demands: “1. Chief Executive C.Y. Leung should resign. 2. The NPC
decision on chief executive elections should be revoked. 3. A new election process
should be proposed, allowing for ‘civil nomination’ of candidates. 4. ‘Genuine universal
suffrage’ should be implemented” (Dapiran 2017). By October, calls for Leung’s
resignation were clear. Alex Chow, the secretary-general of HKFS indirectly addressed
the chief executive in front of a cheering crowd saying, “You thought you can rule this
place… if you don’t respond to the demand of the Hong Kong people, we will paralyze
the government.” 133 The protesters went so far as to set a deadline for C.Y. Leung to step
132F

down: midnight on Thursday evening, October 2, 2014. 134
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The escalation in demands can be traced to mounting frustration over the
government’s indifference to the campaign’s initial demands and fueled by the regime’s
disproportionate violence against unarmed protesters and activists. Whereas a leaderless
campaign might have lost momentum from a lack of progress, the leaders of the
Umbrella Movement knew their potential and derived additional power from the
cohesiveness of the campaign.
At the end of July, Chan Kin Man had met with Carrie Lam, Chief Secretary for
Administration at the time, in which there was no opportunity to discuss constitutional
reform proposals, but rather “Secretary Lau Kong-wah just continued saying [the
movement was] radical. And Carrie Lam just repeatedly ask[ed] [them] to end this
movement as soon as possible.” 135 The movement’s leaders saw civil disobedience as
134F

their “bargaining power,” 136 and escalating demands was a way to up the ante to get the
135F

government’s attention. Chan Kin-man said in an interview at that time, “Only when the
government makes a substantial response, then we will advise people to retreat… we are
always ready for dialog and negotiation.” 137
136F

If demands were escalated by leaders as part of the bargaining process, then this
suggests that the desire for Leung’s resignation was not necessarily widespread.
According to an onsite survey of respondents who visited the protest site on or after
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September 28 (the day that the police fired the teargas), the motivation for participation
was higher for supporting universal suffrage (86.4%) than for opposing the current
administration (68.8%) (Cheng and Chan 2017). Additionally, one can infer from the
campaign’s mixed reaction to Leung’s refusal to resign that his dismissal was not really
what the people wanted.
As the October 2 deadline came to a close, instead of resigning, Leung offered to
negotiate with student leaders. This appeased some and angered others in the campaign.
Some journalists at the scene noted that the tension between the protesters and the police
gathered outside the office of the Chief Executive quickly dissipated following the
announcement, as “the crowd started thinning out, people were checking their phones,
turning around and going home.” 138 Others noted the crowd’s displeasure, with some
137F

protesters calling Leung’s speech “totally useless,” and others saying, “We hoped for a
reversal on universal suffrage [reform] – not just a meeting.” 139 As for the campaign’s
138F

leaders, they welcomed the proposed talks. 140 If the goal was sincerely to get Leung to
139F

resign, the campaign might have been a bit more outraged by his refusal to leave.
Was the escalation of demands inevitable? To the extent that strategic calculation
was driving demand escalation, earlier efforts by the government to negotiate settlement

Bell, Matthew. “Hong Kong’s leader offers to meet protesters, but refuses to resign.” The World,
October 2, 2014. <https://www.pri.org/stories/2014-10-02/hong-kongs-leader-offers-meet-protestersrefuses-resign>.
138

Guilford, Gwynn and Lily Kuo. “Hong Kong is attacking the protest movement’s biggest weakness – its
fragmented leadership,” Quartz, October 2, 2014. <https://qz.com/275263/hong-kongs-chief-executivejust-called-the-protesters-bluff-but-for-some-of-them-it-wasnt-a-bluff/>.
139

“Hong Kong protests: CY Leung refuses to quit as leader,” BBC News, October 2, 2014.
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-29467239>.
140

124

with the movement’s leaders might have appeased the campaign. However, given that
this leader-led campaign was also largely cohesive, preemptive consolidation also could
have played a role. In this pathway, leaders derive power from the movement’s unity and
demands can escalate irrespective of government concessions. When movements are
leader-led, broad, and cohesive, the only chance for neutralizing the escalatory potential
is for the government to refrain from repressing the campaign.
In this reading, the HKG’s biggest mistake was condoning police brutality on
September 28. Even though the “dramatic backlash prompted the authorities to halt
repression and reconsider their response” (Yuen and Cheng 2017, 615), its effects could
not be undone. The dynamic theory of demand escalation cannot adjudicate how much of
each pathway mattered in the 2014 Umbrella Movement, but it provides a useful
framework to understand the strategic role of movement leadership and the extra leverage
cohesion provided the campaign to contend with the government.

5.4 2019 Anti-Extradition Campaign
In March 2019, the HKG proposed a bill that would allow criminal suspects to be
extradited to China under certain circumstances. The proposal was triggered by a murder
case in Taipei, but because the amendment covered mainland China, there were strong
public concerns and suspicions about the HKG’s motivations (Lee et al. 2019). Critics
feared that this would expose Hong Kongers to unfair trials and give China undue
influence over Hong Kong to target activists and journalists.
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Protests against the controversial bill occurred as early as March 31, 2019, 141 but
140F

June 9 kicked off the campaign in earnest, drawing hundreds of thousands (more than a
million by some accounts) to Hong Kong’s sweltering streets. 142 The next day, Chief
14F

Executive Carrie Lam essentially disregarded the widespread fear and anger among Hong
Kong’s populace and doggedly forged ahead by saying, “there is very little merit to be
gained to delay the bill… it’ll just cause more anxiety” and divisiveness in society. 143
142F

The second reading of the extradition bill was to proceed as planned on June 12.
Protesters knew that if the Legislative Council (LegCo) was allowed to meet, then
the pro-Beijing majority would likely push the bill through. In an effort to stall the second
reading, an estimated 40,000 protesters showed up outside the government headquarters
and LegCo building. Around mid-morning, pan-democrat legislator Eddie Chu Hoidick
addressed the crowd with a megaphone, announcing that legislators were unable to reach
the building to get into the chamber and the LegCo meeting had been cancelled (Dapiran
2020, 52). With the forced postponement of the second reading 144 came violent clashes
143F

between the police and the protesters that left dozens of people injured.
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Chief Executive Lam quickly lambasted the protesters for “organizing a riot.” 145
14F

In a video released by the government news service, Carrie Lam doubled down on the
bill, maintaining that she had a clear conscience to push it through, and used a metaphor
describing herself as a mother with a duty to discipline her wayward children. 146 The
145F

interview angered the activists for several reasons. Not only were there legal
consequences to the characterization of the incident as a riot (protesters charged with
rioting could face up to 10 years of imprisonment), Lam was defending the police who
were being accused of using excessive force by tear-gassing, beating, and dragging
unarmed protesters. 147
146F

Additionally, China and Hong Kong’s pro-Beijing elite continually claimed
“foreign meddling” and accused protesters of being “hoodwinked by the opposition camp
and their foreign allies into supporting the anti-extradition campaign.” 148 These
147F

statements depicting the protesters as pawns and dismissing their grievances as externally
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driven contributed to the people’s disillusionment with the HKG and exacerbated
tensions. 149
148F

Then, in an about-face, Carrie Lam expressed her “deep sorrow” over the
controversy and announced an indefinite suspension of the bill. 150 Although it is unclear
149F

why exactly Carrie Lam decided to suspend the bill on June 15, two things are for sure:
one, the intention was not to fuel anti-regime sentiment and two, the announcement was
not the outcome of any meaningful engagement with the opposition. The HKG likely
expected that the suspension of the bill would restore peace and order in Hong Kong; 151
150F

even outsiders such as Britain’s Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt applauded the HKG for
“heeding concerns of the brave citizens” who objected to the bill. 152 But the striking “U15F

turn” 153 from a leader who previously showed little regard for the people’s concerns
152F

backfired and “what seemed a possible end to the protests turned out to be the beginning”
(Lee et al. 2019, 10).
The campaign redoubled with an unprecedented turnout of 2 million people the
very next day. This time, calls for Carrie Lam’s resignation were heard alongside
demands for the bill’s full withdrawal, “an investigation into police violence against
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protesters, retracting the designation of prior protests as “riots,” and an assurance that the
protesters would not face criminal charges.” 154 Contentious activities continued for
153F

several months, taking forms as diverse as airport sit-ins and Baltic-inspired human
chains to collective singing of movement songs in malls and the erection of “Lennon
Walls” for posting pro-movement messages (Lee et al. 2020).
Why did the concession backfire? The HKG made a series of bad judgments
about a highly contentious bill. 155 For one, without engaging the movement, the
154F

government officials could only guess what would be acceptable to the campaign, and
they guessed wrong. Temporary suspension of the bill was not seen as a solution and
opponents of the extradition bill, from the Civil Human Rights Front organization to pandemocratic lawmakers, made it clear that delaying the bill was not enough. 156 There were
15F

others who saw a more fundamental problem and assumed the government was being
disingenuous. People Power lawmaker Raymond Chan Chi-chuen warned Hongkongers
to not be fooled by the government’s tricks in trying to pacify the public and demobilize
the campaign. 157
156F
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Additionally, the concession incentivized rejection because the announcement
itself served as evidence of the campaign’s growing power; to accept the concessions
risked losing momentum. 158 Thus, Carrie Lam’s efforts to placate the campaign served to
157F

invigorate them, and every time Lam tried to appease the public, it ramped up
mobilization. 159 One protest participant noted how the government’s unilateral actions
158F

continually fueled the movement: “I don’t know if [the government] was stupid or too
clever, but they seemed to choose the exact moment when the [campaign’s] momentum
was low to act and push the movement to an unprecedented level.” 160
159F

In addition to seeing the concessions as insufficient, insincere, or too instrumental
to accept, others suggested that it was fundamentally too late. 161 Although hypothetical,
160F

several protest participants and local observers believed that had Carrie Lam been more
responsive to the people’s demands early on, the campaign would have been satisfied and
the movement appeased. 162 However, I argue that it was not just a time delay but what
16F

happened in the interim that exacerbated the leaderless campaign: the concession came in
the heels of unprecedented police brutality that went unchecked by the HKG, and the
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constant denial of the people’s grievances as illegitimate made the people lose their trust
in public institutions and the administration.
Police brutality came to seen as the government response, because the HKG was
not responding in any other way. 163 The government was seen as treating a political
162F

problem as a law and order problem which further fueled public discontent, 164 and the
163F

outrage over state-sanctioned violence formalized into calls for an independent
investigation into police brutality. 165 The final proximate event prior to demand
164F

escalation was the death of a 35-year old protester (Mr. Leung) wearing a yellow raincoat
with the words “Carrie Lam kills Hong Kong.” 166 He plunged to his death after unfurling
165F

a banner on the side of a shopping mall and while the police treated it as a suicide,
protesters hailed him as a “martyr” and he came to represent the final mark against Carrie
Lam’s repressive regime. 167 Mr. Leung’s banner read, “No extradition to China, total
16F

withdrawal of the extradition bill; we are not rioters; release students and the injured;
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Carrie Lam step down; help Hong Kong,” 168 and this formed the basis of the “five
167F

demands” that would become a rallying cry for the campaign at large. 169
168F

If this was a case of organic exacerbation, early efforts by the HKG to listen to the
people’s grievances without the use of disproportionate force might have maintained the
public’s trust and averted the escalation of demands. The government’s unilateral
decision to suspend the bill could also be considered a mistake, but less consequential as
it is not clear who the government could have negotiated with if they wanted to.
There were clear mobilizers especially early on with the Civil Human Rights
Front (CHRF), a local NGO coalition, requesting the police permits required to hold mass
rallies. 170 But CHRF only played a coordinating role and their role faded once police
169F

stopped granting permissions for protest altogether. 171 The campaign’s strategic decisions
170F

were made “open source” through an online forum (LIHKG 172) and messaging channels
17F

like Telegram. 173 Protest participants used virtual platforms to brainstorm ideas and
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popular comments and suggestions were pushed to the top through electronic votes. 174
173F

During the campaign, public figures sometimes acted as facilitators but “if a public figure
attempted to make a speech or give instructions in any way during the protest, the crowds
would boo at them.” 175 The protesters did not want to be led and no one had the capacity
174F

or authority to represent the movement at large. 176
175F

While the HKG was not interested in engaging the campaign prior to escalation,
after more than three months of unrest, there were government officials who sought out
individuals who they could strike a deal with, to no avail. 177 Carrie Lam ended up
176F

holding a public meeting with more than a hundred citizens randomly drawn from a pool
of more than 20,000 applicants at the end of September, but it was largely
meaningless. 178 Lam was accused of putting on a show as she concurrently refused talks
17F

with pro-democracy lawmakers and presented no sign of wanting to meet the
demonstrators’ demands. 179
178F
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Not only did the campaign have no clear leaders, many young people felt that the
older generations had been too eager to compromise in the past, allowing Hong Kong’s
freedoms to be chipped away at. 180 As the campaign was leaderless by design, even if a
179F

deal could be reached with any group of individuals claiming to represent the masses,
demobilization could not have been guaranteed. To some protest participants,
negotiations were seen as something that would only benefit the government and create
divisions among protesters. 181 The double skepticism towards leadership and compromise
180F

are summed up in this anonymous demonstrator’s words who felt that “many leaders just
come out and they’re not actually representing the voice of many protesters… there’s no
room for negotiation.” 182
18F

5.5 Conclusion
The dynamic theory of demand escalation provides a framework to understand
whether and why demands escalated in three mass movements in Hong Kong, and also
how escalation might have been prevented in 2014 and 2019. The 2012 campaign against
Chinese patriotism classes drew the support of the general public and had the potential to
escalate into a maximalist campaign. However, the absence of regime violence and the

Interviewee 4; Hernandez, Javier. “Hong Kong Protesters Storm Legislature, Dividing the Movement.”
The New York Times, July 1, 2019. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/01/world/asia/china-hong-kongprotest.html>.
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state’s willingness to engage with leaders of the campaign resulted in the movement
being satisfied by government concessions.
The 2014 Umbrella Movement had clear leadership and campaign unity, and in
the aftermath of brutal state repression, the escalation of demands can be understood
through the pathways of strategic calculation and preemptive consolidation. In contrast,
the 2019 anti-extradition campaign lacked clear leaders, but individuals were sufficiently
angered by the government’s heavy hand such that when concessions came it backfired
on the regime, triggering the campaign’s escalatory potential through organic
exacerbation.
One caveat in understanding the anti-extradition campaign through the lens of
organic exacerbation is that the movement was uniquely cohesive, such that there was
even a high degree of solidarity between the movement’s moderate and violent flanks
(Lee 2020). This was one of the lessons from the 2014 campaign, in which people saw
the detrimental effects of infighting amongst the leadership. In reaction to 2014, the 2019
campaign opted for leaderless unity and adopted several slogans towards this end, such as
“Brothers climbing mountains, each offering one’s own efforts,” where each participant
chose their own lines of action while maintaining internal solidarity (Lee et al. 2020, 35).
As a result of this leaderless strategy, participants had more agency and felt more
attached to the movement as they gave more of their money, time, and ideas. 183 The QCA
182F

analysis found organic exacerbation to be a pathway for leaderless campaigns lacking
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cohesion, but the 2019 anti-extradition campaign shows that movement unity can give
leaderless campaigns leverage to escalate demands as well.
Additionally, the results of the QCA found that in general, having a broad
composition was more important than experiencing disproportionate state violence in
terms of explaining demand escalation. But analyzing these three cases in Hong Kong,
which all had broad public appeal and the potential to escalate, highlights the
fundamental role of regime repression in turning the people’s trust away from the
government, and points to the value of conducting multi-method research to understand
complex social phenomena.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion

In this dissertation, I put forward a dynamic theory of demand escalation that
considers how different combinations of movement structure and government response
can trigger protest campaigns to escalate demands. The biggest difference between
reformist campaigns that escalate demands and those that do not is whether the campaign
has a diverse participant base. When campaigns with broad public support experience
disproportionate state repression, this elevates the escalatory potential. Demands can then
escalate when leader-led movements are ignored (strategic calculation), when leader-less
campaigns receive unilateral concessions (organic exacerbation), or when leader-led
movements have high internal cohesion (preemptive consolidation). I triangulate
information from academic articles, news sources, and in-depth interviews and use both
quantitative and qualitative analysis to find support for the equifinal nature of this
phenomenon.
Fundamental to the dynamic theory of demand escalation is the different
opportunities (and sometimes deliberate orientations) leader-led and leaderless campaigns
have in terms of bargaining with the government. The fields of negotiation and civil
resistance have largely operated in different orbits, with “revolutionary” and
“resolutionary” approaches to conflict transformation growing in mutual ignorance
(Dudouet 2011). From the civil resistance side, negotiation is often viewed negatively by
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dissidents and some of the activists I interviewed echoed these sentiments about engaging
the government as equivalent to surrender and giving in. But negotiations can be used
instrumentally by both the state and the movement. Gene Sharp, a prominent
contemporary advocate of nonviolent strategy has taken this approach, warning about the
dangers of capitulation, appeasement, and premature resolution “lurking within the
negotiating room” (2011, 19) but also showing how negotiation can be a tactical trap that
civil resisters use against their opponents (2005).
In the growing effort to bridge the divide, scholars have highlighted their shared
underlying principles (Finnegan and Hackley 2008), identified complementary ideas and
practices (Dudouet 2017), and shown how negotiations can be a critical element of civil
resistance strategy (Wanis-St. John and Rosen 2017). There are also notable examples
that show the long-standing “symbiosis” between mass campaigns and negotiations: Dr.
Martin Luther King Jr. considered negotiation to be the very purpose of direct action and
compelled segregationists to negotiate the terms of greater social justice, Mahatma
Gandhi negotiated with the British Raj to gain access to the British authorities after the
Salt March, and the Polish Solidarity movement “negotiated its way into power and
transitioned Poland away from authoritarianism” (Wanis-St. John and Rosen 2017, 5).
Opposition groups may opt out of direct negotiations because they view engaging
the government as “equivalent of surrender of the principles at stake and surrender of the
overarching cause” (Wanis-St. John and Rosen 2017, 5). However, even if dissidents
keep themselves out of the negotiating room in fear of compromise, this does not mean
that bargaining does not happen. In the absence of direct talks, negotiation happens
indirectly and less efficiently. The dynamic theory of demand escalation shows how
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unproductive disengagement can be, both for the government (as ignoring or offering
unilateral concessions can backfire) and for the movement (as refusing to talk with the
government can mean miss opportunities for the gains sought).
There is still a lot to learn about demand escalation. The QCA pointed out the
conditional effects of movement cohesion when it is paired with leader-led versus
leaderless campaigns, and I hope to explore further the circumstances under which
movement cohesion serves as liability or leverage for the campaign at large. QCA also
identified the “contradictory configuration” of campaigns that are leaderless, have a
broad composition, are cohesive, receive government concessions, and face state
repression. A deeper analysis of why some campaigns with this configuration escalate
demands while others do not could help refine the dynamic theory of demand escalation
and help clarify the function of movement cohesion.
Second, while I focused on the question of why demands escalate, going from
reformist to maximalist, there are various ways that demands can evolve and sometimes
even revert from maximalist to reformist. Theorizing how demands transform through
expansion or consolidation, and how this affects the bargaining process is also something
that I hope to analyze further. Third, for this dissertation I blanketed the question of
success or failure, but many different aspects in the escalatory dynamic can theoretically
matter for different outcomes of interest in the conflict process and state-society relations
more broadly.
For one, subsequent research can compare unipartite, bipartite, and tripartite
campaigns in terms of achieving maximalist change. Previous work has shown that
maximalist movements are more effective at achieving their goals when they elicit
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diverse participation from society (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). If escalated campaigns
are predisposed to having a diverse participation base, then they may be more likely to
succeed as maximalist campaigns. Additionally, one can consider the time to escalation
(days between the start of a reformist campaign and when demands escalate to call for
leader removal or broader systemic change) and test if slower escalation is a function of
rational decision making, and therefore more likely to succeed (Weyland 2014).
In terms of the speed of escalation, there seems to be a trend in the number of
days shortening over time; reformist campaigns have taken longer to escalate demands in
the past, and demand escalation has occurred more quickly in recent years. Figure 15
shows the average days it took for a campaign to escalate demands in each decade. This
can factor into the analysis of outcomes or be used as a basis to explore what factors
might be affecting this trend and how it might matter for the future of mass campaigns.

Figure 15. Plotting Time to Escalation
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In sum, many regimes are increasingly facing existential threats from mass
movements, and this project helps to understand how sometimes a government’s best and
worst intentions to stem the tide of reformist campaigns can result in escalation to
maximalist campaigns. Regan and Norton (2005) proposed that “the etiology of civil war
is rooted in grievances and responses by the state to demands that are not necessarily
initially expressed in terms of organized armed rebellion” (335). I expand upon this
notion to suggest that both violent and nonviolent maximalist campaigns are part of this
complex process that often starts from lower levels of anti-state activity. Previous
research has considered how repressive structures and actions of the state can facilitate
the onset of civil wars (Brancati 2006, Buhaug, Cederman, and Rød 2008). Similarly, it
would behoove governments trying to prevent maximalist campaigns against its rule to
repress reformist protests sparingly (if at all) and offer concessions more thoughtfully.
For mass movements and their participants, there should be ongoing
conversations within campaigns about goals and ways to achieve shared objectives.
Especially among leaderless campaigns that are on the rise, 184 the merits of lacking
183F

centralized leadership should be carefully weighed against its alternatives. Ella Baker, an
American civil rights activist, famously said, “strong people don’t need strong leaders,”
and I am not suggesting that charismatic leaders are needed to make leaderless
movements more effective. Leaderless movements have proven to be capable of
functioning strategically, but to the extent that people want to participate in solving the

Serhan, Yasmeen. “The Common Element Uniting Worldwide Protests,” The Atlantic, November 19,
2019. <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/11/leaderless-protests-aroundworld/602194/>.
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problems that spurred them, they must be willing to dialogue and engage with the powers
that be.
As it stands, leaderless movements take a risky gamble with an all or nothing
approach. Many leaderless campaigns threaten to sustain mass action until all of their
demands are met, taking up slogans like “Five demands, not one less,” and “All of them
means all of them” (referring to the rejection of all political elites without exception). 185
184F

But up against a formidable government, this is a gamble movements are far more likely
to lose than win. Thus, the rise of leaderless movements could be another change that is
contributing to the declining effectiveness of all revolutions (Chenoweth 2021, 227).
Mass movements often create “openings for negotiation” but these can become
missed opportunities if no one is willing or able to come to the table (Wanis-St. John and
Rosen 2017). Recent movements may be deliberately leaderless to model the kind of
representative democracy that they desire to achieve, but perhaps they should go even
further and elect representatives from within the movement to practice what they seek.
Having elected leaders, or representatives, would not diminish the people power that is
driving the campaign but allow the campaign’s interests to be better articulated and equip
movements to engage the government for positive change.
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Appendix A – Dissertation Codebook

Scope condition: While campaigns continue to evolve over time, this project is
interested in the initial moment of escalation, when a campaign goes from reformist
demands (trigger or campaign) to being maximalist, and thereby crossing a threshold.
Movement demands:
• “REFORMIST_TRIGGER”: whether a maximalist campaign had a reformist
trigger (1 or 0)
• “REFORMIST_CAMPAIGN”: whether a maximalist campaign had a sustained
protest over the reformist trigger (1 or 0). “Sustained protest” means that it would
qualify as a separate reformist campaign.
o “CAT2_MEC_ID”: if a reformist campaign did precede the maximalist
campaign, indicate the MEC ID of the CAT2 campaign
• Reformist Claims: indicates one or more of the following variables that describe
the nature of the reformist demand(s)
o “REFCLAIM_ELECTORAL”: dichotomous variable, 1 = claim was
electoral in nature, see examples of claims below
o “REFCLAIM_SOCIAL”: dichotomous variable, 1 = claim was social in
nature, see examples of claims below
o “REFCLAIM_ECONOMIC”: dichotomous variable, 1 = claim was
economic in nature, see examples of claims below
o “REFCLAIM_POLITICAL”: dichotomous variable, 1 = claim was
political in nature, see examples of claims below
o “REFCLAIM_OTHER”: dichotomous variable, 1 = claim pertained to
other public concerns, see examples of claims below
Claims

Examples of targets

ELECTORAL
1. Pre-election results

Opposition rallies, etc.

2. Post-election results

Claims of election fraud, etc.

3. Election law

E.g., single-member districts, voting registration
rules, or ranked voting

SOCIAL
1. Social issues

Restrictions on social behavior

2. Ethnic self-determination

Autonomy, self-determination, language rights, etc.
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3. Anti-immigration/xenophobic

Immigration laws, foreigners

4. Religious freedom

Restrictions on religious freedom, religious
discrimination

5. Religious discrimination

Religious freedom of others

6. Environmental degradation

Environmentally-damaging businesses, government
practices, etc.

ECONOMIC
1. Price/tax increase

Food prices, oil prices, etc.

2. Economic corruption

Rent-seeking, patronage of economic elites

3. Labor/wage dispute

Organized labor or wage claims

4. Land tenure/

Farm issues, housing, etc.

POLITICAL
1. Police brutality

Arbitrary security actions; perceived unjust
repression

2. Political corruption

Non-election-related political corruption/insider
favors

3. International action

Protest against foreign policy

4. Irredentism

Pro-annexation

5. Government structure

Constitution, federalism, other governance
arrangements, etc.

6. Judicial/legal system

Fair trials, unpopular court rulings, etc.

7. Pro-government

Loyalists

8. Support of former
leader/deposed figure

Short of demanding that current government stand
down

9. Politician behavior/scandal

Other than corruption

OTHER
1. Other public concerns

•

Typically public policy concerns; often idiosyncratic
or highly context-specific.

“REFORMIST_COUNT”: integer variable (from 1-5) describing the number of
reformist demands of the campaign, 1= one specific demand (e.g., predominantly
economic), 2= two specific demands (e.g., predominantly economic and social); 3
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= three specific demands; 4 = four specific demands; 5 = five or more specific
demands
• “DEMAND_ESCALATION_DATE”: date of when the campaign demands
encompass leader removal or regime change
Movement structure:
• “LEADERSHIP”: dichotomous variable of whether there is/are identifiable
leader(s) or organization(s) providing strategy and leadership for the campaign
• “MOBILIZATION”: dichotomous variable of whether there is/are identifiable
individual(s) or organization(s) mobilizing and coordinating the campaign
• “ORGANIZATION” Is the leadership or mobilization provided by at least one
identifiable preexisting organization? If so, what type? (Adapted from
Foundations of Rebel Group Emergence Dataset)
o 0 = no pre-existing organization
o 1 = group evolved/splintered from a pre-existing rebel group included in
UCDP
o 2 = group evolved/splintered from a pre-existing armed non-state group
that did not cause 25 or more battle deaths (e.g., terrorist organization,
private militia)
o 3 = group developed from a political party
o 4 = group developed from a non-party political movement
o 5 = group developed from a student/youth group
o 6 = group developed from a labor/trade union
o 7 = group splintered/emerged from the government’s armed forces
o 8 = group emerged from a non-military faction within the government
o 9 = group emerged from the country’s former armed forces
o 10 = group developed from a religious organization
o 11 = group developed from foreign fighters/mercenaries
o 12 = group emerged from a refugee/exiled community (but not a formal
organization)
o 13 186 = group emerged from an ethnic group or indigenous organization
(formal or informal)
o 14 = group emerged from another type of organization
o 15 = group emerged for specific issue, related to the campaign
• “STRUCTURE”: (Adapted from Anatomy of Resistance Campaigns) Binary
variable capturing whether the movement in question was largely centralized or
decentralized, 0 = if sources refer to the movement as a “confederation,”
185F

186

This grouping variable diverges from FORGE

154

“federation,” “loose alliance,” “umbrella,” “decentralized”, or “leaderless”; 1 =
centralized/ hierarchical; NA = unclear
• “COHESION”: Binary variable capturing whether the movement in question had
largely cohesive demands, 0 = if sources refer to parts of the movement as having
disparate demands; 1 = unified demands (e.g., as evidenced by formal drafting of
demands); NA = unclear
• “COMPOSITION”: integer variable (from 1-5) describing the general
composition of the campaign, 1= one specific group of people (e.g.,
predominantly students), 2= two specific groups of people (e.g., predominantly
students and laborers); 3 = three specific groups of people (e.g., predominantly
students, laborers, and political opposition); 4 = four specific groups of people; 5
= five or more specific groups of people, or evidence of general public
involvement
Government response:
• “GOV_ENGAGED”: dichotomous variable of whether or not the government
tried to engage with members of the movement
• “MOVEMENT_ENGAGED”: dichotomous variable of whether or not the
movement tried to engage with members of the government
• “ENGAGE_DATE”: date when members of the government and movement first
met or negotiated
• “GOV_CONCESSION”: dichotomous variable of whether or not the government
made a concession to the movement (e.g., an action meant to appease the
movement)
• “GOV_CONCESSION_DATE”: date of first government concession
• “CONCESSION_BACKFIRE”: dichotomous variable of whether or not
government concession is cited as a reason for joining/continuing the campaign
(e.g., seen as insincere)
• “TARGETED_REPRESSION”: dichotomous variable of whether or not the
government targeted specific individual(s) or organization(s) in an effort to thwart
the campaign
• “WIDESPREAD_REPRESSION”: dichotomous variable of whether or not state
apparatus used widespread repression in an effort to thwart the campaign
•
“REPRESSION_BACKFIRE”: dichotomous variable of whether or not
government repression is cited as a reason for joining/continuing the campaign
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Appendix B – List of 26 newly added reformist campaigns to MEC
Campaign
Petrochallengers
1993 Student ID Protests
Communist Party of Columbia and
Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia
Anti-Perez (reformist)
1997 Anti-austerity Campaign
Anti-Petrobras/Corruption protests
Pro-Union Miners Strike
Northern Ireland Nationalists campaign
for equality/NICRA
Gilet Jaunes "Yellow Vest" Protests
(reformist)
Serbian National Council
Kosovo Albanian (reformist)
2017 Presidential Election Protest
Greek anti-military (reformist)
Phosphate War
Benin Public Servants Strike
Guinean pro-democracy movement
(reformist)
Lawyers and Teacher's Anglophone
Strikes
Zambian Civil Rights/ Northern
Rhodesia African National Congress
(NRANC)
Nyasaland African Congress (reformist)
2011-2012 Anti-Mutharika
2011 Libyan Housing Protests
Gezi Park Protest
Tiananmen Square (reformist)
East Pakistan Rights Campaign
Shanti Bahini (reformist)
pro-dem movement in Thailand
(reformist)

Location
Haiti
Guatemala
Colombia

Start Year
2018
1993
1958

End Year
2018
1993
1964

Venezuela
Ecuador
Brazil
Bolivia
Northern
Ireland
France

1991
1997
2014
1981
1967

1992
1997
2015
1981
1972

2018

2018

Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia
Serbia
Greece
Estonia
Benin
Guinea

1990
1988
2017
1973
1987
1989
2007

1990
1990
2017
1973
1988
1989
2007

Cameroon

2016

2017

Zambia

1955

1960

Malawi
Malawi
Libya
Turkey
China
Pakistan
Bangladesh
Thailand

1955
2011
2011
2013
1989
1969
1972
1991

1957
2012
2011
2013
1989
1971
1975
1992
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Appendix C – Case descriptions and coding decisions for the 39 escalated campaigns (in
numerical order by the reformist campaign ID)
MEC ID: 85/84 187
186F

Maximalist Campaign: The Forajido Rebellion
Reformist Claim(s): President Lucio Gutierrez was democratically elected in 2002. By
2005, a series of unpopular policy actions had generated significant discontent among the
people. Notable among these policy actions were increasing Ecuador’s IMF debt,
allowing indigenous lands to be exploited for oil, and perhaps most controversial,
replacing Supreme Court justices with his own supporters. In March 2005 this new court
dropped charges against exiled leader Abdala Bucaram, who was removed from office
following unpopular economic policies and accusations of corruption, embezzlement, and
insanity. When Bucaram was allowed to return to Ecuador, students, local governments,
indigenous groups, urban workers, and teachers took to the streets to demand Gutierrez’s
resignation. During one protest in front of the president’s home, Gutierrez called
demonstrators “forajidos,” or “outlaws.” This insult became the people’s battle cry and
the movement was soon branded as the Forajido Rebellion. The movement maintained its
commitment to nonviolence by employing creative tactics and using local radio to
communicate with one another. Police, on the other hand, used aggressive crowd control
tactics like tear gas, rubber bullets, and high-pressure hoses. This violence prompted the
military to withdraw its support of the president in order to protect civilians. Soon after,
Ecuador’s congress voted to remove Gutierrez from power.
The sequence of events was as follows: Beginning in January 2005, protests
against Gutierrez’s removal and subsequent appointment of supreme court justices
occurred, continuing through February. By March 5, around 1000 protesters attempted to
march to Congress to pressure lawmakers to fire Supreme Court judges aligned with
President Lucio Gutierrez's government. The protesters were charging President
Gutierrez with attempting to take control of the judicial system as pro-government
lawmakers fired 27 of the 31 Supreme Court judges in a simple majority vote earlier.
Moreover, the high court had annulled the criminal charges against former president
Bucaram, who had returned to Ecuador a few days earlier. Although the protesters were
dispersed by the police, other demonstrations continued, such as a sit-in in Quito’s
cathedral by indigenous people and peasants.
On April 13th, Quito's mayor halted bus service and other activities for a day to
protest against President Lucio Gutierrez, the first call directly against the president (vs.
In favor of ousted judges/to oust the regime-aligned judges). Most businesses opened
187

The first number is the maximalist campaign ID, the second number is the reformist campaign ID.
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even though Quito's Chamber of Commerce supported the protest. Although this protest
did not receive the expected support, after lawmakers ratified a decision to dissolve the
Supreme Court a few days later, thousands of people took to streets in Guayaquil and
Quito. The protests were supported by mayors of Quito and Guayaquil as well as the
indigenous organization groups. The number of demonstrators in Quito reached around
30,000-50,000 as they marched to Congress.
Gutierrez was ousted by the Congress on April 20th, after the military had
withdrawn its support and police forces refused to carry out his orders to quell the
protests. Congress named Vice President Alfredo Palacio as the new head of state.
Although protesters and opposition parties demanded Gutierrez put to trial and face
charges, he was granted exile by Brazil.
Number of Reformist Claim(s): 3; political, judicial, support for judges; austerity
measures; indigenous rights
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 84
Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 04/13/2005
Movement Structure:
• Leadership: 1, Quito’s mayor and Guayaquil’s mayor later were clearly key
leaders in both strategy and mobilization, with Quito’s using his office to enable
protests and utilizing the Chamber of Commerce
• Mobilization: 1, Quito’s mayor and Guayaquil’s mayor later were clearly key
leaders in both strategy and mobilization, with Quito’s using his office to enable
protests and utilizing the Chamber of Commerce
• Organization: 6,8 (6= chamber of commerce, 8=mayor of Quito)
• Structure: 0, there is no evidence of hierarchy in the campaign, it was largely
mobilized political rallies but there’s no evidence that the mayor or Chamber tried
to control them.
• Cohesion: 1, both pre- and post-escalation.
• Composition: 5 (mayors, civic groups, Ecuadorian citizens)
Government Response:
• Government Engagement: 0
• Movement Engagement: 1, on March 5, the demonstrators marched to Congress,
but were unsuccessful in securing a meeting with the government.
• Concession(s): 0
• Concession Backfire: NA
• Repression: Yes, targeted and widespread. Attempts at widespread repression
largely failed, though targeted repression did occur
• Repression Backfire: Substantial amounts of backfire in the form of the military
withdrawing its support and police refusing to hose down protests
Sources:
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1. Global Nonviolent Action Database. 2013. “Ecuadorians oust President Gutierrez
(Rebellion of the Forajidos), 2005.” Swarthmore College. Access at
http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/ecuadorians-oust-president-guti-rrezrebellion-forajidos-2005
2. BBC. 2005. “Ecuador Congress sacks president.” Access at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4466697.stm
3. Associated Press International, April 13 2005, “Quito mayor fails to paralyze
capital to protest Ecuador president's Supreme Court purge”
4. Associated Press International, April 18 2005, “Thousands in Ecuador's largest
city pour into streets to protest against president”
5. Agence France Presse, April 20 2005, “Ecuador leader flies out after army
withdraws support”
6. Agence France Press, April 20 2005, “Ecuadoran Congress swears in new
president”

MEC ID: 59/533
Maximalist Campaign: Hong Kong pro-democracy (Umbrella Movement)
Reformist Claim(s): On August 31, China’s Standing Committee of the National
People’s Congress announced the electoral process for the 2017 Chief Executive election
in Hong Kong. In this process, voters could elect the chief executive, but candidates for
the position must be vetted by a pro-Beijing nominating committee, like the Election
Committee which currently chooses the Chief Executive. Led by student groups and prodemocracy activists, protests began with a university student walk-out beginning
September 22, and then expanded to occupation of the area surrounding government
buildings beginning September 26. Over 50,000 people joined the protests at their peak,
with some estimates as high as 60,000 or 80,000 participants. In addition to calls for free
elections, protestors have demanded that current Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying step
down. The protest camps have concentrated in Hong Kong’s Admiralty—the location of
government buildings—Mong Kok, and Central districts. Attempted talks between
protestors and the government have been mostly unsuccessful. Police have repeatedly
clashed with protestors, responding with arrests and using batons, pepper spray, and tear
gas in efforts to disperse demonstrations and clear protest sites. Demonstrators have also
clashed with counter-protestors who support the government and oppose the sit-in
occupation. Public support for the demonstrations has gradually waned, with the number
of protestors at the camps shrinking to hundreds from earlier heights of more than 50,000
demonstrators. Hong Kong police cleared the Mong Kok protest camp on November 26,
violently clashing with and detaining protestors, including leaders of the student groups
Scholarism and the Hong Kong Federation of Students. After further violence between
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protestors and police on the night of November 30, the founders of the pro-democracy
group Occupy Central symbolically surrendered to police on December 3 and urged
protestors to retreat from occupation. Arresting over 250 protestors who refused to leave,
police forcefully dismantled the remaining Admiralty and Causeway Bay sites on
December 11 and December 15. Although pro-democracy groups repeated their demands
for free elections at marches in December and February, these rallies abandoned the
occupation’s maximalist demand for the resignation of Chief Executive Leung.
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 533
Demand Escalation (date and description): On September 23, as the student protest
continued, 1,000 students moved the protest to the government headquarters and
promised to escalate action if the leader of Hong Kong, Leung Chun-ying, refused to
meet with protesters; On September 25, 2,000 students marched on Chun-ying’s
residence and called on him to resign.
Movement structure:
• Leadership: 1, student leaders (later joined by Occupy Central)
• Mobilization: 1, students
• Organization: 5, student groups
• Structure: 0, no clear structure; movement was not centralized or hierarchical
• Cohesion: 1, demands were mostly cohesive and unified
• Composition: 5, students and Occupy Central, general public participation
Government response:
• Government Engagement: leaders of the protest movement agreed to talks with
the government on October 2; on October 9, the government called off the talks
and accused protest leaders of undermining constructive dialogue and using the
talks to incite more people to join the protest.
• Movement Engagement: protesters demanded talks (after escalating demands);
leaders of the protest movement agreed to talks with the government on October 2
but vowed to continue their demonstrations; protesters later announced they were
calling off talks with the government following inaction by the police to curb the
violence committed by the attackers.
• Concession(s): 0
• Concession Backfire (describe nature of backfire): NA
• Repression (describe both targeted and widespread): Both targeted and
widespread
• Repression Backfire (describe nature of backfire): Yes, police brutality
resulted in greater mobilization
Sources:
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AFP. 2014. “Thousands of Hong Kong students on strike for democracy,” Agence
France Presse – English, September 22.
AFP. 2014. “Scuffles as Hong Kong students escalate democracy strike,” Agence
France Presse – English, September 23.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong students march on financial district,” Agence France
Presse – English, September 24.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong students take democracy protest to leader’s home,”
Agence France Presse – English, September 25.
AFP. 2014. “Protesting Hong Kong students storm government complex,” Agence
France Presse – English, September 26.
AFP. 2014. “School pupils join Hong Kong democracy protests,” Agence France
Presse – English, September 26.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong democracy protesters dig in at government HQ,” Agence
France Presse – English, September 27.
AFP. 2014. “Police clear HK democracy protesters who stormed govt HQ,”
Agence France Presse – English, September 27.
AFP. 2014. “Tear gas fired at chaotic Hong Kong democracy protests,” Agence
France Presse – English, September 28.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong protest spreads to new site across harbour,” Agence
France Presse – English, September 28.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong protests turn festive after tear gas chaos,” Agence
France Presse – English, September 29.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong protesters prepare for new night of clashes,” Agence
France Presse – English, September 29.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong protesters renew fight on China’s National Day,”
Agence France Presse – English, September 30.
AFP. 2014. “Thousands swarm HK leader’s office as calls grow to quit,” Agence
France Presse – English, October 1.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong protest leader threatens to step up mass action,” Agence
France Presse – English, October 1.
AFP. 2014. “Defiant protesters gather in Hong Kong on China’s National Day,”
Agence France Presse – English, October 1.
AFP. 2014. “HK student protesters agree to talks but leader refuses to quit,”
Agence France Presse – English, October 2.
AFP. 2014. “Angry clashes between pro- and anti-protest groups in H.K.,”
Agence France Presse – English, October 3.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong protesters call off talks with govt after clashes,” Agence
France Presse – English, October 3.
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API. 2014. “Hong Kong police arrest 19 in protest clash,” Associated Press
International, October 4.
AFP. 2014. “Riot police fight back Hong Kong demonstrators,” Agence France
Presse – English, October 4.
AFP. 2014. “HK protesters refuse to budge as deadline to clear streets arrives,”
Agence France Presse – English, October 5.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong activists agree to talks as protests shrink,” Agence
France Presse – English, October 6.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong protest numbers dwindle as talks make slow progress,”
Agence France Presse – English, October 7.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong protest leaders vow to ‘stay on the streets’,” Agence
France Presse – English, October 8.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong government calls off talks with pro-democracy
students,” Agence France Presse – English, October 9.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong protesters vow to fight on as talks collapse,” Agence
France Presse – English, October 9.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong democracy protesters digging in for long haul,” Agence
France Presse – English, October 10.
API. 2014. “Hong Kong protesters petition Chinese President Xi,” Associated
Press International, October 11.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong police mass at protest sites,” Agence France Presse –
English, October 12.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong protesters clash with masked men at rally site,” Agence
France Presse – English, October 13.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong authorities accused of hiring thugs after clashes,”
Agence France Presse – English, October 13.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong police beat back protesters in violent clashes,” Agence
France Presse – English, October 14.
AFP. 2014. “HK legal chief says govt ‘impartial’ on police brutality,” Agence
France Presse – English, October 15.
AFP. 2014. “HK leader reopens talks offer after police brutality video,” Agence
France Presse – English, October 16.
API. 2014. “Fresh scuffles between Hong Kong police, activists,” Associated
Press International, October 16.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong police clear Mongkok protest site,” Agence France
Presse – English, October 16.
AFP. 2014. “New clashes in Hong Kong as demonstrators try to retake protest
camp,” Agence France Presse – English, October 17.
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AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong police charge leaves protesters injured,” Agence France
Presse – English, October 18.
AFP. 2014. “HK govt to open talks with democracy protesters next week,”
Agence France Presse – English, October 18.
AFP. 2014. “20 injured in new Hong Kong protest violence,” Agence France
Presse – English, October 19.
AFP. 2014. “’Foreign forces’ at work in Hong Kong protests, says leader,”
Agence France Presse – English, October 19.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong protest leaders ridicule ‘external forces’ claim,” Agence
France Presse – English, October 20.
AFP. 2014. “No breakthrough during Hong Kong protest talks,” Agence France
Presse – English, October 21.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong government hopeful for more talks with protesters,”
Agence France Presse – English, October 21.
API. 2014. “Hong Kong students, officials talk but don’t agree,” Associated Press
International, October 21.
AFP. 2014. “No end in sight for Hong Kong protests after talks,” Agence France
Presse – English, October 22.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong civil servants show support for democracy protests,”
Agence France Presse – English, October 23.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong protesters to hold street vote,” Agence France Presse –
English, October 24.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong protests in disarray as vote on next move scrapped,”
Agence France Presse – English, October 26.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong activists mark one month of ‘Umbrella Movement’,”
Agence France Presse – English, October 28.
API. 2014. “Hong Kong protesters suggest talks with Beijing,” Associated Press
International, October 28.
API. 2014. “Democracy protesters clash with Hong Kong police,” Associated
Press International, November 6.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong protest leaders request formal meeting with Beijing,”
Agence France Presse – English, November 7.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong democracy protesters march to China office,” Agence
France Presse – English, November 9.
API. 2014. “Hong Kong official warns protesters face arrest,” Associated Press
International, November 11.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong protesters plan to occupy British consulate,” Agence
France Presse – English, November 12.
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AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong protest leaders prevented from flying to Beijing,”
Agence France Presse – English, November 15.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong court notice clears way for action at protest site,”
Agence France Presse – English, November 16.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong authorities begin clearing main protest camp,” Agence
France Presse – English, November 18.
AFP. 2014. “Clashes as Hong Kong protesters attempt to break into parliament,”
Agence France Presse – English, November 19.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong democracy activists protest outside British consulate,”
Agence France Presse – English, November 21.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong police spray protesters, arrest 80 in bid to clear streets,”
Agence France Presse – English, November 25.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong police reopen main road after clearing protest camp,”
Agence France Presse – English, November 26.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong police clash with protesters outside govt HQ,” Agence
France Presse – English, November 30.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong protesters on hunger strike after violent clashes,” Agence
France Presse – English, December 1.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong protest founders to ‘surrender’, urge students to retreat,”
Agence France Presse – English, December 2.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong student leaders consider protest retreat,” Agence France
Presse – English, December 4.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong protest leader says block government, not roads,”
Agence France Presse – English, December 5.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong student leader Joshua Wong calls off hunger strike,”
Agence France Presse – English, December 6.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong police arrest protesters, dismantle main rally site,”
Agence France Presse – English, December 11.
AFP. 2014. “Hong Kong leader declares Occupy protest ‘over’ as last site
cleared,” Agence France Presse – English, December 15.

MEC ID: 166/782
Maximalist Campaign: Anti-Kishi Campaign
Reformist Claim(s): “In early 1959, negotiations began to revise and strengthen the
mutual security treaty (AMPO) between Japan and the United States. Leftist groups
opposed to Japan’s close relationship with the US and particularly to American bases on
Japanese soil joined together to create the People’s Council to Stop the Revised Security
Treaty. The Council began demonstrations against the new Security Treaty in April
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1959, primarily led by student activists and trade union members. In November, 20,000
student protesters stormed the Diet building in Tokyo, an event which was condemned by
mainstream political parties, but which served as a powerful rallying point for future
demonstrations. The new treaty was signed in January 1960 and scheduled to be ratified
by both houses of the Diet by June 19th, on which date President Eisenhower would travel
to Japan to celebrate the ratification.”
Number of Reformist Claim(s): 1
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 782
Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 05/20/1960; on the 19th, during a latenight meeting of the lower house of the Diet Prime Minister Kishi pushed through the
AMPO amendments without consulting the opposition parties. The following day antitreaty protesters and opposition groups began demanding the resignation of the Prime
Minister.
Movement Structure:
• Leadership: 1; The campaign was led by the executive council of the People’s
Council to Stop the Revised Security Treaty, made up of 15 to 16 different
representatives of various major pre-existing movements.
• Mobilization: 1; Mobilization was led by the People’s Council organized by the
Japanese Socialist Party and the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan,
joined at founding by 134 existing political and social movements.
• Organization: 15; Group emerged in regard to the revised treaty negotiations.
• Structure: 1; The campaign was centralized around the People’s Council.
• Cohesion: 1; The People’s Council was the sole organization making demands.
• Composition: 5; Opposition Parties, Students, Trade Unions.
• Movement Engagement: 0
Government Response:
• Government Engagement: 0
• Concession(s): 0
• Concession Backfire: NA
• Repression: 1, targeted; 0, widespread; “Nobusuke was determined to get the
treaty passed at all costs, and took the risky move of having the Socialist Party
members removed through physical force by the police. Without those members
present, the treaty was voted through within fifteen minutes. This police order,
along with other strong-armed actions he took, became Nobusuke’s downfall.
Although the treaty had been passed, and the campaign failed to achieve its
original goal, the protest now became a larger protest against the government.
Protesters were angered by Nobusuke’s behavior and demanded that he step
down. The campaign became a campaign to protect Japanese people’s democratic
rights.”
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Repression Backfire: 1
Sources:
1. Saruya, Hiroe. Protests and Democracy in Japan: The Development of Movement
Fields and the 1960 ANPO Protests. PhD Dissertation, University of Michigan.
Accessed 7/10/13 at
http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/96001/hsaruya_1.pdf?seq
uence=1.
2. https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/japanese-protest-security-treaty-usand-unseat-prime-minister-1959-1960

MEC ID: 2771/963
Maximalist Campaign: 2008 Anti-US Beef Protest
Reformist Claim(s): In April 2008, South Korea announced that it was lifting the ban on
imported beef from the United States as part of free trade agreement negotiations with the
United States. On April 27, a television program aired by MBC in South Korea
investigating safety of US Beef sparked widespread controversy over this part of the
agreement. In early May, candlelight vigils began among student groups and grew rapidly
to protest the lifting of the ban. An online petition calling for the impeachment of South
Korean President Lee Myung-bak began and quickly accrued over a million signatures.
By May 29th, protesters began calling for President Myung-bak’s resignation. The
president’s approval rating dropped significantly, and in early June his entire cabinet and
prime minister offered to resign. The president apologized, and in response to criticism,
there was a slight delay in the resumption of imports, an inspection of US facilities, and a
promise to not ease imports of other categories of US beef beyond what was already
negotiated. However, imports resumed at the beginning of July and were received in
South Korea by the end of the month and have continued since. Protests largely died out
by the beginning of August, and new cabinet officials replaced the agriculture and health
ministers who had resigned.
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1, Political (foreign policy/free trade agreement
provision)
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 963
Demand Escalation (date and description): 05/29/2008, First publicized call for
President Lee Myung-bak to resign--earlier petitions for impeachment, calls for various
government ministers and general unpopularity notwithstanding, this was the earliest
public explicit identification of maximalist demands identified.
Movement structure:
• Leadership: 0, no evidence of individual leadership found--protest movement
began on university campuses by students and quickly
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Mobilization: 0, no evidence of mobilization of specific groups--students were at
the center of initial candlelight vigil but the movement was largely grassroots and
organic, driven in part by the MBC television program.
• Organization: 5 students began protests, though they quickly grew to encompass
general public involvement
• Structure: 0, no evidence of formal hierarchy found.
• Cohesion: 1, yes, protest demands for the resumption of the ban on imports were
cohesive until the end of the campaign.
• Composition: 5, evidence of general public involvement (1 million protest
participants at the peak of the movement in June)
Government response:
• Government Engagement: 0, no evidence of direct engagement between
movement and government was found for the duration of the campaign
• Movement Engagement: 0, no evidence of direct engagement between
movement and government was found for the duration of the campaign
• Concession(s): 1, the president apologized twice and did negotiate further with
the US and eventually reached agreement restricting the age of beef imported
• Concession Backfire (describe nature of backfire): 0
• Repression (describe both targeted and widespread): 0, targeted; 1,
widespread; no evidence of targeted repression found, however, some evidence of
some widespread repression in the form of use of water cannons resulting in
hundreds of injuries and several thousand arrests was found, though no deaths
were found
• Repression Backfire (describe nature of backfire): 0, no campaign backfire
found.
Sources:
1. “Candlelit protests planned in SKorea ahead of US beef imports”, Agence France
Presse -- English May 9, 2008
2. “Thousands protest South Korean move on US beef” Agence France Presse -English May 29, 2008
3. “Huge Seoul protest over U.S. beef deal; Rally shows deep discontent with Lee as
his entire cabinet offers to step down” NYT International Edition, June 11, 2008
4. “Chronology of major events in South Korea-US beef talks” - BBC Monitoring
Asia Pacific, June 21, 2008
5. “SOUTH KOREA: POLICING THE CANDLELIGHT PROTESTS IN SOUTH
KOREA” Amnesty International, 6 October 2008, Index number: ASA
25/008/2008
6. “South Koreans protest government's lift of ban on US beef, 2008” Swarthmore
Global Nonviolent Action Database, retrieved 8/7/2020 from :
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https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/south-koreans-protest-governmentslift-ban-us-beef-2008

MEC ID: 41/1062
Maximalist Campaign: Anti-Compaore Campaign
Reformist Claim(s): This was a clear government structure/constitutional reform
campaign. Hundreds of protestors erected barricades and burned tires in the capital since
the proposal to extend Compaore's rule was announced on October 21. On October 24,
secondary school children deserted classes to join the protests. Schools and universities
closed on October 27, 2014 in Burkina Faso as incensed opposition members vowed to
fight a proposal to amend the constitution to extend President Compaore's 27-year rule.
Hundreds of women got a jump on the opposition's plan for protests by staging their own
demonstration on the 27th in Ouagadougou. They held spatulas in their hands in
symbolic defiance. Youth clashed with security forces on October 28 as gendarmes
deployed to disperse several dozen youths barricading the country's main highway. They
fired tear gas at the crowd, who hurled stones in response. Hundreds of thousands of
people set off from the capital's main Nation Square, blowing whistles and trumpets
before violence broke out. Protests grew on October 29, and a general strike was
called. On October 30, demonstrators set fire to Parliament after ransacking the building
in protest. The national television building was also stormed. Protests turned violent on
10/29, with protestors storming Parliament and setting it on fire. At least 30 were killed
when security forces fired at protestors, but they succeeded in forcing Compaore to scrap
his plan to run for another term, by changing the constitution. The press reported on
October 30 that around 30 people were killed and more than 100 injured in violence that
rocked the country that same day. On October 31, Compaore announced that he would
step down to make way for elections. His resignation came as tens of thousands of
protestors demanded that he quit.
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1 (Political, government structure/constitutional)
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 1062
Demand Escalation (date and description): 10/28/2014 (“28 October saw
demonstrations from over a hundred thousand people against the extension of term limits.
Protesters massed in central areas of the city and made clear that they would not accept
Compaoré staying as president. Many also called for him to leave immediately.”)
Movement structure:
• Leadership: 1, “One large organizing party was the Movement of People for
Progress (MPP), which was formed by former Compaoré supporters who defected
in January. The main founders of the party were Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, the
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National Assembly’s former president; Simon Campaoré, the mayor of
Ouagadougou; and Salif Diallo, a former cabinet minister. Labor unions were also
key organizers of the protests.”
• Mobilization: 1, see above, MPP/labor unions/opposition party members played
roles in mobilizing for protests, as did a pair of musicians, Sams’K Le Jah and
Serge Bambara who were popular with youth and called for the president’s
resignation.
• Organization: 3, MPP= opposition parties
• Structure: 0, no strong evidence for any hierarchical structure.
• Cohesion: 1, calls for constitutional reform and later the president’s resignation
were shared by the entire movement.
• Composition: 5, opposition political parties, youth, women, general public
involvement.
Government response:
• Government Engagement: None
• Movement Engagement: None
• Concession(s): None
• Concession Backfire (describe nature of backfire): NA
• Repression (describe both targeted and widespread): 1, 1; targeted and
widespread repression occurred during demonstrations, with the worst incident
being live fire into a crowd, killing at least 6. (8)
• Repression Backfire (describe nature of backfire): Yes, the largest protests
occurred after initial use of force, and repression was likely part of this, though
it’s unclear to what extent.
Sources:
1. AFPR. 2014. "Burkina braces for protests over move to extend leader's rule,"
Agence France Presse, October 27.
2. AFPR. 2014. "Clashed in Burkina over move to extend leader's rule," Agence
France Presse, October 28.
3. AFPR. 2014. "Clashes as 'one million' protest Burkina leader's power bid,"
Agence France Presse, October 28.
4. AFPR. 2014. "Burkina protestors set fire to parliament," Agence France Presse,
October 30.
5. AFPR. 2014. "Around 30 dead, 100 injured in Burkina Faso violence:
opposition," Agence France Presse, October 30.
6. Hien, Romaric Ollo. 2014. "Burkina's Blaise Compaore ousted," Agence France
Presse, October 31.
7. Swarthmore Global Nonviolent Action Database, “Burkina Faso protesters
remove Blaise Compaore from power, 2014”, Retrieved 1/18/2020
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from:https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/burkina-faso-protesters-removeblaise-compaore-power-2014
8. Christian Science Monitor, “Could Burkina Faso protests signal end of president's
27-year rule?” October 27.
https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2014/1030/Could-Burkina-Fasoprotests-signal-end-of-president-s-27-year-rule

MEC ID: 213/1727
Maximalist Campaign: Moldovan Anti-Government Protest
Reformist Claim(s): On May 3, more than 10,000 Moldovans gathered in the capital city
of Chisinau to protest the disappearance of over a billion dollars from the three largest
banks in Moldova. In April, the Moldovan Central Bank notified the public loans to
unidentified individuals had extracted the wealth from the country over several days prior
to elections the previous year, with some of the money located in Russian banks.
Protesters called for anti-corruption reforms and demanded the resignation of the
Prosecutor General, several supreme court judges, and other politicians tied to the
scandal.
Number of Reformist Claim(s): 2 (political and economic corruption)
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 1727
Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 09/06/2015; Following several months of
failed government actions to resolve the case of the missing money protesters gathered
again, this time demanding the resignation of the government.
Movement Structure:
• Leadership: 0; The unofficial leader of the mobilizing organization was lawyer
Andrei Nastase, but it is unclear how much of a leadership role he held over the
entire campaign.
• Mobilization: 1; The Civic Platform for Dignity and Truth (PCDA) was the
mobilizing organization of this campaign, utilizing traditional and new media
sources to organize the protests.
• Organization: 4, Pre-existing non-political movement; PCDA was formed in
Feb. 2015 to coordinate a number of anti-government movements planned during
the year.
• Structure: 0; While the PCDA was responsible for much of the mobilization
participation and campaign control was largely decentralized, with many other
groups involved including the liberal democratic and socialist political parties.
• Cohesion: 0; Sources indicate that the campaign had a difficult time unifying
protest demands prior to escalation, which in part, resulted in lower turnout.
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Composition: 5; indications of widespread involvement drawing from opposition
parties and civil society groups, though the campaign also relied on general
mobilization using social media
• Movement Engagement: 0; neither the movement nor government attempted
engagement.
Government Response:
• Government Engagement: 0; neither the movement nor government attempted
engagement.
• Concession(s): 0
• Concession Backfire: NA
• Repression: 0
• Repression Backfire: NA
Sources:
1. "Thousands protest in Moldova over missing $1 billion". Agence France Presse
-- English. May 3, 2015 Sunday.
2. Brett, Daniel, Ellie Knott, and Mihai Popșoi. "The ‘billion-dollar protests’ in
Moldova are threatening the survival of the country’s political elite." LSE
European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog (2015).
3. "Thousands protest in Moldova over missing $1 billion". Agence France Presse
-- English. May 3, 2015 Sunday.
4. Goșu, Armand. "Republic of Moldova. The Year 2015 in Politics." Studia
Politica. Romanian Political Science Review 16, no. 1 (2016): 21-51.

MEC ID: 14/1898
Maximalist Campaign: Pro-democracy movement in Argentina
Reformist Claim(s): The origins of the pro-democracy movement in Argentina are
rooted in other social movements that began in the mid-1970s such as the mothers of the
Plaza de Mayo, also known as the Mothers of the Disappeared. These protests
specifically focused on the regime’s brutality and demanded to know the locations of
those disappeared’. Economic concerns and Argentina’s loss in the Falklands war also
triggered protests. The day after Argentina surrendered, the largest protest since the
dictatorship gained power was held, with 7,000 chanting, “it’s over, it’s over, the military
dictatorship is over”. In October 1982 las madres held a “march for life”, despite
government threats and statements calling las madres the mothers of terrorists. By
December 1982, days after Argentina surrendered in the Falklands Wars, massive
protests broke out pushing for elections. In 1982, rallies and strikes began in Argentina to
protest the military government headed by President Reynaldo Bignone. Protests were
against inflation, the forced disappearances of thousands of Argentines during the
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government’s anti-terrorism campaign, and for a return to civilian rule. On March 30,
1982, around 1,500 Argentine protesters were arrested in one of the largest protests
against the military regime to that date. The “March for Life” on October 5 against the
forced disappearances of Argentines was attended by around 7,000 protesters. Weeks
before, 25,000 labor members had protested against economic issues in the country.
During the month of December, protests and strikes against the military regime occurred
on a near-daily basis. December activities included a strike of around nine million
Argentines against inflation and human rights abuses on December 6 and a demonstration
in Buenos Aires against the disappearances on December 10. On December 16, during a
“March for Democracy,” tens of thousands of Argentines protested for Argentina to
return to civilian rule by October 1983. Over 100 arrests were made, and one
demonstrator was shot and killed. Thirty protesters and thirty-five police were injured in
clashes.
Protests continued in 1983 against the disappearances, proposed amnesty for the military,
inflation, and for a return to civilian rule. Around 25,000 Argentines on May 29 protested
a report absolving the military of responsibility for human rights abuses while a protest of
around the same size on August 19 rejected proposed amnesty for perpetrators of abuses.
Tens of thousands marched on July 3 for a return to civilian rule.
Wildcat strikes beginning in the latter half of August through mid-September protested
inflation. These strikes affected hospitals, schools, banks, ports, factories, the mint,
police, telephone operators, and tax collectors. Labor unions held a nationwide strike
affecting businesses, transportation, and industry on October 4. Democratic elections
brought Argentina under the control of a civilian government led by President Raúl
Alfonsín on October 30, 1983.
Number of Reformist Claim(s): 3 (Economic issues, including inflation; political,
police brutality/forced disappearances, eventually adding Electoral reform (competitive
elections))
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 1898
Demand Escalation (Date and Description): December 16, 1982 (Multi-Party March;
“Multipartidaria”) (4).
Movement Structure:
• Leadership: Unclear. Prior to escalation, the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo were
leaders, though that group was decentralized and non-hierarchical. No formal
leadership emerged, though the Multi-party Group was an organizer of the
December 1982 march.
• Mobilization: Clear, “While not formally unified, opposition groups frequently
cooperated in order to organize mass demonstrations, such as those of 1983–84
calling for direct presidential elections”.
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Organization: 3,4 (Madres = non-party political movement, Multi-Party group =
political parties)
• Structure: No hierarchical structure found.
• Cohesion: Yes, the protests consistently mobilized for democracy and elections
and were cohesive early on (the reasons for doing so being economic
mismanagement and forced disappearances)
• Composition: 5, “The opposition consisted of labor unions, the Catholic Church,
intellectuals, and other segments of civil society.” “Opposition to the government
has covered a wide range of the political spectrum - from middle-class
housewives banging pots outside the Ministry of the Economy to a large group of
Falklands war veterans speaking out against their generals and staging a sit-in
during a recent parade to honor the fallen” 188
Government Response:
• Government Engagement: None.
• Movement Engagement: Yes, the Madres attempted to engage the government
and know the locations of the disappeared, but there was no evidence of the
government meeting with them.
• Concession(s): Yes, Dec 2, “the ruling military junta announced that it was
putting forward the date of presidential elections to the last quarter of 1983 in an
attempt to defuse civilian unrest”
• Concession Backfire: NA.
• Repression: Yes – targeted and widespread; considerable repression before and
after escalation. The December 1982 march left at least 1 dead and hundreds more
arrested as well as dozens of injured.
• Repression Backfire: Yes. Before mobilization, the repression used against the
disappeared triggered the initial Madres movement and subsequent repression of
protests in the early days of the escalation triggered additional participation and
mobilization, as well as strikes.
Sources:
1. Swarthmore Global Nonviolent Action Database, “Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo
campaign for democracy and the return of their “disappeared” family members,
1977-1983”, accessed 1/6/2020
from:https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/mothers-plaza-de-mayocampaign-democracy-and-return-their-disappeared-family-members-1977-19
187F

188

https://www.csmonitor.com/1982/1217/121753.html
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2. UPI, Smith, Geri, 1982. “Mass march for Argentine democracy” December 16,
accessed 01/08/2020 from:https://www.upi.com/Archives/1982/12/16/Massmarch-for-Argentine-democracy/4381408862800/
3. Burns, Jimmy. 1982. “Argentines strike as pressure for reform mounts,” Financial
Times, December 6.

MEC ID: 29/1937
Maximalist Campaign: Anti-Siles Zuazo
Reformist Claim(s): The three-year presidency of Siles Zuazo was plagued by some of
the worst inflation in modern history which resulted in frequent strikes and economic
protests. On Jan. 17 many factories in La Paz went on strike, taking factory executives
hostage as part of their negotiating strategy. These strikers where demanding back pay
owed as part of a previous successful strike, as well as holiday pay. Negotiations on the
18th between labor leaders and the President secured the release of the executives but
failed to end the strike. The following day a general strike was declared, spreading across
nearly all industries and covering the entire country. Over the next several months the
economy continued to decline, and the general strike continued with periodic strikes and
protests. On March 4, a new series of strikes began demanding the resignation of the
President, growing into another general strike by the 7th.
Number of Reformist Claim(s): 1
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 1937
Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 03/04/1985; Following the failure of the
initial general strike, demands increased to include the resignation of the president
Movement Structure:
• Leadership: Clear; While unnamed in most accounts, it is clear the strikes are
being led by union leadership
• Mobilization: Mobilization was initially led by the miner’s union before being
joined by the larger Bolivian Labor Confederation
• Organization: 6. Pre-existing labor unions
• Structure: 1, hierarchical
• Cohesion: Yes, the movement presented a unified series of demands when
engaging with the government.
• Composition: 1. Trade Unionists
• Movement Engagement: Labor leaders met with the government during the
initial hostage-taking incident on 1/4/1985
Government Response:
• Government Engagement: Labor leaders met with the government during the
initial hostage-taking incident on 1/4/1985
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Concession(s): 0, no concessions were made during the reformist portion of the
campaign
• Concession Backfire: NA.
• Repression: 0; The government threatened repression during the hostage-taking
incident but otherwise allowed the strikes to continue.
• Repression Backfire: NA
Sources:
1. "600 Factories in La Paz Shut in Protest Over Hostage Taking". The Associated
Press. January 17, 1985, Thursday, PM cycle.
2. "Hostages Released But General Strike Begins". The Associated Press. January
19, 1985, Saturday, AM cycle.
3. "Currency Devalued by Nearly 81 Percent, Prices Hiked 400 Percent". The
Associated Press. February 9, 1985, Saturday, PM cycle.
4. "Miners Throw Dynamite During Protest". The Associated Press. March 4,
1985, Monday, AM cycle.
5. "Bolivia Paralyzed by General Strike; Government Warns of Coup". The
Associated Press. March 8, 1985, Friday, AM cycle.
6. Buitrago, Miguel A. “Civil Society, Social Protest, and Presidential
Breakdowns in Bolivia.” Presidential Breakdowns in Latin America. Llanos,
Mariana and Marsteintredet, Leiv, (eds). Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

MEC ID: 9/2241
Maximalist Campaign: Islamic Salvation Front
Reformist Claim(s): Prior to the formation of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in 1989,
widespread protests occurred over high prices and economic problems, aided by
corruption on part of the ruling FLN party. These protests in late 1988 (including the
1988 October Riots) laid the groundwork for the FIS to take root after competitive
elections were instituted the following year and led to a sweep of local government seats
in 1990 (4). Following the October 1988 riots, the Benjedid government promised
political reforms with a “greater democratization of political action,” and “political and
institutional changes (5). While religious motivation remained a key part of the FIS
platform, economic issues and anti-corruption rhetoric were frequently cited as well. For
example, beginning in 1991, the FIS released statements critiquing government economic
mismanagement (3) and eventually succeeded in winning the general election of 1992,
only to be banned by the government.
Violent clashes erupted in Algeria on February 7, 1992 between Muslim
fundamentalists and security forces after the military forced President Chadli Benjedid
out of office on January 11. The ouster was followed by a crackdown on the Islamic
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Salvation Front (FIS), which had been set to win an overwhelming majority in the
country’s parliamentary elections. The FIS was officially outlawed in March 1992. The
clashes became a full-fledged insurgency in 1993, and grew to involve a number of nonstate armed groups, including the Groupe Islamiste Armé (GIA); the Armée Islamique du
Salut (AIS); and various splinter groups (e.g., the Groupe salafist pour la predication et le
combat, GSPC). Following the initial clashes in 1992, a number of unelected, armysupported regimes ruled Algeria. Bouteflika was elected in 1999 and remained president
until 2019. Over time, the army’s countermeasures against the insurgency became
increasingly brutal, resulting in a large number of gross human rights violations. Both
sides are accused of massacring civilians. The intensity of the violence decreased in 2002
(most databases record the end of the conflict between Algeria-FIS as 2002 or 2003), a
number of Islamist groups that fought in the insurgency – including the FIS – laid down
their arms. A number of groups, however, remained active as anti-government forces in
Algeria (e.g., GSPC, AQIM).
A number of foreign states provided support to both the Algerian government and
non-state armed groups during the conflict. France supplied Algeria with arms initially,
and other states including Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt, and the U.S. have also all
contributed. Organizations such as the Islamic Relief Organization, affiliated with al
Qaeda, provided economic support to the AIS, and Sudan may also have provided aid to
the GIA in the late 1990s.
Number of Reformist Claim(s): 2 – economic problems and corruption
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2241
Demand Escalation (date and description): 2/7/1992
Movement Structure:
• Leadership: 1, the FIS was the leader of the campaign and played a key role in
the armed group’s leadership as well as mobilization of troops. Hierarchical
leadership was present in FIS and the armed groups
• Mobilization: 1, the FIS was the leader of the campaign and played a key role in
the armed group’s leadership as well as mobilization of troops. Hierarchical
leadership was present in both FIS and the armed groups
• Organization: GIA/AIS = 2; FIS = 3
• Structure: Centralized, clear hierarchy present in FIS, with military groups also
exhibiting hierarchy.
• Composition: FIS= political party, GIA and AIS =splinter military groups
• Cohesion: No, the GIA opposed the FIS and other armed groups, though they
fought the government, they differed on ideological grounds.
• Movement Engagement: Unclear. No evidence for direct engagement. Prior to
escalation, engagement occurred politically at a local level and via mobilization
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against government, but a strike in 1989 and in 1992 made it difficult to discern if
any direct engagement occurred. Coded as zero.
Government Response:
• Government Engagement: None prior to escalation
• Concession(s): Yes; prior to escalation, the 1991 general strike resulted in
concessions promising a fair election, but these were reneged on and were never
concrete
• Concession Backfire: N/A
• Repression: Targeted & widespread; prior to escalation, repression
occurred against FIS, with leadership and members being arrested in purges. After
escalation, substantial repression in the form of armed campaigns against
FIS/AIS/GIA lasted for years.
• Repression Backfire: The total repression of the FIS and widespread arrests in
the wake of the 1992 election triggered an armed backlash that lasted for decades.
Sources:
1. UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, Algeria:Government,More Information, accessed
1/2/2020 from: https://ucdp.uu.se/conflict/386
2. Khiari, Rachid. 1992. “Clashes erupt at mosques around country during Friday
prayers,” The Associated Press, February 7.
3. Willis, Michael. 1996. "ALgeria's troubled road towards liberalization, 19881995". In Nonneman, Gerd (ed.). Political and Economic Liberalization:
Dynamics and Linkages in Comparative Perspective. Lynne Rienner Publishers.
p. 220.
4. Kepel, Gilles 2002. Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. Harvard University Press.
(Ch 7 pp, 159-176)
5. “Algeria: Riots of October 1988.” Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 1
September 1989. <https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aba95c.html>

MEC ID: 10/2248
Maximalist Campaign: Anti-Abdelaziz Bouteflika Campaign
Reformist Claim(s): Abdelaziz Bouteflika became president of Algeria in 1999 in an
uncontested election. By his second term, he had changed the laws and abolished the law
on term limits. In 2009, he again ran uncontested and won a third term. This sparked
several small and uncoordinated protests against the change in the law and uncontested
elections. By the end of 2010, the groups had bound together to form a solidified
resistance movement.
Protests began in December 2010 over housing prices, the high price of basic food and
oil, and high unemployment, similar to Tunisia’s ongoing events at the time. The protests
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didn’t have cohesive demands, but widespread economic discontent was a consistent
theme.
On December 28, 2010, over 9700 people gathered in Algiers calling for Bouteflika to
step down, as well as for constitutional reforms. The movement spread throughout
Algeria and in the first weeks of January 2011, there were continual nationwide protests.
In addition to calling for Bouteflika’s resignation, protesters called for electoral,
economic and judicial reform. By the end of January, several opposition and human
rights groups had formally formed the National Coordination for Change and Democracy,
in an attempt to reform the system politically. President Bouteflika promised to meet with
the group, however, their demands fell upon deaf ears. Spurred by the fall of the Tunisian
and Egyptian regimes, protest numbers swelled in 2011, with protests frequently reaching
over 15000 participants. Labor unions and professional associations joined in and
conducted mass strikes and walk-outs through the summer of 2011. Protesters and
picketers were met with violence and oppression from the government forces. Hundreds
of protesters were killed, and thousands imprisoned. Self-immolations became a popular
response to the government repression. In late summer of 2011, President Bouteflika
promised to amend the constitution to restore democratic rule. The National Coordination
for Change and Democracy welcomed this announcement and began to expand its
membership to include previously exiled Islamist groups in anticipation of impending
elections. Protests petered out in January of 2012, and following another constitutional
amendment, Bouteflika won a fourth term in 2014.
Number of Reformist Claim(s): 3 (ECONOMIC: Price/tax increase, ELECTORAL:
election law, Amending the constitution, and POLITICAL: constitution)
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2248
Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 12/28/2010 (explicit call for Bouteflika to
step down); 1/21/2011 (when the National Coordination for Change and Democracy for
formed)
Movement Structure:
• Leadership: No, the National Coordination for Change and Democracy (CNCD)
was a leader in the protests and the loose coalition it formed was highly inclusive,
though not particularly strong
• Mobilization: Yes, The CNCD did mobilize for protests.
• Organization: 15 (CNCD = umbrella organization for the campaign)
• Structure: No hierarchical structure evident, largely grassroots movement.
• Cohesion: No, no cohesive set of goals found, though frustration with Bouteflika
government was generally shared
• Composition: Labor unions, opposition political parties, professional
associations, limited general public involvement
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Movement Engagement: Not prior to escalation; movement engaged in dialogue
during April 2011, though the results of the dialogue were uncertain
Government Response:
• Government Engagement: Not prior to escalation, Bouteflika did engage with
protestors, albeit indirectly, via associations, particularly after the summer when
he circulated drafts of the constitutional amendment
• Concession(s): Yes, January 8, government agreed to a temporary cut in taxes
and duties on sugar and cooking oil
• Concession Backfire: the Socialist Forces Front responded to the government's
lowering of food prices on 8 January with the slogan "The government cannot buy
Algerians' silence"
• Repression: Yes, thousands of arrests and many injuries, plus several deaths in
January 2011, (2)
• Repression Backfire: Yes, backfire likely as protest attendance spiked after
January 2011, though it’s difficult to parse out how much backfire contributed to
escalation given concurrent events in neighboring countries.
Sources:
1. Nossiter, Adam and Timothy Williams. 2011. “Algerian Riot Police Break Up
Protest.” The New York Times. February 12. Access at:
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/13/world/africa/13algeria.html?pagewanted=all
&_r=1&
2. Staff Writer. 2011. “Algerian Protesters Push for Change.” Al
Jazeera. February 12. Access at:
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/02/201121235130627461.html
3. Staff Writer. 2011. “Algeria Leader vows to “Reinforce” Democracy.” The
Wall Street Journal. April 15. Access at:
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870332740457619436324498534
4.html?mod=googlenews_wsj
4. Foreign Policy. 2012. “Algeria’s Revolution that Wasn’t” Real Clear
World. January 7. Access at:
http://www.realclearworld.com/2012/01/07/algerias_revolution_that_wasnt_1315
49.html
5. Ouali, Aomar. 2011. “Algerian police break up march protesting ban on public
gatherings; at least 19 injured,” The Associated Press, January 22.
6. AFPR. 2011. “Thousands in Algeria protest march: organizers,” Agence France
Presse, January 29.
7. AFPR. 2011. “Protest strikes dog Algeria,” Agence France Presse, February 22.
8. Gainley, Elaine. 2011. “Algeria sitting in circle of fire but keeps lid on social
unrest_for now,” The Associated Press, March 2.
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9. AFPR. 2011. “Thousands of police rally in Algeria,” Agence France Presse,
March 7.
10. AFPR. 2011. “Nine hurt in student demo in Algiers,” Agence France Presse,
May 2.
11. AFPR. 2011. “Algeria passes budget law as public anger grows,” Agence France
Presse, June 15.
12. Ouali, Aomar and Paul Schemm. 2011. “Facebook call for Algeria protest
ignored, but nation still rife with discontent,” The Associated Press, September
25.
13. Northey, J 2017, 'Associations and Democracy in Algeria' Democratization, vol
24, no. 2, pp. 209-225 https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2016.1144590
14. Chikhi, Lamine. 2011. “Algeria announces food price cuts to quell riots,” Reuters,
January 8. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-algeria-riots/algeria-announcesfood-price-cuts-to-quell-riots-idUSTRE7053EL20110108?pageNumber=2>.

MEC ID: 88/2280
Maximalist Campaign: Kefaya
Reformist Claim(s): The origins of Kefaya begin in the protest against the US invasion
of Iraq on March 20, 2003, drawing 20,000 protesters into the street. Criticism of the
action was highly stymied by the close relationship between the Egyptian regime and the
US, but it represented some of the early mobilization of those who would come to found
Kefaya.
Number of Reformist Claim(s): 1
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2280
Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 08/01/2004; Kefaya put out its first initial
set of demand seeking to remove President Mubarak’s control of the government.
Movement Structure:
• Leadership: 0; These protests had no clear leadership.
• Mobilization: 1; Mobilization was led by various student groups and islamist
groups.
• Organization: 15, Kefaya = new group
• Structure: 0; Various groups took part in the overall protest without a unifying
structure.
• Cohesion: 1; The groups were all protesting the US invasion of Iraq. [2]
• Composition: 5; Though initially started by university students, numerous other
groups joined the protests.
• Movement Engagement: 0
Government Response:
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Government Engagement: 0
• Concession(s): 0
• Concession Backfire: NA
• Repression: Yes – targeted and widespread 189
• Repression Backfire: 0
Sources:
1. Killian Clarke (2011) Saying "Enough": Authoritarianism and Egypt's Kefaya
Movement. Mobilization: An International Quarterly: December 2011, Vol. 16,
No. 4, pp. 397-416.
2. Oweidat, Nadia, Cheryl Benard, Dale Stahl, Walid Kildani, Edward O'Connell,
and Audra K. Grant. "Kefaya’s Origins." In The Kefaya Movement: A Case Study
of a Grassroots Reform Initiative, 3-16. Santa Monica, CA; Arlington, VA;
Pittsburgh, PA: RAND Corporation, 2008. Accessed January 13, 2020.
18F

MEC ID: 229/2489
Maximalist Campaign: 2019 Anti-Ortega Protests
Reformist Claim(s): While a nascent anti-Ortega protest movement began in late
2014/early 2015 with sporadic activity protesting a proposed canal in Nicaragua, this
campaign was triggered by initial protests which started on 19 April 2018 with about
10,000 demonstrators over a proposed social security reform by Daniel Ortega’s
government that would have reduced benefits and raised taxes. The government’s
response to the protests had angered Nicaraguan citizens and protests continued, shifting
demands to Ortega’s resignation.
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1, economic
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2489
Demand Escalation (date and description): On April 23, protesters began to demand
Ortega’s resignation.
Movement structure:
• Leadership: 1, Initially led by workers during the social security reform phase,
students at Central American University were integral to initiating the demand for
Ortega's removal. After the National Dialogue began in May, opposition has
formally coalesced into Alianza Civica (Civic Alliance), led by a diverse group of
former Chamber of Commerce and business leaders, nonprofit leaders and
religious leaders.
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https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/kefaya-protests-mubaraks-referendum-and-re-election-egypt2005
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Mobilization: 1, Superior Council for Private Enterprise (COSEP) played a key
role in mobilizing against the social security reform. Subsequent protests
mobilized by Civic Alliance.
• Organization: 4, 5, 6, 10; COSEP = labor union; Civic Alliance = coalition of
students, academics, business, and labor, as well as opposition political parties.
• Structure: 0, Civic Alliance has formal leadership elected from each of the
sectors comprising it but is non-hierarchical.
• Cohesion: 1, calls for Ortega’s resignation were shared across the movement.
• Composition: 5; Students, farmers, politicians and academics
Government response:
• Government Engagement: 1, on May 16, Ortega agreed to meet leaders of the
protest in a National Dialogue, brokered by religious church pressure. However,
these quickly fell apart. By May 22, talks ceased.
• Movement Engagement: 1, on May 16, Ortega agreed to meet leaders of the
protest in a National Dialogue, brokered by religious church pressure. However,
these quickly fell apart. By May 22, talks.
• Concession(s): 1, Prior to escalation, the government cancelled the social security
reforms.
• Concession Backfire: 1, Cancelling the reform was insufficient to halt protests
and atone for government repression, triggering the subsequent maximalist
campaign.
• Repression: 1, targeted; 1, widespread; Initial reformist protests quickly escalated
in size and scale and the government repressed protests with considerable force.
Dozens were killed and the Nicaraguan government faced significant domestic
and international condemnation. Troops were sent to repress student protests at
universities, resulting in deaths. By the end of 2018, protests left at least 322
people dead and 565 others in jail.
• Repression Backfire: Repression used during the initial protests significantly
backfired, escalating to hundreds of thousands of people. After escalation,
significant repression thereafter shrank the number of protesters as the regime
cracked down hard. The repression has drawn international condemnation from
the U.N. and OAS’s IACHR and caused his allies to reverse course and support
his removal.
Sources:
1. AFP. 2018. “More protests in Nicaragua, 5 TV channels ordered off air”
Associated Press. April 20
2. AP. 2018. “The Latest: Nicaragua cancels social security overhaul”. Associated
Press. April 22.
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3. AP. 2018. “Cardinal: Nicaragua talks at impasse, suspended indefinitely”
Associated Press, May 23, 2018.
4. Anderson, Jon Lee. 2015. “Breaking Ground on the Nicaragua Canal.” The New
Yorker, January 2, 2015. https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/breakingground-nicaragua-canal.
5. Civic Alliance. n.d. “Sobre Nosotros.” Blog. Alianza Cívica Por La Justicia y La
Democracia de Nicaragua (blog). Accessed December 18, 2019.
https://www.alianzacivicanicaragua.com/sobre-nosotros/.
6. Delphine Shrank. 2018. “Nicaragua Protests Erode Pillars of Support for Ortega.”
Reuters, May 29, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nicaragua-protestsanalysis-idUSKCN1IT1XX
7. Lucjan, Estefany. 2019. “Daniel Ortega Declara Ilegales Las Protestas En
Nicaragua y Amenaza Con Prisión a Organizadores.” La Republica, May 29,
2019. https://larepublica.pe/mundo/1328115-nicaragua-daniel-ortega-declarailegales-protestas-criminalizacion-protesta-derechos-humanos/.
8. Nick Cumming-Bruce. 2018. “U.N. Sounds Alarm on Repression in Nicaragua The New York Times.” New York Times, August 29, 2018.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/29/world/americas/nicaragua-repression.html.
9. Robles, Frances. 2018a. “As Nicaragua Death Toll Grows, Support for Ortega
Slips.” The New York Times, May 4, 2018, sec. World.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/04/world/americas/nicaragua-protestsortega.html.
10. ———. 2018b. “In Nicaragua, Ortega Was on the Ropes. Now, He Has Protesters
on the Run.” The NewYork Times, December 24, 2018, sec. World.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/24/world/americas/nicaragua-protests-danielortega.html.
11. ———. 2019. “Nicaraguan Supreme Court Justice Slams His Former Ally,
President Ortega.” The New York Times, January 12, 2019, sec. World.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/12/world/americas/nicaragua-ortegalegal.html.
12. Salinas, Carlos. 2018. “Nicaragua se vuelca en una gigantesca marcha contra
Ortega.” El País, April 29, 2018, sec. America.
https://elpais.com/internacional/2018/04/29/america/1524955927_450517.html.
13. Rivas, Oswald. Reuters. 2018. Protesters demand resignation of Nicaraguan
president after unrest April 23. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nicaraguaprotests-usa/protesters-demand-resignation-of-nicaraguan-president-after-unrestidUSKBN1HU1YA
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MEC ID: 322/2685
Maximalist Campaign: Sudanese Uprising
Reformist Claim(s): On December 13, 2018, protests broke out in Sudan over sharp
increases in the price of food and fuel due to economic mismanagement. Led and
mobilized in part by the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), the protests spread
quickly to the capital. By the end of December, protests escalated to demanding Omar
Al-Bashir’s resignation. Repression was swift and violent, with hundreds being injured,
arrested and detained. On January 1, 2019, the opposition coalesced into the Forces of
Freedom and Change, formally calling for Bashir’s resignation. Protests continued amidst
a media blackout for several months. On April 6, the SPA organized a march of hundreds
of thousands to the headquarters of the military, where they were attacked by pro-Bashir
security forces. Members of the military actively joined the protests, sheltering them and
protecting them from the security forces. On April 11, Bashir was removed from power
by a military coup, after which a transitional military council was formed. However,
protests continued, as the organizers continued to demand a democratic civilian
government. Over the summer, several large scale incidents occurred in Khartoum and
El-Albeid where hundreds were killed, triggering calls for civil disobedience by the
SPA.
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2685
Demand Escalation (date and description): By December 18, protestors demanded
Bashir’s resignation and the call became widespread by the end of December.
Movement structure:
• Leadership: 0, While Mohamed Yousif Ahmed Al Mustafa led the Sudanese
Professionals Association, and leaders of the Forces for Freedom and Change
came from a variety of sectors, the protests themselves were decentralized, and no
individual took clear leadership
• Mobilization: 1, Forces of Freedom and Change, Sudanese Professionals
Association (SPA)
• Organization: 6 (SPA = labor)
• Structure: 0, no formal hierarchical leadership found.
• Cohesion: 1, calls for Bashir’s resignation were shared across the movement.
• Composition: 5; General Public Involvement, students, women, academics,
doctors, teachers, later in the campaign, defections from military
• Movement Engagement: 0, the call for Bashir’s resignation was firm and the
protests didn’t seek concessions or engagement.
Government response:
• Government Engagement: 0
• Concession(s): 0
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•

Concession Backfire: NA
• Repression: 1, targeted; 1, widespread; Significant repression occurred
throughout the campaign, beginning immediately when protests broke out and
police used live ammunition and teargas against largely peaceful demonstrators,
and continuing throughout the campaign. At least 246 died over the course of the
campaign with thousands more injured.
• Repression Backfire: 1, Considerable violence against protesters by Bashir led to
increased participation and defections from the military, eventually resulting in a
coup. Post-coup, violence against protestors, particularly the June and July
massacres in Khartoum and El-Albeid further amplified support for a civilian
transitional government.
Sources:
1. Al Jazeera, n.d. Sudan forms 11-member sovereign council, headed by al-Burhan
[WWW Document]. URL https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/sudan-forms11-member-sovereign-council-headed-al-burhan-190820204821614.html
(accessed 12.18.19).
2. BBC News, 2019. Sudan protests: Inside the sit-in at army HQ. BBC News.
3. France 24, 2019. Sudan’s disparate opposition comes together post Bashir
[WWW Document]. France 24. URL https://www.france24.com/en/20190416sudans-disparate-opposition-comes-together-post-bashir-0 (accessed 12.19.19).
4. Hassan, M., Kodouda, A., n.d. Analysis | Sudan ousted two autocrats in three
days. Here’s what’s next. [WWW Document]. Washington Post. URL
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/15/four-things-know-aboutsudans-coups/ (accessed 12.19.19).
5. International Crisis Group, 2019a. Improving Prospects for a Peaceful Transition
in Sudan [WWW Document]. Crisis Group. URL
https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/sudan/b143-improving-prospectspeaceful-transition-sudan (accessed 12.19.19).
6. International Crisis Group, 2019b. Safeguarding Sudan’s Revolution [WWW
Document]. Crisis Group. URL https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/hornafrica/sudan/281-safeguarding-sudans-revolution (accessed 12.19.19).
7. January 31, P.W., 2019, 2019. Repression strengthens mass movement aiming to
topple Sudan’s dictator. Waging Nonviolence. URL
https://wagingnonviolence.org/2019/01/sudan-bashir-dictator-mass-movement/
(accessed 12.19.19).
8. Mahmoud Osha, n.d. “It’s more than bread”: Why are protests in Sudan
happening? [WWW Document]. Middle East Eye. URL
http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/its-more-bread-why-are-protests-sudanhappening (accessed 12.18.19).
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9. Radio Dabanga, 2019. More than 240 people killed in Sudan uprising. Radio
Dabanga.

MEC ID: 100/2708
Maximalist Campaign: Yellow Vest Protests
Reformist Claim(s): Yellow Vest protests began on Nov. 17, 2018 over a proposed raise
in the gas tax, shutting down traffic across the country while donning yellow safety vests.
Quickly protests expanded to encompass a number of economic problems facing France,
such as economic stagnation and a lack of concern by Macron. Millions would eventually
participate in the protests across the entirety of France.
Number of Reformist Claim(s): 1
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2708
Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 12/01/2018; New protests were declared
throughout France with the expressed goal of forcing President Macron from power.
Movement Structure:
• Leadership: 0; While there were regional leaders and organizers of the
movement there was not a unified leadership structure.
• Mobilization: 0; No single group was responsible for mobilization or for
coordination the protests, instead they involved ad hoc coordination. [1][2]
• Organization: 15; Group emerged for a specific reason, fuel tax.
• Structure: 0; The structure was organized around regional structures rather than a
unified structure.
• Cohesion: 0; Incohesive.
• Composition: 5; Many parts of French society took part in the protests including
the both the middle and lower classes, unions, various civic groups and individual
French citizens.
• Movement Engagement: 1; both the government and the movement attempted
talks, but they collapsed prior to the actual meeting, “after a request to broadcast
the talks live was rejected”
Government Response:
• Government Engagement: 1; both the government and the movement attempted
talks, but they collapsed prior to the actual meeting, “after a request to broadcast
the talks live was rejected”
• Concession(s): 0; Macron made vague promises of reform, but it wasn’t until
after Dec. 1 that the government began making solid offers of concession to the
protesters.
• Concession Backfire: NA
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Repression: 0, targeted; 1, widespread. Initially the French government allowed
the protests to go on undisturbed, but eventually as the protests expanded, utilized
water cannons, tear gas, and arrests to repress the protest.
• Repression Backfire: Increased Mobilization.
Sources:
1. "'Yellow vest' protests against Macron snarl traffic across France". Agence
France Presse -- English. November 17, 2018 Saturday.
2. "Violent clashes engulf Paris in new anti-Macron protests". Agence France
Presse -- English. December 1, 2018 Saturday.
3. "Paris police use tear gas, water cannon against 'yellow vest' protesters".
Agence France Presse -- English. November 24, 2018 Saturday.
4. "Paris the prize as French tax revolt rumbles on". Agence France Presse -English. November 22, 2018 Thursday.
5. By SYLVIE CORBET and ELAINE GANLEY. "Talks collapse between
French protesters and prime minister". The Associated Press. November 30, 2018
Friday.

MEC ID: 290/2718
Maximalist Campaign: Anti-Vucic
Reformist Claim(s): Since Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic’s presidential election win
on April 2, thousands of protesters have taken to Belgrade’s streets each evening blowing
whistles and chanting slogans such as “Vucic thief, you stole the elections!”, “Against the
government terror” and “Down with dictatorship.” (Protests were also triggered by
assault on opposition Serbian Left party leader Borko Stefanovic). 190 Similar protests
were held in the towns of Novi Sad and Nis. Vucic secured 55% of the vote against a
fractured opposition, but demonstrators say the poll was unfair and accuse him of
becoming increasingly authoritarian. There is no clear leader of the campaign that claims
to be self-organized through Facebook; the protests peaked at more than 20,000
participants. Many of the demonstrators are students, but they have been joined by
protesters of all ages, including those who marched against Serbian strongman Slobodan
Milosevic in the 1990s. Vucic said he has nothing against the protests, “as long as they
are peaceful.” The nightly protests gradually shrank from thousands to about a hundred in
May, and the movement split along ideological lines - one focusing on Vucic’s policies
and the other on the socio-economic reality in Serbia. Vucic was sworn in as Serbia’s
president on May 31 despite the protests of opposition groups. Members of the opposition
189F
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https://balkaninsight.com/2019/01/04/serbian-protesters-face-dilemma-over-movement-s-goals-01-042019/
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clashed with Vucic supporters in Belgrade and were prevented from protesting
downtown. A few thousand people participated in the May 31 protests, and no incidents
were reported. In September, Serbia’s independent media staged a blackout to warn
against Vucic’s muzzling of the press by intimidation, threats, and financial pressure.
Dozens of Serbian media outlets and non-government organizations darkened their web
pages for one hour at noon. In October, several hundred people gathered at an opposition
protest demanding that an upcoming local election in Belgrade be free and fair.
Opposition leaders have accused Vucic of stifling democratic freedoms, exerting pressure
on the media, and threatening opponents. On October 17, two Serbian students appeared
before a court over street protests in April against the election of President Vucic. The
police accused them of organizing a protest without notifying authorities, and dozens of
people gathered outside the court in support of the students while alleging government
intimidation. After a year of lull, anti-government demonstrations erupted after thugs beat
up opposition politicians in November 2018. Thousands of people rallied in Serbia
against Vucic for four consecutive weekends, accusing Vucic of stifling democratic
freedoms and calling for his resignation. On December 29, around 25,000 joined the
rally.
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 2 (electoral, pre- and post-election results)
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2718
Demand Escalation (date and description): 4/10/2017 191; initial message was “simply
that they viewed the presidential election as illegitimate” 192
Movement structure:
• Leadership: 0, there is no clear leadership in this campaign
• Mobilization: 1, students were clear mobilizers, as were NGOs and opposition
parties
• Organization: 3, 5; Students, opposition parties
• Structure: 0, no evidence of hierarchy found
• Cohesion: 1, movement appeared cohesive
• Composition: 5 students, political parties, opposition movements, NGOs and
public figures
Government response:
• Government Engagement: 0
• Movement Engagement: 0
• Concession(s): 0
190F
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https://balkaninsight.com/2017/04/10/new-anti-govt-protests-starting-in-serbia-04-10-2017/
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https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/04/18/who-are-the-protesters-in-serbia-and-what-do-they-reallywant/
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Concession Backfire (describe nature of backfire): NA
• Repression (describe both targeted and widespread): 0, though it’s possible
that limited targeted repression was used
• Repression Backfire (describe nature of backfire): NA
Sources:
1. AP. 2017. “Whistling crowds protests Vucic’s presidential election win,” The
Associated Press, April 4.
2. AP. 2017. “Thousands protest Serbia presidential outcome for 7th day,” The
Associated Press, April 9.
3. AFP. 2017. “Protesters take to Serbian streets against ‘dictatorship’,” Agence
France Presse, April 12.
4. Rudic, Filip. 2017. “Serbia’s Fading Protest Movement Splits,” Balkan Insight,
May 4.
5. Stojanovic, Dusan. 2017. “Vucic sworn in as Serbia’s new president amid
protests,” The Associated Press, May 31.
6. Gec, Jovana. 2017. “Serbia's media stage blackout over pressure on free press,”
The Associated Press, September 28.
7. AP. 2017. “Hundreds rally for free, fair elections in Serbian capital,” The
Associated Press, October 6.
8. AP. 2017. “2 Serbian students appear in court over April protests,” The
Associated Press, October 17.
9. AP. 2018. “Thousands march against Serbian president's autocratic rule,” The
Associated Press, December 8.
10. AP. 2018. “Thousands brave snow to rally against Serbian leader Vucic,” The
Associated Press, December 15.
11. AP. 2018. “Thousands protest in Serbia against populist leader Vucic,” The
Associated Press, December 22.
12. AP. 2018. “Thousands march against Serbia's president for 4th week,” The
Associated Press, December 29.
13. AFP. 2018. “Serbian protesters maintain pressure on president in Belgrade,”
Agence France Presse, December 29.
14. DW. 2019. “Why are Serbs protesting against Aleksandar Vucic? April 19.
Retrieved 2/27/20 from: https://www.dw.com/en/why-are-serbs-protestingagainst-aleksandar-vucic/a-48306953

MEC ID: 198/2744
Maximalist Campaign: Anti-Mutharika
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Reformist Claim(s): On July 20, thousands of protesters from various NGO and CSO
members of the Human Rights Consultative Committee (HRCC) protested for various
reforms ranging from Electoral changes, economic development, and anti-corruption
measures. During the protest the organizer gave the district commissioners this list of 20
demands “1. Ensure availability of, and access to, forex. 2. Facilitate the importation of
fuel without interruptions. 3. Replace top management of ESCOM and Water Board with
independent experts to reverse shortages within three months. 4. The Anti-corruption
Bureau (ACB) to investigate those implicated in the Malawi Housing Corporation
(MHC) scandal. (Peter Mutharika and other senior officials and politicians allegedly
jumped the queue and received houses at knock-down prices. In October 2011 the former
manager of the MHC had been charged by the ACB, which said the politicians were
innocent.) 5. The ACB to investigate all cabinet ministers and public servants about
unexplained wealth accumulated while holding office, and the Declaration of Assets Bill
to be ‘ratified’. 6. President Mutharika to declare his assets and explain the source of
funds for building his new Ndata Farmhouse. 7. Nullify Callista Mutharika’s contract and
require her to repay her salary. (She was appointed to a ‘volunteer’ job on maternal health
and is paid a generous salary by the government.) 8. Law Commission to review Penal
Code (the new Section 46 allows the minister of information to ban publications) and the
new Injunctions Act (delaying for three days any action on injunctions filed against
government; Mutharika had signed the act into law even though there was an injunction
filed against it) and to make recommendations on their constitutionality within six
months. 9. Mutharika to act in good faith toward Vice-President Joyce Banda. (She was
expelled from the DPP, had her motorcade withdrawn, and had been barred from official
duties as she was seen as a political threat to the DPP’s 2014 presidential candidate, Peter
Mutharika. She started her own political party thereafter. The president filed a
constitutional case to see if he could remove her from office, and in October there were
rumors that she would be arrested for sedition.) 10. Government should hold local
council elections within the next year. 11. The University Council should readmit the
four dismissed lecturers and affirm that no spies will be allowed in lecture rooms. 12.
Nullify the president’s order for NGOs to pay MWK2 million prior to any demonstration.
(This decree was challenged in court.) 13. Halt the inequitable and politicized use of
public broadcasters (MBC and TV Malawi). (This is a complaint going back to the pretransitional period.) 14. The executive to stop disregarding court rulings and contempt of
court charges. 15. Provide essential drugs to all hospitals and clinics. (This and following
demands reflect the presence of health-sector activists among the demonstration’s
leadership. Other sectors had similar complaints but were not directly represented.) 16.
Provide capacity building for health workers. 17. Pay overdue allowances (up to three
years are overdue) to nurses. 18. Raise the national minimum wage to
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MWK25,000/month. 19. Ensure ‘decent jobs and conditions for all workers’. 20. Institute
a social protection system for the welfare of the poorest.”
Number of Reformist Claim(s): 5+
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2744
Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 03/15/2012; Government repression
during the July 20 protests led to considerable disagreement and a fracturing of the
HRCC, a majority of whose constituent groups wanted to pursue negotiation out of fear
of subsequent government repression. Following this one of the constituent groups, the
religious rights Public Affairs Committee (PAC) began calling on President Mutharika to
resign alongside several opposition groups.
Movement Structure:
• Leadership: 1; The HRCC had a leadership structure chaired by Undule
Mwakasungula.
• Mobilization: 1; The HRCC and its constituent organizations were responsible
for its mobilization.
• Organization: 4, 5, 10; included with the HRCC was existing human and civil
rights organizations, student groups, and several Christian religious
denominations.
• Structure: 0; The HRCC operated as a loose confederation of the preexisting
orgs.
• Cohesion: 0; Ultimately the various groups would begin to pursue divergent
campaign strategies.
• Composition: 5; various different civil society groups participated.
• Movement Engagement: 1, in August various groups attempted to negotiate with
the government rather than risk more violent repression due to their protesting.
These negotiations were set for September but were postponed following an
outburst Mutharika’s against the protesters.
Government Response:
• Government Engagement: 0, despite initially agreeing to UN led talks, these
efforts were rejected by the government.
• Concession(s): 0
• Concession Backfire: NA
• Repression: 1, widespread; 0, targeted; the government used tear gas, arrests, and
live ammunition to break up the protests which led to the arrest of 275 individuals
and the deaths of at least 18 protesters.
• Repression Backfire: 0; Repression was successful in forcing a change in
opposition strategy and fracture the HRCC coalition.
Sources:
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1. Nathan, L. (2018), “Capturing UN Preventive Diplomacy Success: How and
Why Does It Work?” United Nations University - Policy Paper and Case Studies,
April 2018. <https://i.unu.edu/media/cpr.unu.edu/post/2739/UN-PreventiveDiplomacy-Policy-Paper-and-Case-StudiesWEB.pdf>.
2. Diana Cammack (2012) Malawi in crisis, 2011–12, Review of African Political
Economy, 39:132, 375-388.
3. "Rights group ask Malawi leader to resign". Agence France Presse -- English.
March 15, 2012 Thursday.
4. Makuwira, Jonathan. "Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and the Changing
Nature of African Politics: The Case of the CSO–Government Relationship in
Malawi." Journal of Asian and African Studies. 46, no. 6 (2011): 615-28.
5. "Malawi riots death toll rises to 19 as army chief replaced". Agence France
Presse -- English. July 23, 2011 Saturday.
6. "Over 275 arrested in Malawi riots: police". Agence France Presse -- English.
July 22, 2011 Friday.

MEC ID: 37/2745
Maximalist Campaign: Anti-Roussef
Reformist Claim(s): Following the revelation of a massive corruption scandal involving
senior members of President Dilma Rousseff’s administration and the state-owned oil
company, Petrobras, over a million Brazilians have been involved in demonstrations
calling for the resignation or impeachment of Rousseff. Recently re-elected to a second
term, Rousseff’s popularity was already waning due to a flagging economy, but the
discovery of the corruption scheme has plummeted the President’s public support.
Though Rousseff herself has yet to be directly implicated, many high-level political
figures have been snagged in the investigation and much of the corruption took place
while Rouseff was the chairwoman of Petrobras. The scandal involved kickbacks and
money laundering that resulted in an estimated $3.8 billion dollars being skimmed off the
top of inflated contracts over the course of a decade.
On March 15, about 1.5 million protesters took to the streets in 83 cities and
towns across Brazil. Major, peaceful, protests were held in Brasilia and Rio de Janeiro.
Protesters were calling for the impeachment of President Rousseff due to the failing
economy and the Petrobras corruption scandal. Two days prior, a rally in support of
Rousseff drew little support. In light of the large turnout, the Government quickly
responded and sought to appease the protesters. The Justice Minister, Jose Eduardo
Cardozo and Rousseff’s chief of staff, Miguel Rossetto, gave a press conference in which
they said immediate steps would be taken to fight graft and impunity. A second
nationwide demonstration calling for the impeachment of President Rousseff drew
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slightly smaller crowds than the first. The protest was organized largely through social
media by an array of groups. Estimates indicate that the April protest only drew about
half the number of participants as the March demonstrations. Many analysts said the
comparatively low turnout did not bode well for the movement, although leaders from
numerous groups vow to continue the campaign.
On August 16, the third major demonstration of the campaign drew hundreds of
thousands of participants demanding President Dilma Rousseff’s resignation. The crowds
blamed Rousseff and her leftist Worker’s Party for flagrant corruption and an economy in
recession. Crowds sang the national anthem and chanted “Dilma out!” as they marched
through the streets of Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, and dozens of other cities. The
opposition in Congress has been considering taking up impeachment proceedings. House
Speaker Eduardo Cunha, a formal member of the President’s governing coalition,
withdrew his support in July and is now considering beginning the impeachment process.
On October 21, Brazil’s opposition filed an impeachment petition against
President Rousseff, accusing her of illegal accounting practices. The petition was
submitted to the House Speaker, Eduardo Cunha, himself under investigation for
involvement in the Petrobras scandal. Though Rousseff has yet to be tied explicitly to the
Petrobras issue, the latest petition accuses the President of unauthorized state bank loans
to cover holes in the budget ahead of and after the start of her second term. Rousseff’s
approval ratings are sitting at a dismal 10 percent.
On December 02, Lower House Speaker, Eduardo Cunha, launched impeachment
proceedings against President Rousseff. Cunha accepted a petition filed by several
attorneys in the first step of what could be a long process. A special committee must now
approve the measure for it to go any further. On December 13, 2015 about 81,000
protesters participated in peaceful demonstrations held across the country calling for the
removal of President Rousseff from office. Thirty-nine cities reported demonstrations.
However, the days’ marches marked a stark decline from the 2.4 million who had
participated in earlier demonstrations. Earlier in the week the Supreme Court suspended
the committee determining if impeachment proceedings should continue for one week,
citing irregularities.
On March 13, protests calling for the end of the Dilma Rouseff administration
continued after the former President, Lula da Silva was charged in the ongoing corruption
investigation that has implicated much of Brazil’s political class. Law enforcement
estimated 1.4 million demonstrators took to the streets of Sao Paulo, in addition to
smaller protests across the country. Protesters, wrapped in the national flag, chanted
“Dilma out!” On March 17, thousands once again protested in Brasilia and Sao Paulo
after a leaked phone call between President Rouseff and Lula da Silva exposed that the
President was attempting to appoint Lula to her cabinet to protect him from prosecution.
Protesters chanted “Resign!” and called for impeachment proceedings to continue. Riot
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police broke up anti-government protests in Sao Paulo by firing water cannons and stun
grenades into the remnants of the previous day’s demonstration.
On March 22, in a speech from the Presidential Palace, Rouseff repeated her
claim that she had committed no crime and vowed that she would “never resign.”
However, on March 29, the country’s largest party, the PMDB, announced that it would
be leaving the governing coalition of Dilma Rousseff. The loss of PMDB greatly reduces
the chances that Rousseff will be able to garner the votes required to survive
impeachment proceedings.
On April 17, as lawmakers began contentious impeachment hearings, protesters
took to the streets of cities throughout the country. In many town squares large screen
televisions aired the hearings live for the demonstrators. Though there were pro and antiRousseff demonstrations taking place, there were no reports of violence. Lawmakers in
the lower house overwhelming voted to advance the impeachment process to the Senate.
The Senate voted to suspend Rousseff on May 12; she is temporarily removed from her
office while an impeachment trial is conducted; the Senate will have up to 180 days to
vote whether to permanently remove Rousseff on the misconduct charges, and in the
interim, Vice President Michel Temer will assume the presidency. Outside Congress,
about 6,000 supporters of impeachment chanted “out with Dilma” while police used
pepper spray to disperse Rousseff supporters.
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1 (Political, non-electoral corruption)
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2745
Demand Escalation (date and description): 03/14/2015, 1.5mn+ turned out to call for
Roussef’s resignation
Movement structure:
• Leadership: 0. While opposition parties and grassroots groups from a variety of
ideologies opposed Roussef and worked to impeach her, there was no formalized
leadership or clear focal leader during this campaign.
• Mobilization: Yes, while formal leadership and structure/strategy are uncertain,
evidence linking a number of mobilizing organizations to opposition parties was
found, and they played a significant role in mobilizing for protests; VemPraRua 193
• Organization: 3, opposition political parties were the earliest opposition to
Roussef
• Structure: 0. No evidence of hierarchy, movement indicates widespread
grassroots characteristics.
• Cohesion: 1, the campaign was united in calling for Roussef’s impeachment
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•

Composition: 5. This campaign began with general public involvement.
(15,16,17)
Government response:
• Government Engagement: 0
• Movement Engagement: 0
• Concession(s): Yes, Roussef proposed a package of anti-corruption measures
following initial protests, March 18, 2015
• Concession Backfire (describe nature of backfire): Yes, the protest continued
and escalated in terms of participation following concessions, resulting in
impeachment and removal within two months.
• Repression (describe both targeted and widespread): Yes, some widespread
repression occurred, from arrests to injuries to tear gas/pepper spray
• Repression Backfire (describe nature of backfire): No specific evidence of
backfire, although the movement grew in the months following initial protests.
However, this was likely due to widespread frustration with inaction from the
regime, not in response to repression.
Sources:
1. (September 6, 2014 Saturday). Dozens of Brazil lawmakers linked to graft
scandal as election looms. Agence France Presse -- English. Retrieved from
https://advance-lexiscom.du.idm.oclc.org/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:5D34B271-DY93-M03Y-00000-00&context=1516831.
2. (September 23, 2014 Tuesday). Defeating corruption dominates Brazil debate.
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MEC ID: 94/2746
Maximalist Campaign: Singing revolution
Reformist Claim(s): The genesis of this campaign is in part tied to protests against
phosphorus mining (See the corresponding Cat 2 entry on the Phosphorus War for more
details). Protests against environmental damages from phosphate aimed at preventing
future mining efforts were successful, and one of the earliest anti-Soviet mobilizations.
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On August 24, 1987, hundreds to thousands of Estonians protested in Tallinn against
Soviet rule. The protest was held simultaneously with protests in Riga, Latvia and
Vilnius, Lithuania and occurred on the anniversary of the signing of the 1939 nonaggression pact that paved the way for Soviet takeover of the Baltic region. By
September, this sentiment was more widespread. On October 21, nationalists in Estonia
again demonstrated for freedom from the Soviet Union in the town of Viru. In the town
of Tartu, they attacked the graves of Russian soldiers who fought in World War II. In
early 1988, nationalist sentiment, along with an application by a separatist group to form
a political party, led the Soviet Union to begin to crackdown on these groups and repress
their attempts to demonstrate against the Soviet government. On February 25, 4000
Estonians gathered in the capital to demonstrate for independence on the anniversary of
Estonia’s original declaration of independence during the interwar years. Small protests
continued to be held throughout the year. At the Communist Party conference in June, the
Estonian delegates submitted a platform for economic independence from Moscow. On
August 23, 10,000 Estonians rallied in Tallinn and many others in smaller cities to again
demand independence on the anniversary of the signing of the 1939 non-aggression pact.
In October 1988, the Popular Front, a movement formed six months prior, released its
platform calling for an independent Estonia with its own political system and free-market
economy. The Front claimed 60,000 active members. On November 9, Gorbachev met
with Estonian leaders following outcry against proposed constitutional changes that
would centralize power in Moscow. Estonians had launched a petition drive to call on the
government to drop the changes and grant greater sovereignty to the constituent
republics. The local Estonian government asserted that it had the right to reject Soviet
laws that infringed on local autonomy, though the Supreme Soviet declared this invalid.
In January 1989, the Estonian government passed a law that made Estonian the
sole official language of Estonia, removing that status for Russian. In June, Gorbachev
met with Estonian leaders and reassured them that their calls for economic independence
fit in with Gorbachev’s wider reform plans. However, as nationalist movements in
several republics began to heat up, Gorbachev reversed his earlier reassurances and
warned against ethnic violence and calls for greater autonomy in July. Despite this, the
Supreme Soviet began to debate a proposed law to authorize Lithuania and Estonia to
begin market-style experiments, allowing the two republics to control their own budgets,
tax policies, prices, financial markets and foreign trade. The law was bitterly debated in
the legislature. On July 27, the Soviet legislature endorsed the plan but postponed final
actions on the laws until October. On August 23, the 50th anniversary of the 1939 nonaggression pact, hundreds of thousands of Estonians, Latvians, and Lithuanians linked
hands across their countries to form a human chain and demanded independence.
Following Kremlin warnings against excessive demonstrations towards autonomy, 15
officials of the Estonian Communist Party were replaced, though two of these were
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among the most conservative members of party leadership. On November 27, the Soviet
legislature voted to grant Estonia, along with Latvia and Lithuania, economic autonomy
beginning January 1. On December 7, the Estonian Communist Party voted to drop its
leading role, paving the way for a multi-party system.
In February 1990, 100 prominent Estonians published an appeal calling for a free
Estonia within a common European home and a multi-party democracy. Members of the
Communist party broke off to form the Social Democratic Party and others were mulling
a decision to form a Democratic Reform Party. After Lithuania declared independence,
Gorbachev called the Estonian President on April 4 to warn him not to declare
independence, warning him that the repressive actions taken against Lithuania would also
be taken against Estonia. However, in 1991, Gorbachev was more conciliatory,
appointing panels for discussion with representatives from the three Baltic republics. On
March 3, Estonians voted overwhelmingly for independence from the Soviet Union in a
non-binding referendum on the issue. Following the failed coup in the Soviet Union on
August 21, the Soviet Union began to break up and Estonia declared independence.
Number of Reformist Claim(s): 1 Social, environmental/anti-phosphate mining, later
leading into calls for nationalism and separatism.
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2746
Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 10/04/1988, Popular Front is the first
movement to call for independence.
Movement Structure:
• Leadership: 1, The Heritage Society (led by Trivimi Velliste), the Popular Front
(led by Marju Lauristin), the Estonian National Independence Party (ENIP),
Citizens’ Committees Movement (led by Tunne Kelam), the Congress of Estonia,
the Estonian Supreme Council
• Mobilization: 1, The Heritage Society (led by Trivimi Velliste), the Popular
Front (led by Marju Lauristin), the Estonian National Independence Party (ENIP),
Citizens’ Committees Movement (led by Tunne Kelam), the Congress of Estonia,
the Estonian Supreme Council
• Organization: 4 (generally considered political opposition movements, civic
organizations)
• Structure: 1, these organizations were formal, hierarchical, and eventually
became political parties
• Cohesion: 1, the movement was cohesive in calling for independence
• Composition: 5, general public involvement
Government Response:
• Government Engagement: 1, multiple meetings between campaign leaders and
Soviet authorities occurred
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•

Movement Engagement: 1, multiple meetings between campaign leaders and
Soviet authorities occurred, as early as 11/08/1988.
• Concession(s): 1, economic independence and more autonomy were granted
• Concession Backfire: Yes, concessions were not enough and the campaign grew,
protests continued until independence.
• Repression: 1, targeted; 0, widespread. Shows of force with tanks, arrests.
• Repression Backfire: No
Sources:
1. Walter R. Iwaskiw, ed. Estonia: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the
Library of Congress, 1995.
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12. NYT. 1988. “Soviets Overturn Move By Estonia To More Self-Rule,” New York
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13. WP. 1989. “Baltics Renew Drive To Assert Autonomy,” New York Times.
January 19.
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Times. July 28.
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Times. August 24.
19. WP. 1989. “Communists Oust Officials In Estonia,” Washington Post. September
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Washington Post. February 9.
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26. NYT. 1991. “Icons Are Toppled,” New York Times. August 24.

MEC ID: 116/2747
Maximalist Campaign: Haitian anti-Moise protests
Reformist Claim(s): In August, a social media campaign known by hashtag
#petrocaribechallenge demanded an accounting of the money that was supposed to be
spent on social and economic projects in Haiti. Former government officials have been
accused of embezzling the fund. Protests sprang up in September. This campaign helped
spur tens of thousands of Haitians to participate in nationwide demonstrations on October
17, and for a week in November. While the protests initially focused on demands for
action against government corruption, President Jovenel Moise was accused of not
investigating allegations of corruption in the previous administration and calls for his
removal increased over time. In November, thousands of Haitians marched in Port-auPrince in a display of public fury at the government over rampant corruption, economic
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malaise, and other grievances. Chanting anti-government slogans, some demonstrators set
piles of tires on fire and threw rocks, and the police fired tear gas to control the protests.
Protesters clashed with police, and at least 11 people died in the protests. Weeks of
protests paralyzed commerce, forced schools and shops to close, and compelled many
Haitians to stay home. After the tense week of violence and protests against the
government, Haiti’s Prime Minister Jean-Henry Ceant promised a cash program to create
jobs in poor neighborhoods.
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1 (political, anti-corruption)
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2747
Demand Escalation (date and description): 10/17/2018 (first calls for removal of
Moise)
Movement structure:
• Leadership: 1, the “petrochallengers” were led by a group of clearly identifiable
individuals, pre-escalation, who primarily organized via Twitter. Post-escalation,
the “Michel/FL coalition and Dessalines Children” wings were also leaders,
though there is not cohesion on goals between these three groups.
• Mobilization: 1, the “petrochallengers” were led by a group of clearly
identifiable individuals, pre-escalation, who primarily organized via twitter. Postescalation, the “Michel/FL coalition and Dessalines Children” wings were also
leaders, though there is not cohesion on goals between these three groups. Both
groups were significant mobilizers, especially during October and November, and
well into 2019.
• Organization: 15 (petrochallengers formed around this specific issue, and came
from a wide variety of backgrounds)
• Structure: 0, No evidence of hierarchy found. The Petrochallengers largely
organized via twitter, and no individual has identifiable influence over the rest of
the movement.
• Cohesion: 0, The Petrochallengers primarily sought to account for embezzled
money. The movement escalated in October 2018 to call for Moise’s resignation,
but prior to that, and even subsequent to that, not every protest can be traced to
anti-Moise sentiment vs. a general anti-corruption goal, though several wings
appear to support this goal.
• Composition: 5. General public involvement.
Government response:
• Government Engagement: 0. Government has not engaged demonstrators at all,
no evidence to suggest they have any interest in doing so.
• Movement Engagement: 0. Movement refuses to meet or negotiate with the
current administration.
• Concession(s): 0
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Concession Backfire (describe nature of backfire): NA
• Repression (describe both targeted and widespread): 1, both targeted and
widespread. Hundreds of protesters have been killed, including at funerals of
those who had been killed. The government has targeted protesters, but has also
engaged in widespread repression
• Repression Backfire (describe nature of backfire): 1, the intensity and
participation in protests continued to escalate in to 2019, in part due to consistent
repression
Sources:
1. Ives, K., 2018. The Class Dynamics of Haiti’s 2018 Uprising | Haiti Liberte. Haiti
Liberte. URL https://haitiliberte.com/the-class-dynamics-of-haitis-2018-uprising/
(accessed 2.2.20). Nov. 21
2. Jr, C. of G.M., August 23, 2018 ‘Where did the money go?’ Haitians denounce
corruption in social media campaign [WWW Document]. miamiherald. URL
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/world/americas/haiti/article217110220.html (accessed 2.2.20).
3. Le Nouvelliste, 2018. 17 octobre : des dizaines de milliers d’Haïtiens manifestent
contre la corruption et pour la démission de Jovenel Moïse [WWW Document].
Le Nouvelliste. URL https://lenouvelliste.com/article/193977/17-octobre-desdizaines-de-milliers-dhaitiens-manifestent-contre-la-corruption-et-pour-lademission-de-jovenel-moise (accessed 2.2.20).
4. Miami Herald, 2017. Haiti owes Venezuela $2 billion – and much of it was
embezzled, Senate report says [WWW Document]. miamiherald. URL
https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/world/americas/haiti/article184740783.html (accessed 2.2.20).
5. Milfort, M., September 5 2018. Haitian Demonstrators Ask: “Where is the
PetroCaribe money?” [WWW Document]. Haiti Liberte. URL
https://haitiliberte.com/haitian-demonstrators-ask-where-is-the-petrocaribemoney/ (accessed 2.2.20).
6. AFP. 2018. “Thousands protest corruption in Haiti, president gets shoved,”
Agence France Presse, October 18
7. Semple, Kirk. 2018. “Haitians Furious at Their Government Protest in a Week of
Unrest,” The New York Times, November 23.
8. AP. 2018. “Protesters clash with police in Haiti as death toll rises,” Associated
Press International, November 23.
9. AFP. 2018. “Haiti prime minister promises jobs in answer to unrest,” Agence
France Presse, November 24.
10. Miami Herald, 2019. Haitian activists testify to House Foreign Affairs Committee
| Miami Herald [WWW Document]. December 10 .URL
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https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nationworld/world/americas/haiti/article238204744.html (accessed 2.2.20).
11. Le Nouvelliste, 2019.. David Hale a rencontré Jovenel Moïse et l’opposition, les
lignes n’ont toujours pas bougé... [WWW Document]. Le Nouvelliste. December
6 URL https://lenouvelliste.com/article/209940/david-hale-a-rencontre-jovenelmoise-et-lopposition-les-lignes-nont-toujours-pas-bouge (accessed 2.2.20).

MEC ID: 243/2748
Maximalist Campaign: Bangladeshi Liberation War
Reformist Claim(s): Having been politically active since the protests against the
previous Pakistani leader Ayub Khan, Eastern Pakistani political forces had begun to
mobilize demanding greater rights and roles within the territorially divided state.
Escalation of these demands began following the nationwide parliamentary elections
which saw the Awami League secure a majority by solely winning nearly every seat in
the East, as compared to the splintered results in the West. The Awami League had been
a long-standing party within East Pakistan but following the previous protests had seen
significant growth due to their pursuit of Bangladeshi rights. Immediately following this
surprise victory, the Pakistani military and western parties began to attempt to prevent the
seating of an East Pakistani controlled parliament. Multiple dates set for the first
parliamentary meeting were delayed by President Khan, which many Awami League
supporters saw as an attempt to stymie the results of the democratic elections. Mass
protests began throughout East Pakistan, with multiple cities coming fully under the
control of protesters as both sides engaged with each other and maneuvered for better
political positions. Eventually, the Pakistani military took to the streets of East Pakistan,
violently suppressing protests, though this led to increased turnout. Recognizing that
stalling escalation may splinter the movement, Awami League leadership officially
declared their intent to pursue secession from Pakistan and the formation of an
independent state of Bangladesh.
Number of Reformist Claim(s): 1
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2748
Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 03/07/1971; Sensing an increased desire
for a more radical position from the street and hoping to head off West Pakistani attempts
to undermine his leadership, Awami League leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman declared the
movements intention of secession at a rally before hundreds of thousands of supporters.
This followed months of demands from the more radical elements of the League,
particularly from the students, for the party to adopt a stronger position against Western
rule.
Movement Structure:
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Leadership: 1; The movement for Bangladeshi independence was led by the head
of the Awami League, Sheikh Mujabur Rahman.
• Mobilization: 1; Mobilization was led by the Awami League, a longstand “front”
party within Bangladesh representing a broad cross-section of Eastern Pakistani
society.
• Organization: 3, 5, 6; pre-existing political parties, student organizations, and
trade leagues; The Awami League represented a number of sub-organizations
including the leftist parties and radical student organizations.
• Structure: 0; The Awami League could largely be described as a “front”
organization or an umbrella organization.
• Cohesion: 0; Throughout the period of escalation Mujabir faced calls from the
radical elements of the party to escalate the conflict with West Pakistan, though
he held off these calls until escalation of March 7.
• Composition: 5; Widespread involvement.
• Movement Engagement: 1; Sheikh Mujibur met with the President of Pakistan,
Yahya Khan, on December 12 to attempt to negotiate around East Pakistani
demands; These talks were ultimately unsuccessful
Government Response:
• Government Engagement: 1; Sheikh Mujibur met with the President of
Pakistan, Yahya Khan, on December 12 to attempt to negotiate around East
Pakistani demands; These talks were ultimately unsuccessful
• Concession(s): 1; the government offered to negotiate on an initial set of
demands set forth by the Awami League, though these were not taken as serious
overtures but rather as attempts to divide moderates and radicals within the
movement.
• Concession Backfire: 1; due to the perceived insincerity of the concessions, this
action led to the escalation of the campaign.
• Repression: 0, targeted; 1, widespread; As East Pakistani protests began to take
to the street the government began to respond by sending the military, staffed
predominantly by West Pakistani’s into the streets. This led to widespread
bloodshed, the West claiming hundreds of civilian deaths and Bangladeshi
sources citing much higher numbers.
• Repression Backfire: 1, Increased mobilization.
Sources:
1. Raghavan, Srinath. 1971. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
2013
2. Events in East Pakistan, 1971: A Legal Study. Geneva, International
Commission of Jurists.
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3. Choudhury, G. W. "The Last Days of United Pakistan: A Personal Account."
International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 49, no. 2
(1973): 229-39. Accessed February 16, 2020.
4. Humayun, S. and Tanweer Khalid. "Student Politics and Bengali Nationalist
Movement." Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society 44, no. 3 (Jul 01, 1996):
273.
5. Dobell, W. M. "Ayub Khan as President of Pakistan." Pacific Affairs 42, no. 3
(1969): 294-310.

MEC ID: 376/2749
Maximalist Campaign: Anti-Perez
Reformist Claim(s): Beginning around October 3, various groups throughout Venezuela
began to protest the declining economic conditions and growing levels of corruption
throughout the country. The cause of the economic decline stemmed from the global
decrease in the price of oil; Venezuela’s economy was nearly completely dependent on
commodities and in response had begun to take out large international loans to mitigate
the falling export income. To deal with these economic issues, President Perez enacted a
policy of systemic gas price increase on domestic consumption, upending long standing
subsidies. On Oct. 16 10,000 university students and workers from the Central
Venezualan University protested against the force privatization and increased funding for
the university. Smaller protests continued to mount through the rest of the month as the
price of gas steadily increased, with the government responding to these protests with
rubber bullets and tear gas. On November, further strikes followed numbering in the
hundreds of thousands, “Four major unions called for the dawn-to-dusk strike in Caracas,
a neighboring port and the southeastern state of Bolivar to protest increases in
government-regulated gasoline and public transport prices. Police arrested at least 39
union and student leaders who were accused of plotting violence, according to a human
rights group.” Further, smaller protests continued throughout the rest of the year in waves
of unrest, sparked by high school and university students and workers as the economic
situation continued to worsen. The following month protests began again after the
holiday season in a series of violent clashes between the police and students from
universities around the country.
Number of Reformist Claim(s): 1
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2749
Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 02/04/1992; Following months of protests
throughout Venezuela a group of military officers, led by Hugo Chavez, was put down by
the government in a few hours. Protests began following the failed coup, though they had
taken on a distinctly anti-government tenor.
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Movement Structure:
• Leadership: 0; While there were certain groups, and presumably group leaders,
the overall trajectory of the campaign remained spontaneous and without any
overall leadership.
• Mobilization: 0; As with the leadership, individual groups involved did not
appear to have a role in campaign-wide mobilization; some groups, such as labor
unions, unified to mobilize their workers at times, but these did not extend
throughout the entirety of the campaign.
• Organization: 5, 6; Pre-existing student groups and labor unions.
• Structure: 0; There did not appear to be a central organizing group unifying the
various student and worker protests and strikes.
• Cohesion: 0; Despite being instigated by the increase in gas prices, group
demands often varied based on their personal interests, as with the students
protesting university privatizations and lack of funds. [2]
• Composition: 5; Indication of widespread involvement, including University and
Highschool students, Teachers, Labor workers, and everyday Venezuelans.
• Movement Engagement: 0; No indication that either the movement or
government attempted to engage with the other side.
Government Response:
• Government Engagement: 0; No indication that either the movement or
government attempted to engage with the other side.
• Concession(s): 1, “President Carlos Andres Perez, responding to the pressure,
proposed raising the country's minimum wage to about $ 130 a month.”
• Concession Backfire: 0
• Repression: 0, targeted; 1, widespread; The government used tear gas and rubber
bullets to attempt to repress the protests, leading to the deaths of several
protesters.
• Repression Backfire: 0; Repression was not given for any backfire described in
the sources consulted
Sources:
1. "In Caracas, A Social Gap Persists and Billboards Plead for Respect". The
Associated Press. October 3, 1991, Thursday, AM cycle.
2. "Venezuelan police fire tear gas on protesters". Agence France Presse -English. October 16, 1991.
3. "Venezuelan Economy May Be Improving, But Poor Don't Feel It". The
Associated Press. November 5, 1991, Tuesday, AM cycle.
4. "Strike Paralyzes Parts Of Venezuela". The Associated Press. November 7,
1991, Thursday, AM cycle.
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5. "Fears of Social Breakdown in Venezuela". The Associated Press. November
22, 1991, Friday, AM cycle.
6. "High School Students The New Protest Leaders in Venezuela". The
Associated Press. November 23, 1991, Saturday, PM cycle.
7."Student protests at Veneuzelan universities". Agence France Presse -- English.
December 3, 1991.
8. "Venezuela On Edge Amid Fresh Round of Protests and Violence". The
Associated Press. December 4, 1991, Wednesday, PM cycle.
9. "Divide Between Haves, Have-Nots Spurs Venezuelan Riots". The Associated
Press. January 22, 1992, Wednesday, PM cycle.
10. "Military Units Attempt Coup in Venezuela". The Associated Press. February
4, 1992, Tuesday, PM cycle.

MEC ID: 82/2750
Maximalist Campaign: 1997 Anti-Bucaram Campaign
Reformist Claim(s): In early January 1997, students of Ecuador started demonstrations
in Quito against President Bucaram’s belt-tightening economic programs, which
substantially increased the prices of power, communications, fuel, and public transport.
After two weeks of protests, the students were joined by union movements, led by the
country's biggest union, the United Workers' Front, which announced a general, nationwide strike planned for February 5th. Moreover, demonstrators in Quito were also
supported by the mayor, journalists’ union, manufacturing executives and neighborhood
groups. Bucaram initially supported the announcement of strike and announced he would
reshuffle his cabinet by replacing 60 percent of his government’s 13 ministries. However,
the protests calling for his resignation continued as many organizations began their
demonstrations ahead of the announced date for the strike. Most notably, peasants in the
Andean province of Tungurahua, 120 kilometers (74 miles) south of Quito blocked
regional highways and the trucker’s union started to strike 2 days earlier by halting fuel
deliveries. Moreover, the indigenous people movement has joined the protests one day
before the strike. On February 5, Bucaram withdrew to the presidential palace where he
was cordoned by the military and police forces and withdrew his support from the strike,
calling it a “conspiracy”. After the national strike was extended an additional day,
Bucaram promised to roll-back the austerity measures and declared a "state of national
mobilization," ordering the armed forces and the national police to enforce a return to
work. However, the same day the Congress ousted Bucaram, declaring “mental
incapacity”. The armed forces, who refused the state of emergency declared by Bucaram,
accepted the Congress’ decision to remove Bucaram and mediated the appointment of a
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new interim president, Alarcon. Alarcon swore in as the interim President on February
12th and announced he would roll back all the economic measures taken by Bucaram.
Number of Reformist Claim(s): 1 (economic, price increase/anti-austerity)
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2750
Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 02/03/1997
Movement Structure:
• Leadership: 1, the Patriotic Front was clearly the leader in this campaign,
consisting of a wide coalition of Ecuadorian groups and set the strategy for the
campaign
• Mobilization: 1, the groups comprising the Patriotic Front, including student,
labor and indigenous organizations were all active in mobilizing during this
campaign.
• Organization: 5, 6; Students, Labor
• Structure: 0, hierarchy existed within several groups, including Ecuador’s largest
union, but it was not universally shared among the campaign
• Cohesion: 1, Pre-escalation Bucaram’s austerity measures were universally
unpopular, even in Congress, and the post-escalation campaign reflected widely
shared sentiment that he was unfit for office
• Composition: 5 “the Patriotic Front....this all-encompassing organization boasted
the ranks of the Coordinadora de Movimientos Sociales, the United Workers
Front, the Confederation of Indigenous Nationalities in Ecuador, women’s interest
groups, environmentalist groups, petroleum workers, and the lower, middle, and
upper classes.
• Movement Engagement: 1, the movement attempted to engage with Congress
directly in calling for Bucaram’s removal.
Government Response:
Government Engagement: 0. No evidence suggesting protest leaders were
successful in meeting with Congress, although the pressure was enough to allow
Congress to oust Bucaram.
• Concession(s): 1, Bucaram intended to reshuffle his cabinet and announced he
was making significant policy changes
• Concession Backfire: 1, the concessions were not enough to quell the movement
and were insufficient to prevent his removal from office.
• Repression: 1, though very limited and targeted. There is very little evidence of
repressive violence, but police were mobilized in response to protests and some
reports of tear gas
• Repression Backfire: 0
Sources:
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1. Agence France Presse, January 12 1997, “Peruvian, Ecuadoran leaders to meet
despite domestic troubles”
2. Agence France Presse, January 25, 1997 “Street protests to build into national
strike in Ecuador”
3. Agence France Presse January 26, 1997 “Ecuadorans reject their president:
survey”
4. Agence France Presse February 02, 1997 “Ecuador's Bucaram says government
supports massive strike”
5. Agence France Presse February 03, 1997, “Truckers grind Ecuador to a halt
before general strike”
6. Associated Press February 03, 1997, “Protests begin in advance of national strike
in Ecuador”
7. Agence France Presse February 04, 1997 “Ecuador at a standstill one eve of
general strike”
8. Agence France Presse February 05, 1997 “Bucaram promises far-reaching
corrections to his government”
9. Associated Press February 05, 1997 “Nationwide strike begins against Ecuador's
Bucaram”
10. Agence France Presse February 06, 1997 “Ecuador president sacks ministers, rolls
back austerity drive”
11. Associated Press February 07, 1997 “Ecuador's Congress votes to oust 'El Loco'
president”
12. Associated Press February 08, 1997 “Military commander says armed forces
withdraw support for Bucaram”
13. Agence France Presse February 12, 1997 “New president of Ecuador sworn in,
six-day crisis ends”
14. Swarthmore Global Nonviolent Action Database, “Ecuadorians general strike and
protest to oust president Abdala Bucaram, 1997“ retrieved 1/21/2020 from:
https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/ecuadorians-general-strike-andprotest-oust-president-abdala-bucaram-1997
15. Chicago Tribune, Goering, L., 1997. ECUADOR LAWMAKERS VOTE OUT
PRESIDENT. Chicago Tribune. February 2.
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1997-02-07-9702070291story.html

MEC ID: 111/2751
Maximalist Campaign: Anti-Serrano
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Reformist Claim(s): What began as a student protest over government issued ID cards
and local protests against high electricity prices ultimately ended in a government coup.
On 05/12/1993, students demonstrated against Government ID cards that students
claimed were intended to facilitate government tracking of student leaders. Police broke
up the protest with tear gas and one student was shot and killed. The death sparked
further protests and united the students with a broader movement protesting government
austerity measures. Throughout the following week protesters clashed with riot police,
throwing stones and Molotov cocktails. Eighty percent of schools and universities were
closed after the protests began.
On 05/21/1993, most of Guatemala’s public employees stayed away from work in
a pre-planned 24-hour strike over President Jorge Serrano’s policies. At the end of the
day, more than 10,000 Guatemalans demonstrated peacefully in the capital city. Many
carried placards with pictures of President Serrano and shouted “Resign!” In response to
the growing civil unrest, the President dissolved the congress and the Supreme Court on
05/25/1993. He said he would rule by decree until a new constitution could be drafted.
The action ended a brief period of relative peace and democracy in Guatemala. The move
was widely condemned by the international community.
On 05/26/1993, troops were deployed throughout Guatemala City and harsh
censorship of the media was enacted. The next day, tanks and tear gas were used to break
up a protest of about 1,000 court workers who gathered outside the Supreme Court to
protest the President’s power grab. An umbrella group representing some 20 unions,
student groups, peasants, religious, and human rights organizations called for another
demonstration later in the week.
The situation began to change rapidly on 06/01/1993 when the Army dropped its support
for the President. Despite conflicting reports and statements early in the day, by the end it
was clear that Serrano had been ousted and the military had taken control of the country
in response to the President’s suspension of democracy. The military high command
made the move after meeting with many business leaders from the Guatemalan
community. After taking power, the military vowed to restore the constitution and move
towards holding elections.
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 2 (other, situation-specific, gov’t ID cards; Economic,
high electricity prices)
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2751
Demand Escalation (date and description): 5/21/1993 – on this day, protests began
calling for Serrano’s resignation and protests escalated
Movement structure:
• Leadership: 0. No clear leaders or organizations found--the movement appeared
to be widely grassroots until 5/26, when the umbrella group formed, and there’s
still no evidence of either hierarchical leadership or strategic contributions.
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Mobilization: 1, the students at Guatemala’s schools and universities were clear
pre-escalation leaders, leading to the closure of schools, and post-escalation, the
general strike indicates significant mobilization support among labor/public
employees, though not leadership in the strategic sense.
• Organization: 5, 6; Students and public employees
• Structure: 0. No evidence of hierarchy found.
• Cohesion: 1, the outrage against Serrano’s actions were widely shared, no
evidence of dissent found.
• Composition: 5. Students, Public Employees, unions, religious and human rights
groups, later Army/military forces.
Government response:
• Government Engagement: 0
• Movement Engagement: 1, both pre-escalation and post escalation, the
movement wanted government action taken, and protests were held directly at
government bodies, though the government didn’t meet with any protestors.
• Concession(s): 1, the actions taken by Serrano on 5/25/1993.
• Concession Backfire (describe nature of backfire): 0
• Repression (describe both targeted and widespread): 1, targeted; 1,
widespread. At first targeted, later widespread, until the military dropped support
for the president
• Repression Backfire (describe nature of backfire): 1, the army dropped support
for the president after it became clear that repression wasn’t going to be enough,
and Serrano was eventually forced to flee
Sources:
1. Agence France Press. 1993. “Student shot during demonstration.” In Agence
France Press, May 12, 1993.
2. Agence France Press. 1993. “Guard killed in attack on legislator amid violent
student unrest.” In Agence France Press, May 19, 1993
3. Agence France Press. 1993. “24-hour strike gets underway.” In Agence France
Press, May 21, 1993.
4. The Associated Press. 1993. “Thousands protest austerity in Guatemala.” In The
Associated Press, May 21, 1993.
5. The Associated Press. 1993. “President of Guatemala dissolves congress, supreme
court.” In The Associated Press, May 25, 1993.
6. The Associated Press. 1993. “Troops take to streets after Guatemala president
suspends democratic rule.” In The Associated Press, May 26, 1993.
7. Agence France Press. 1993. “Police break up court workers’ protest against
Serrano.” In Agence France Press, May 27, 1993.
•
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8. The Associated Press. 1993. “Opposition unites against power grab, newspaper
returns under censorship.” In The Associated Press, May 27, 1993.
9. Agence France Press. 1993. “Army dropping support for Serrano.” In Agence
France Press, June 01, 1993.
10. Agence France Press. 1993. “Guatemalan military sends Serrano packing.” In
Agence France Press, June 01, 1993.
11. The Associated Press. 1993. “Serrano forced out of office by army.” In The
Associated Press, June 01, 1993.
12. Martinez, Emma G. “Guatemala:The Coup All Knew Was Coming” Envio, July
1993. Accessed 1/20/20 from: https://www.envio.org.ni/articulo/1699

MEC ID: 188/2752
Maximalist Campaign: Libyan Civil War
Reformist Claim(s): In January 2011, street protests broke out over high housing prices
and government corruption, lasting largely until the beginning of this civil war on the
16th of February 2011. The Libyan civil war erupted in February 2011 after several days
of disorganized street protests led to massive defections from Muammar Qaddafi’s
regime. With heavily armed defectors prepared to fight Qaddafi loyalists, Qaddafi issued
a statement threatening to go door to door in the rebel-held areas and kill all those
engaged in rebellion against him. This statement prompted international action, with a
UN Security Council resolution calling for an armed force to protect civilians and a
NATO campaign that ultimately tilted the balance in favor of the rebels. By October
2012, Qaddafi had been killed after being found in hiding, the NATO-backed rebels had
seized Tripoli, and the Transitional National Council (TNC) assumed sovereign power.
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 2 (political, corruption, economic, high housing
prices)
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2752
Demand Escalation (date and description): 2/16/2011
Movement structure:
• Leadership: 1, the National Transition Council (NTC) was the de facto leader of
the campaign and later government.
• Mobilization: 1, the National Transition Council (NTC) was the de facto leader
of the campaign and later government.
• Organization: 7,8, (NTC evolved from military and civilian government leaders)
• Structure: 1, NTC was hierarchical
• Cohesion: 1, NTC sought the downfall of Quaddafi with no other goals or
internal disagreement (until later challenge by rival factions, see 2014 Civil War)
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Composition: 5 (Libyan citizens, military defectors, govt employees, students,
etc. strong evidence of general public involvement)
Government response:
• Government Engagement: 0
• Movement Engagement: 0
• Concession(s): 1, on 1/27/11, the pre-escalation campaign had limited success,
extracting promises of billions in housing, but the protests continued and
escalated into civil war
• Concession Backfire (describe nature of backfire): 1, the sub-maximalist
demands eventually escalated into calls for Quaddafi’s resignation
• Repression (describe both targeted and widespread): 1 targeted; 1 widespread;
extremely brutal widespread and targeted repression resulting in thousands of
deaths
• Repression Backfire (describe nature of backfire): 1, extremely brutal
widespread and targeted repression resulting in thousands of deaths also triggered
domestic escalation of the movement and eventually international intervention,
effectively destroying Quaddafi’s forces.
Sources:
1. Staff writer. 2011. “Timeline: Libya’s civil war.” The Guardian (November 20).
Access at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/19/timeline-libya-civilwar.
2. Staff writer. 2012. “Libya’s civil war.” Globalsecurity.org (April 7). Access at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/libya-civil-war.htm.
3. Al Jazeera, 2011. Libyan police stations torched [WWW Document]. February
16. Al Jazeera. URL
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/02/20112167051422444.html
(accessed 2.16.20).
4. Reuters, 2011. Libya sets up $24 bln fund for housing . Jan 27.
https://www.reuters.com/article/libya-fund-investment/libya-sets-up-24-bln-fundfor-housing-idUSLDE70Q1ZM20110127

MEC ID: 239/2753
Campaign: IRA/Irish Nationalists
Reformist Claim(s): While the Irish Republican Army (IRA) is the most well-known of
the Irish nationalist groups having its roots in the original or “old” 1919 IRA that fought
for the establishment of a Republic of Ireland, it is important to note that a civil rights
campaign predated the modern IRA that originated in Northern Ireland. On January 29,
1967, a group of political leaders and tradesmen formed the Northern Ireland Civil Rights
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Association, which had 5 demands pertaining to political freedoms, but didn’t call for
secession or independence. Events escalated on August 12, 1969 during the Battle of the
Bogside, which resulted in the assembly of barricades in Derry, and escalation in
demands. After this period, violence was more common, and splits occurred in the
movement between nonviolent activists and the nascent IRA became the primary
mobilizer after the events of Bloody Sunday, when the British security forces opened fire
on an unarmed civil rights demonstration killing 14. While NICRA organized a protest of
100,000 citizens immediately after this, it was their last large mobilization, and support
for the IRA and armed conflict skyrocketed. The IRA and subsequent splinter groups
then waged an armed campaign against the British government until the signing of the
Good Friday Agreement in 1997.
Number of Reformist Claim(s): 4 (Economic, Labor Dispute over unfair employment
laws to Catholics/Republicans & Housing discrimination; Political, Police brutality with
Arbitrary security actions against Catholics/Republicans and Government structure
reforms – e.g., Bill of Rights type protections for freedom of assembly, speech
association for Catholics/Republicans)"
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2753
Campaign Escalation Date: 12/28/1969
Movement Structure:
• Leadership: 1, initially led by NICRA, later the IRA emerged, key individuals
included John Hume (NICRA/nonviolent mobilization) and Gerry Adams
(IRA/later Sinn Fein)
• Mobilization: 1, initial mobilization was encouraged by NICRA, after 1972, IRA
and splinter IRA groups mobilized, though scattered nonviolent mobilization
increased in the 1990s.
• Organization(s): 1 (IRA), 6 (NICRA)
• Structure: 1, the pre-escalation movement was hierarchical and formally
organized, and its successors were decidedly hierarchical
• Cohesion: 1, though the IRA did fracture, its groups shared the goal of Northern
Irish reunification.
• Composition: 5; Students, political party leaders, labor unions, religious leaders,
later near exclusively Catholics.
Government Response:
• Government Engagement: 0
• Movement Engagement: 1, the movement attempted to gain civil rights by
engaging with government formally and informally, but was met with no success
• Concessions: 1, Five Point Reform on November 22, 1968
• Concession Backfire: 1, Five Point Reform was seen as insufficient
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•

Repression: 1, targeted and 1, widespread; Significant repression occurred during
both phases of the campaign, both targeted and widespread repression escalating
into war between the IRA and British government.
• Repression Backfire: 1, Repression beginning in the early phases of the
campaign escalated in 1969 during the Bogside and again during the Bloody
Sunday incident, mobilizing considerably more support than was present prior to
repression.
Sources:
1. Irish Times, “No One Imagined the Violence to Follow” 9/29/18 retrieved 8/26/19
from: https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/no-one-imagined-the-violencethat-would-follow-eamonn-mccann-on-derry-in-1968-1.3644698
2. Bew, P., & Gillespie, G. (1999). Northern Ireland: a chronology of the troubles
1968-1999. Gill & Macmillan Ltd.
3. McKeown, Michael. (2001; revised 2009). Post-Mortem: An examination of the
patterns of politically associated violence in Northern Ireland during the years
1969-2001 as reflected in the fatality figures for those years, (June 2009), [PDF;
279KB]. CAIN: <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/mckeown/mckeown01.pdf>
4. Purdie, Bob (1990). Politics in the Streets: The origins of the Civil Rights
Movement. Belfast: Blackstaff Press.
https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/events/crights/purdie/index.html
5. Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association, 1979. " We shall overcome"...: the
history of the struggle for civil rights in Northern Ireland, 1968-1978. Northern
Ireland Civil Rights
Association.https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/events/crights/nicra/nicra781.htm
6. Peter Pringle and Philip Jacobson (2000). Those Are Real Bullets, Aren't They?.
London: Fourth Estate. ISBN 1-84115-316-8
7. O’Hagan, S., 2018. Northern Ireland’s lost moment: how the peaceful protests
of ’68 escalated into years of bloody conflict | Politics | The Guardian [WWW
Document]. The Guardian. URL
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/apr/22/lost-moment-exhibitionnorthern-ireland-civil-rights-1968-troubles-what-if (accessed 12.23.19).
8. PBS, n.d. Chronology | The Ira & Sinn Fein | FRONTLINE | PBS [WWW
Document]. URL
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ira/etc/cron.html (accessed
1.19.20).

MEC ID: 361/2754
Maximalist Campaign: Anti-Erdogan
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Reformist Claim(s): Following the Gezi Park protests calling for economic, political,
and social reforms, scattered protests continued throughout the country through 2013.
However, protestors mobilized on December 26, 2013 explicitly calling for Erdogan to
step down and remained mobilized at significant levels. Mass demonstrations have been
met with police repression, including a notable mobilization of 40,000 police on the May
Day demonstrations in Taksim Square. Nevertheless, anger over mishandling of a mining
disaster in Soma resulted in more widespread demonstrations throughout the country,
continuing through August 2014. In December, police arrested over two dozen people
thought to be supporters of Gulen. The arrests were aimed at pro-Gulen media outlets.
Ergodan believes this movement is guilty of plotting to overthrow his government. A
protest was held in commemoration of Berkin Elvan, who was killed as a result of the
anti-Erdogan demonstrations in 2013. The death of Elvan brought together opponents of
Erdogan, with demonstrations taking place in 20 cities in Turkey. Some protesters had
Molotov cocktails and firecrackers and engaged in clashes with police. Police used tear
gas and water cannons to break up demonstrations. Days later, three people were arrested
for insulting Erdogan on Twitter. On March 31, a leftist group claiming to be avenging
the death of Elvan took a prosecutor hostage in a courthouse. 22 people were arrested, all
of whom were suspected to be linked to the group.
Violence in the run-up to the July 7 election included clashes and attacks, mainly
targeting the HDP, a mainly Kurdish party. The election carried particular importance
because HDP reached the threshold needed to enter Parliament, which prevented
President Erdogan from reaching the majority needed to change the constitution, which
would have given him executive powers. Hundreds of HDP party supporters
demonstrated in response to an attack on regional HDP headquarters on May 18. This
was also after the party reported that 73 attacks had been made on HDP offices since the
previous month. On June 4, clashes occurred between about 1000 nationalists and 2000
HDP supporters at an HDP rally. Police responded by using water cannons and tear gas
on the demonstrators. Explosions at an HDP rally of tens of thousands in Diyarbakir on
June 5 killed two and injured hundreds more.
During May Day protests, clashes took place between protesters and police.
Police used tear gas and water cannon trucks to halt protesters trying to move toward
Taskim Square. Istanbul’s governor reported 203 arrested and 18 wounded. Protests on
May 31 to mark the anniversary of anti-Erdogan protests were blocked by thousands of
police stationed to prevent such demonstrations. The July 7 elections dealt a blow to
Erdogan’s party and prevented him changing the constitution to gain executive power.
The campaign is coded as completed as of July 7.
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 5 (Social, Social issues, Environmental damages,
Political, unjust police brutality/security repression, political corruption, foreign policy)
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2754
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Demand Escalation (date and description): 12/26/2013
Movement structure:
• Leadership: 0. Prior to escalation, the Gezi Park protests had no clear leadership
though it assembled a very large coalition that had largely fizzled out by
September 2013. The maximalist campaign had no clear leadership, though
mobilization was clearly done by opposition party supporters
• Mobilization: 1, Prior to escalation, the Gezi park campaign had very clear
mobilizers across civil society, ranging from opposition parties to environmental
groups to trade and journalism unions. The maximalist campaign had no clear
leadership, though mobilization was clearly done by opposition party supporters.
• Organization: 3 (opposition parties)
• Structure: 0, no evidence of hierarchy found
• Cohesion: 1, protests appeared cohesive, though the goals were more focused for
the maximalist campaign than during the Gezi Park Protests
• Composition: 5 students, environmentalists, women, opposition parties, evidence
of general public involvement
Government response:
• Government Engagement: 1, during the Gezi park protests prior to the
maximalist campaign, the government did indeed meet with movement leaders,
some of whom were in the opposition party that opposed Erdogan in this
campaign.
• Movement Engagement: 1, just as mentioned above, while the Erdogan regime
didn’t meet with protest or opposition leaders during the maximalist phase of this
campaign, there is evidence that the movement pushed for meeting with the
regime during the Gezi park protests, and they eventually succeeded in meeting
and extracting some concessions
• Concession(s): 1, Gezi park protests elicited some concessions in that the
government didn’t end up developing the park
• Concession Backfire (describe nature of backfire): 0
• Repression (describe both targeted and widespread): 1, Targeted; 1,
Widespread; both widespread and targeted repression used.
• Repression Backfire (describe nature of backfire): 1; substantial backfire
during the Gezi Park protests, including the (eventually resulting in over 3.5
million Turkish protesters)
Sources:
1. “Thousands of Turkish protesters urge Erdogan to step down,” Xinhua,
2/26/2013.
2. “Turkish Protestors Defy Government’s May Day Ban,” New York Times,
5/1/2014.
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3. AFPR. 2014. “Turkey's Gulen movement: nebulous group opposing Erdogan,”
Agence France-Presse, December 15.
4. AFPR. 2014. “Erdogan tells EU to 'mind own business' in Turkey arrests,”
Agence France-Presse, December 15.
5. AFPR. 2014. “Turkey sacks 4 prosecutors behind anti-Erdogan graft probe,”
Agence France-Presse, December 30.
6. AFPR. 2015. “Erdogan vows to rid Turkey's judiciary of 'cancer cells',” Agence
France-Presse, February 2.
7. AFPR. 2015. “Erdogan leading Turkey to 'totalitarianism': arch-foe Gulen,”
Agence France-Presse, February 3.
8. AFP. 2015. “Turkey police break up protests remembering slain teen,” Agence
France-Presse, March 11.
9. AFP. 2015. “Turkey arrests 3 in raids over Erdogan Twitter insults,” Agence
France-Presse, March 13.
10. AFP. 2015. “Turkey detains 22 suspected radicals after hostage standoff: report,”
Agence France-Presse, April 1.
11. AFP. “Police use tear gas on Turkey May Day protesters.” Agence France Presse.
01 May 2015.
12. AFP. “Turkey's Kurdish party rocked by twin attacks.” Agence France Presse. 18
May 2015.
13. AP. “Police block entry to Istanbul park on protest anniversary.” The Associated
Press. 31 May 2015.
14. AFP. “Clashes as protesters storm rally by Turkey pro-Kurdish party.” Agence
France Presse. 04 June 2015.
15. AFP. “Two killed in blasts at Turkey party rally ahead of polls.” Agence France
Presse. 05 June 2015.
16. AP. “Turkey's Erdogan urges parties to put differences aside.” The Associated
Press. 11 June 2015.
17. AFP. “Joy and anguish greet AKP win in Turkey vote.” Agence France-Presse. 01
November 2015.
18. AFP. “Erdogan pushes for new charter to create executive presidency.” Agence
France-Presse. 04 November 2015
19. Al Jazeera, 2013. Turkey protests continue despite apology [WWW Document].
URL https://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2013/06/20136551212442132.html
(accessed 3.14.20).
20. Arsu, S., Mackey, R., 2013. With a Burst of Color, Turkey’s Public Walkways
Become a Focus of Quiet Protest. The Lede. URL
https://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/03/with-a-burst-of-color-turkeyspublic-walkways-become-a-focus-of-quiet-protest/ (accessed 3.14.20).
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21. Bianet, n.d. An Infographic History of the Gezi Resistance [WWW Document].
Bianet - Bagimsiz Iletisim Agi. URL
http://www.bianet.org/english/youth/147428-an-infographic-history-of-the-geziresistance (accessed 3.14.20).
22. ERZURUM (DHA), N.K.-K.B., n.d. Beyoğlu Belediye Başkanı: Gezi Parkı
eylemleri geride kaldı [WWW Document]. URL
https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/beyoglu-belediye-baskani-gezi-parkieylemleri-geride-kaldi-24577170 (accessed 3.14.20).
23. Good Morning Turkey, n.d. Police use tear gas early in morning, Taksim park
protesters again halt demolition - Good Morning Turkey [WWW Document].
URL
https://web.archive.org/web/20130607205828/http://www.goodmorningturkey.co
m/police-use-tear-gas-early-in-morning-taksim-park-protesters-again-haltdemolition/ (accessed 3.14.20).
24. Hurriyet, 2013. 2.5 million people attended Gezi protests across Turkey: Interior
Ministry - Turkey News [WWW Document]. Hürriyet Daily News. URL
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/25-million-people-attended-gezi-protestsacross-turkey-interior-ministry--49292 (accessed 3.14.20).
25. Letsch, C., 2013. Turkish protest takes root in Istanbul square after security forces
withdraw. The Observer.
26. Reuters, 2013. UPDATE 3-Turkish court blocks disputed park project. Reuters.

MEC ID: 402/2755
Maximalist Campaign: Zambian independence movement
Reformist Claim(s): Beginning in the mid 1940’s, resistance against a planned
consolidation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia into a Central African Federation that
would tilt the balance of power further in favor of white colonists grew into a political
movement for African Nationalism within what would later become Zambia. Of note, “In
addition, campaigners called for an end to racist discrimination against the black majority
within the political, economic, and social spheres of Northern Rhodesia.” Reformist
claims are thus political (constitutional), economic (high prices/unemployment), and
social (discrimination against Africans). Tensions escalated in 1953 with a call for a
general strike by leaders within the newly formed Northern Rhodesia African National
Congress (NRANC) and the leadership began direct engagement with the British
government in London to formally protest the proposed Federation on the grounds that
black African voices were not represented. Fearing additional African political control,
the colonists continued to arrest and intimidate leaders of the opposition. Despite this, the
campaign continued to further call for boycotts and strikes against British economic
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interests. By 1958, support for NRANC resurged, aided by economic problems including
a decline of the price of copper, the region’s primary commodity and high
unemployment. At this point, the movement fractured, with Nkumbula and Kaunda
splitting on strategy, one favoring congressional reforms and push for re-enfranchising
African voters and the other favoring a boycott. Kaunda formed his own political party.
By 1959, the colonial government spread rumors about murders of white colonists and
repressed both African political parties, arresting their leaders until they were freed in
1960.
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 3
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2755
Demand Escalation (date and description): 01/31/1960, c.f. NAVCO date, presumably
when Kaunda took over the United National Independence Party (UNIP).
Movement structure:
• Leadership: 1, Kenneth Kaunda and Harry Nkumbula were clear leaders of the
movement, along with their subsequent parties.
• Mobilization: 1, Kaunda was active in calling for strikes and boycotts and
mobilizing against the colonial government.
• Organization: 3 (UNIP + NRANC were both political parties).
• Structure: 1, the political parties were hierarchical, though small, and Kaunda is
widely regarded as the leader.
• Cohesion: 0, the leadership’s notable split and subs indicate substantial
differences in strategy and possibly goals, though eventually Nkumbula’s party
did back Kaunda’s in a vote that led to independence.
• Composition: 5. Students, Teachers, Black Africans of Northern Rhodesia,
Mineworkers, tribal chiefs, clerks
Government response:
• Government Engagement: 1, both prior to escalation and subsequent to
escalation. British Gov’t considered the petition on May 4, 1953.
• Movement Engagement: 1, British parliamentary notes that the letter of
engagement was sent on 4/12/1953.
• Concession(s): 1, the governance structure of then-Southern Rhodesia was
changed to accommodate more African political representation. “As a result of the
campaign, the colonial government revised the constitution once again in 1962,
allowing UNIP to participate in the October 1962 elections”. Exact date uncertain,
though first reference in British parliamentary records occurred on March 8, 1961.
• Concession Backfire (describe nature of backfire): 1. “However, this proposed
concession and its ultimate revision prompted UNIP to begin a stronger civil
disobedience campaign throughout the northern and eastern parts of the region in
1961(1).” Additionally, while not backfire in the traditional sense of increased
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mobilization, the concession did lead to the independence vote and can directly be
factored into the eventual formation of Zambia.
• Repression (describe both targeted and widespread): 1, targeted; 0,
widespread; prior to escalation “the colonial government responded with beatings,
assaults, and arrests (1)” including the arrests of leaders of the campaign, Kenneth
Kaunda and Harry Nkumbula.
• Repression Backfire (describe nature of backfire): 1, both pre and post
escalation. In the above incident, arresting Kaunda and Nkumbula increased
strikes. In 1959, “these arrests only helped to fuel black African resistance, and
prompted demonstrators to turn to property damage for two months.” Post
escalation, repression in 1961 of the push for African representation resulted in
additional participation in civil disobedience.
Sources:
1. Global Nonviolent Action Database, “Zambians campaign for independence,
1944-1964”, retrieved 8/30/19
from:https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/zambians-campaignindependence-1944-1964
2. Fergus Macpherson, Kenneth Kaunda: The Times and the Man (1974)
3. Richard Hall, The High Price of Principles: Kaunda and the White South (1969)
4. David C. Mulford, Zambia: The Politics of Independence, 1957–1964 (1967)
5. Hall, Richard, "Zambia, 1890-1964: the colonial period, 1976
6. CENTRAL AFRICAN FEDERATION. HC Deb 04 May 1953 vol 515 cc3716737, §3.46 p.m. retrieved 1/15/2020 from: https://api.parliament.uk/historichansard/commons/1953/may/04/central-african-federation
7. P Murray, (2005). British Documents on the End of Empire: Central Africa,
pp.lxxxi-iv.
8. R. I. Rotberg, (1965). The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa, pp. 311–12, 315.
9. CENTRAL AFRICA HL Deb 08 March 1961 vol 229 cc398-508

MEC ID: 27/2756
Maximalist Campaign: Benin Anti-Kerekou Campaign
Reformist Claim(s): In early 1989 Benin faced growing economic troubles with the
government failing to pay many public servants, leading to widespread series of
escalating strikes. These strikes began on Jan. 9 with a teacher’s strike, followed by a
student’s strike the following week. “Towards the end of the month there was unrest on
the streets of Porto Novo and shortly afterwards civil servants demonstrated against a
proposal put forward by the single trade union that they should forego three months'
salaries so as to provide some relief for the public finances. In April, the teachers started
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an indefinite strike with the result that the school year of 1988/89 could not be completed
and had to be cancelled. By July, finally, the employees of 13 of the 16 ministries were
on strike.” In June, reformists were elected to parliament and provided President Kerekou
with a set of demands of various reforms. “30 November, Kerekou gave his usual annual
keynote address which contained some vague promises of reform. It did nothing to calm
the tumultuous situation: on the contrary, it provoked major demonstrations in many of
the country's cities.” These protests led to the end of one-party rule on Dec. 7 and the
creation of a national conference establishing a new government on Feb. 19-28.
Number of Reformist Claim(s): 1
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2756
Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 12/2/1989; “30 November, Kerekou gave
his usual annual keynote address which contained some vague promises of reform. It did
nothing to calm the tumultuous situation: on the contrary, it provoked major
demonstrations in many of the country's cities.”
Movement Structure:
• Leadership: Unclear; Despite the presence of figures such as parliamentarian
reformist Robert Dossou, no figure clearly leads the movement.
• Mobilization: Clear; Multiple different groups were responsible for the
mobilization, such as labor unions and the Communist Party of Benin (CPB).
“Around the same time protest leaders began to circulate leaflets calling for a full
general strike in Benin.” 194
• Organization: 3, 5, 6; There were multiple pre-existing organizations such as
political parties (CPB) and the teachers and students’ unions.
• Structure: 0; Multiple different organizations made up the structure of this
campaign.
• Cohesion: 0; Despite the demands presented by the parliamentarians, the
different groups lacked a unified set of demands.
• Composition: 4; Initial composition included students, teachers, civil servants,
and communist party members.
• Movement Engagement: 0; various individuals within the movement attempted
engagement, but without unified engagement.
Government Response:
• Government Engagement: None; there was no direct engagement by the
government.
• Concession(s): 1; promise of reform was given, 11/30/1989.
193F
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•

Concession Backfire: 1; the vague nature of the promised concessions set off
further protests and an escalation of the campaign.
• Repression: Targeted; some of the early students’ protests were repressed
through police break-ups, but otherwise the campaign was largely unrepressed.
• Repression Backfire: None; Repression was not given as a reason for
mobilization.
Sources:
1. Bierschenk, Thomas. "Democratization without Development: Benin 19892009." International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 22, no. 3 (2009):
337-57.
2. Jennifer C. Seely (2005) The legacies of transition governments: post-transition
dynamics in Benin and Togo, Democratization, 12:3, 357-377.
3. Rachel M. Gisselquist (2008) Democratic Transition and Democratic Survival
in Benin, Democratization, 15:4, 789-814.

MEC ID: 52/2757
Maximalist Campaign: Anglophone Crisis
Reformist Claim(s): On October 11, 2016 a series of strikes and protests began by South
Cameroonian lawyers organized a protest of several hundred demanding a return to a
Common Law and the change to a federal government system and the use of English in
courts. On November 21, teachers on strike over the same language issue were joined by
several thousand South Cameroonians demanding more Anglophone teachers, before
being violently dispersed by the police. A series of further protests followed throughout
Nov. and early Dec. Though originally separate organizations, they quickly joined
together as the Cameroon Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC) on December
6. From Dec.-mid Jan. an ad hoc government committee attempted to negotiate with the
Consortium but talks collapsed due to the police violence. During this early period,
organizing was led largely by domestic Anglophone Cameroonians until the arrest of the
Consortium leadership in January 2017. At the same time the government shut down the
internet to the region and closed many schools. While this repression continued, the
government also offered new concessions, including measures to increase bilingualism
and multiculturalism. Following The arrest of Consortium leaders on Jan. 17, groups
advocating secession from the rest of Cameroon grew in strength with the support of
many diaspora communities.
Number of Reformist Claim(s): 1
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2757

225

Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 01/17/2017; The diaspora community
leadership was much more inclined to pursue a secessionist movement following the
arrest of the Consortium leaders.
Movement Structure:
• Leadership: 1, Until their arrest the movement was led by the leadership of the
CACSC with Felix Khongo Agbor Balla serving as president.
• Mobilization: 1; Mobilization was led first by lawyers and teacher’s
organizations, then the CACSC.
• Organization: 6; Pre-existing trade organization.
• Structure: 1; After the initial protests the movement came together under the
CACSC.
• Cohesion: 1; Under the CACSC the movement presented a unified set of
demands.
• Composition: 5; Though initially led by lawyers and teachers the movement
quickly included broad representation.
• Movement Engagement: 1; Engagement first began on Nov. 25, between the
Cameroonian Prime Minister and CACSC leadership. This was unsuccessful and
followed up with negotiations with the government ad hoc committee.
Government Response:
• Government Engagement: 1; Engagement first began on Nov. 25, between the
Cameroonian Prime Minister and CACSC leadership. This was unsuccessful and
followed up with negotiations with the government ad hoc committee.
• Concession(s): 1; 12/1/2016. During the negotiations the government agreed to a
number of demands before the CACSC pulled out of talk due to repression.
• Concession Backfire: 0
• Repression: Targeted and Widespread; The police used arrests and intimidation
against both protests and CACSC leadership. The government also closed schools
and shut down the internet.
• Repression Backfire: 1, Government repression led the CACSC leadership to
break off talks with the government.
Sources:
1. “Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis at the Crossroads.” International Crisis Group.
August 2, 2017. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/250cameroons-anglophone-crisis-crossroads.
2. Marie-Emmanuelle Pommerolle, Hans De Marie Heungoup. “The
“Anglophone crisis”: A tale of the Cameroonian postcolony”. African Affairs,
Volume 116, Issue 464, July 2017, 526–538.
3. Okereke, C. Nna-Emeka. "Analysing Cameroon’s Anglophone Crisis." Counter
Terrorist Trends and Analyses 10, no. 3 (2018): 8-12. Accessed January 9, 2020.
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MEC ID: 63/2758
Maximalist Campaign: Tiananmen Square
Reformist Claim(s): On April 15 Communist Party reformer Hu Yaobang died of a heart
attack. Hu was highly regarded by the students of Beijing for his moderate policy
regarding student protest; to honor this effort the students of various Beijing universities
planned to march to Tiananmen Square on April 16 and 17. “On the 16th several hundred
students marched and by the next evening, approximately 2,000 students took part in
marches to the square.” These marches were organized by a new student organization, the
Autonomous Student Union of Beijing Universities and Colleges.” “Starting on the night
of April 17, three thousand PKU students marched from the campus towards Tiananmen
Square, and soon nearly a thousand students from Tsinghua joined. Upon arrival, they
soon joined forces with those already gathered at the Square. As its size grew, the
gathering gradually evolved into a protest, as students began to draft a list of pleas and
suggestions (Seven Demands) for the government:
1. Affirm Hu Yaobang's views on democracy and freedom as correct.
2. Admit that the campaigns against spiritual pollution and bourgeois
liberalization had been wrong.
3. Publish information on the income of state leaders and their family
members.
4. Allow privately run newspapers and stop press censorship.
5. Increase funding for education and raise intellectuals' pay.
6. End restrictions on demonstrations in Beijing.
7. Provide objective coverage of students in official media”
During these initial periods the government had not settled on a clear response to the
protests, instead opting to occasionally peacefully dispersing the protests. “Although the
government prohibited student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square during Hu’s funeral
on April 22, the students continued to protest in the Square. 50,000 students occupied the
square the night before the funeral and remained there through the next day.” On April 26
the Central Government released an editorial in the People’s Daily which polarized both
students and average citizens by condemning the acts of the students as a form of antigovernment action. Despite the increased attention caused by the editorial, the
government and several student leaders met on April 28, though these had little result as
the government failed to make concessions to the entire movement. Throughout the next
several weeks there were multiple new protests in Tiananmen Square, with both an
increasing number of protesters and growing demands. At times the protest would reach
over one million protests from various walks of life, including students, workers, and
everyday citizens. On May 19 the government formally declared martial law and began
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military operations to clear the Square, utilizing increasing violence. Violence continued
for the next several days before the government was able to completely stem the protests.
Number of Reformist Claim(s): 7
Demand Escalation (date and description): 04/26/1989; The Central Government
Editorial published on this date made clear that the student protests would not be
tolerated going forward, catalyzing the protests towards more maximalist goals. “In a
twist of irony, student factions who genuinely called for the overthrow of the Communist
Party gained traction as the result of an April 26 editorial” (THE POWER OF
TIANNAMEN) 195
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2758
Movement Structure:
• Leadership: 0; These protests were organized across multiple universities and
student groups without a clear leadership structure, despite the presence of senior
student leaders such as Wang Dan and ASU President Wuer Kaixi.
• Mobilization: 1; Early mobilization was led by the Autonomous Student Union
of Beijing Universities and Colleges.
• Organization: 5, students
• Structure: 0, Decentralized
• Cohesion: 1, Cohesive
• Composition: 2, fairly narrow composition prior to escalation with various
students
• Movement Engagement: 1. The protesters attempted to negotiate with the
government by presenting various officials with sets of demands regarding their
reformist goals.
Government Response:
• Engagement: 1. The Central Party attempted to engage with individual leaders
within the movement but not the Autonomous Student Union.
• Concessions: 0. Concessions were never made due to the government’s failure to
recognize the central organizing body, a bare minimum requirement of the
protests
• Concessions Backfire: NA
• Repression: Widespread; Initially the protests were peacefully broken by Beijing
police, who used little to no force and the students left without resistance. The
government response to the protests did not turn violent until May 19 when
martial law was declared.
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Repression Backfire: Initially, the repression of the protests led to a greater
turnout by the protesters, who flocked to the square and block government troops.
The protests were effectively crushed following the entry of large numbers of
government troops into the square on June 3.
Sources:
1. Atshan, Nida; Tedia, Aden (2010) "Chinese students campaign for democratic
reform (Tiananmen Square), 1989" Global Nonviolent Action Database,
Swarthmore College [online], accessed 8/15/19
https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/chinese-students-campaigndemocratic-reform-tiananmen-square-1989
2. Calhoun, Craig. "Revolution and Repression in Tiananmen Square." Society
26(6) 1989.
3. "Students Mourn Hu Yaobang, Demand that China's Politburo Resign". The
Associated Press. April 17, 1989, Monday, AM cycle.
4. "Students Stage Sit-In At Great Hall Of People, Demand Reforms". The
Associated Press. April 18, 1989, Tuesday, PM cycle.
5. Francis, Corinna-Barbara. "The Progress of Protest in China: The Spring of
1989." Asian Survey 29, no. 9 (1989): 898-915.
6. "Police Break Up Student Protest At Communist Party HQ". The Associated
Press. April 18, 1989, Tuesday, AM cycle.
7. "Students Demanding Reforms Peacefully Dispersed by Police". The
Associated Press. April 19, 1989, Wednesday, AM cycle.
8. "Campuses Quiet as Students Prepare For Talks With Government". The
Associated Press. April 28, 1989, Friday, AM cycle.
9. "China Declares Martial Law To End Student Protests". The Associated Press.
May 19, 1989, Friday, PM cycle.
10. By NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF, Special to The New York Times. "CHINA
HARD-LINERS SEND TROOPS TO BEIJING; PARTY HEAD MAY BE OUT,
REPORTING IS CURBED". The New York Times. May 20, 1989, Saturday, Late
City Final Edition.
11. "Police Beat 45, Demonstrators Mass in Streets to Defy Martial Law". The
Associated Press. May 20, 1989, Saturday, PM cycle.
12. "Violence at Tiananmen Could Leave Permanent Scar on China". The
Associated Press. June 3, 1989, Saturday, AM cycle.
13. “1989 Tiananmen Square protests.” Wikipedia.
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1989_Tiananmen_Square_protests#Turning_point:
_April_26_Editorial>.
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MEC ID: 65/2759
Maximalist Campaign: Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia and National
Liberation Army
Reformist Claim(s): Throughout the 1950’s and 1960’s the Communist Party of
Columbia mobilized rural peasants in an effort to alleviate the economic conditions and
corruption. This came in the form of strikes and protests against the labor conditions that
disadvantaged labors against the landowners. As the repression against the peasants grew,
they also began to form defense units. Following the formation of the National Front
between Liberal and Conservative groups in Columbia, peasants began to face increased
repression leading to the formation of FARC out of the communist party.
Number of Reformist Claim(s): 1
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2759
Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 04/27/1964; FARC was established out of
the peasant defense units of the Columbian Communist Party following increased regime
repression.
Movement Structure:
• Leadership: 1;
• Mobilization: 1. Mobilization was led by the Colombian Communist Party.
• Organization: 3. Pre-existing political party.
• Structure: 1;
• Cohesion: 1; demands were unified under the PCC.
• Composition: 3; initially made up of leftist intellectuals, peasants, and laborers
• Movement Engagement: 0;
Government Response:
• Government Engagement: 0;
• Concession(s): 0;
• Concession Backfire: NA;
• Repression: Widespread and targeted; The Colombian government utilized
military action to target peasants sympathetic to or aligned with the PCC, as well
as eventually banning the communist party.
• Repression Backfire: Repression led to the creation of more defense units and
the eventual creation of FARC to combat the military repression.
Sources:
1. Brittain, James J. Revolutionary Social Change in Colombia : The Origin and
Direction of the FARC-EP / James J. Brittain ; Foreword by James Petras. 2010.
2. Alfredo Molano (2000) The Evolution Of The Farc: A Guerrilla Group’s Long
History, NACLA Report on the Americas, 34:2, 23-31.
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MEC ID: 107/2760
Maximalist Campaign: Greek Anti-Military
Reformist Claim(s): On Feb. 1, 4000 students at Athens Polytechnic went on strike
seeking a greater role in school policies and the abolition of laws on student behavior. In
response the government threatened to revoke the students' draft deferments if they did
not return to class, followed by police raids and arrests. Protest spread to the major
universities in Greece, though they were centered around Athens, while 88 student
leaders were ordered to report for military service. Clashes continued sporadically
between the regime and students as the regime underwent an attempt at liberalization.
Number of Reformist Claim(s): 1
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2760
Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 11/14/1973; Like previous protests,
students gathered to press for greater academic freedom, though on this occasion protest
quickly escalated and demanded the downfall of the regime.
Movement Structure:
• Leadership: 0; There was no centralized leadership within the movement.
• Mobilization: 0; there was no central organization mobilizing the movement.
• Organization: 5, Students.
• Structure: 0; Each university was autonomous in its effort, without any clear
internal structure.
• Cohesion: 1; The various universities generally took direction from the first
university to protest, Athens Polytechnic
• Composition: 1; University Students.
• Movement Engagement: 0; there were no observed attempts to negotiate on the
part of the movement or the government.
Government Response:
• Government Engagement: 0; there were no observed attempts to negotiate on
the part of the movement or the government.
• Concession(s): 0
• Concession Backfire: NA
• Repression: 1, targeted; 0, widespread. The government revoked students'
military deferments, followed by arrests and beatings. Lastly the government
shutdown the main point of protest, Athens University.
• Repression Backfire: 1, Increased mobilization.
Sources:
1. Special to The New,York Times. "Greece Threatens to Draft Students in
Campus Protests." New York Times (1923-Current File), Feb 14, 1973.
2. Special to The New,York Times. "Protesting Greek Students and Police Clash
in Athens." New York Times (1923-Current File), Feb 15, 1973.
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3. Special to The New,York Times. "STUDENTS BEATEN BY ATHENS
POLICE: ABOUT 100 ARE ARRESTED AS THEY PROTEST A CURB ON
DRAFT DEFERMENTS SOME 2,000 INVOLVED STUDENTS IN ATHENS
ARE BEATEN BY POLICE." New York Times (1923-Current File), Feb 17,
1973.
4. Special to The New,York Times. "Athens University is Shut for a Week by
Regime." New York Times (1923-Current File), Mar 07, 1973.
5. Special to The New,York Times. "STUDENTS IN ATHENS STAGE MASS
PROTEST." New York Times (1923-Current File), Nov 15, 1973.

MEC ID: 113/2761
Maximalist Campaign: Guinean Pro-Democracy Protests
Reformist Claim(s): On January 10, the two largest Guinean labor unions began a
nationwide strike with the support of 14 opposition parties, protesting the recent release
of Guinea’s wealthiest citizen and a former minister arrested for corruption. The strikers,
accompanied by opposition protests, demanded an end to the corruption and the re-arrest
of the suspects. On January 15 the protests turned violent, with police arresting and
breaking up segments of the protests, while protesters turned to stone throwing. The
leaderships’ demands escalated on January 18 following the death of protesters,
demanding the removal of the president. With mounting casualties, the Unions entered
into negotiations with the government on the 20th, which ultimately proved
unproductive. On February 27, Guineans returned to work after the trade unions and
President Conte agreed on the ending the weeks of unrest – “Ex-diplomat Lansana
Kouyate was chosen as a new prime minister on Monday night from a list supplied by
unions and the opposition after a deal at the weekend. He replaces Eugene Camara - a
close aide to the president whose appointment sparked the violence.” 196
Number of Reformist Claim(s): 1
Demand Escalation (date and description): 01/18/2007; Following the killing of a
protester by the government repression the campaign took on new maximalist claims.
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2761
Movement Structure:
• Leadership: 1; Union leadership (Rabiatou Serah Diallo, CNGT), alongside that
of the 14 opposition parties.
• Mobilization: 1; Trade unions CNGT and USTG
195F

196

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6399235.stm
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•

Organization: 3, 6, pre-existing Labor Unions - CNGT, USTG; Pre-existing
Political Parties
• Structure: 1;
• Cohesion: 1; The political parties involved in the protests appeared to have
followed the lead of the labor unions, leading to a single set of demands.
• Composition: 2; union and opposition members.
• Movement Engagement: 1, on January 20 the government and labor unions met
for talks that were ultimately unproductive.
Government Response:
• Engagement: 1, on January 20 the government and labor unions met for talks that
were ultimately unproductive.
• Concessions: 0;
• Repression: 0, targeted; 1, widespread; Government arrests and the breakup of
protests.
• Repression Backfire: 1, after the initial strikes were met with government
resistance many opposition members and average Guinean citizens joined the
protests.
Sources:
1. "Guinea opposition calls for 'civil disobedience'". Agence France Presse -English. January 9, 2007 Tuesday.
2."Guinea opposition calls for 'civil disobedience'". Agence France Presse -English. January 9, 2007 Tuesday.
3. Mouctar Bah. "General strike in Guinea turns violent". Agence France Presse - English. January 15, 2007 Monday.
4. Mouctar Bah. (January 18, 2007 Thursday). One killed, several wounded in
Guinea protests against president. Agence France Presse -- English.
5. Mouctar Bah. "Guinea police break up demo, arrest union leaders behind
strike". Agence France Presse -- English. January 17, 2007 Wednesday.
6. Alexandre Grosbois. "Four more killed in Guinea as crisis talks under way".
Agence France Presse -- English. January 20, 2007 Saturday.

MEC ID: 196/2762
Maximalist Campaign: Nyasaland African Congress
Reformist Claim(s): The early years of the Nyasaland African Congress were marked by
a reformist tradition, due in large part to its composition of intellectuals and Africans
with governmental posts. From 1944, when the party was founded, to 1956 it pursued a
policy of increased African representation within the government bodies. This policy and
its reliance on the intelligentsia and bureaucracy limited the size and ability of the
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organization, reaching a high of 5000 members in 1953. 1953 was a turning point, both
for the movement and for Malawi generally due to the outbreak of protests in the south
over enforced Federation with Rhodesia. During this period the NAC nearly collapsed
due to infighting between the moderate and radical wings of the party. During this period
the party occasionally utilized nonviolent noncooperation favored by the more radical
wing, though the moderates still favor working from within. This infighting allowed the
radicals to come to power within the NAC which led to its transformation into a mass
party structure, expanding its operations into the village level. By 1957 the party
membership had risen to 13,000 and was actively pursuing the more radical program of
non-cooperation. Political agitation increased through the next few years, particularly
under the leadership of Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda, who led the organization following his
return to Malawi in July 1958. At this point the NAC had fully shifted from any form of
reformism, to the outright removal of colonial rule, though the roots of this change go as
far back as 1956. This radical position led to the subsequent banning of the party and the
arrest of some of the party leadership, essentially shuttering the party.
Number of Reformist Claim(s): 1
Demand Escalation (date and description): 07/01/1957
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2762
Movement Structure:
• Leadership: 1; The party was headed by a party president throughout its history,
during this period being led by Dr. Banda.
• Mobilization: 1; Mobilization was led by the NAC, along with its subsequent
village, women’s, and youth wings.
• Organization: 3; Pre-existing Political organization – Nyasaland African
Congress.
• Structure: 1; Centralized
• Cohesion: 0; The internal makeup of the NAC was prone to infighting over
strategy and didn’t coalesce into a cohesive unit until at least 1956.
• Composition: 5; Originally the party was largely just intellectuals and
bureaucrats, but later many different social actors joined.
• Movement Engagement: 1, During the early years of the movement leadership
focused on engaging with the government, mostly unsuccessfully.
Government Response:
• Engagement: 1; During its reformist period the colonial government recognized
the role of the party, though it did little with its recommendations.
• Concessions: 0
• Concessions Backlash: NA
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Repression: 1, widespread and 1, targeted; The party was banned and its
leadership arrested during its radical phase while many of its members were
assaulted by police.
• Repression Backfire: 1, the NAC was replaced by the much larger Malawi
National Congress following its banning by British authorities.
Sources:
1. McCracken, J. (1998). Democracy and Nationalism in Historical Perspective:
The Case of Malawi. African Affairs, 97(387), 231-249. Retrieved from
http://www.jstor.org.du.idm.oclc.org/stable/723265
2. Power, Joey. “Building Relevance: The Blantyre Congress 1953-1956.” Journal
of Southern African Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1, Special Issue: Malawi (Mar., 2002),
pp. 45-65.
3. Tangri, Roger K. “The Rise of Nationalism in Colonial Africa: The Case of
Colonial Malawi.” Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 10, No. 2
(Jan., 1968), pp. 142-161.

MEC ID: 341/2763
Maximalist Campaign: Pro-dem movement in Thailand
Reformist Claim(s): On April 19, 1991, 19 organizations representing various interest
groups in Thailand joined with the Students Federation of Thailand (SFT) to form the
Campaign for Popular Democracy (CPD). Their goal was to fight against the military’s
attempts to seize control of the country through a rewrite of the Thai constitution. Major
protests began in November. The protesters’ biggest concerns were the constitutional
changes which would have allowed for an unelected Prime Minister and granted greater
powers to the military appointed senate. On November 19, 70,000 protesters turned out,
but after the protest the Thai King intervened, asking protesters to wait until after the
March 1992 election and allow the passage of the new constitution. To further diffuse the
situation, the head of the military, General Suchinda, promised he would not accept the
position.
Number of Reformist Claim(s): 1
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2763
Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 04/07/1992; Following the March
elections, General Suchinda went back on his previous agreement not to accept the role
of Prime Minister. The following day the movement began to remobilize towards the
removal of Suchinda and the end of military government.
Movement Structure:
• Leadership: 0; Despite unifying under the Campaign for Popular Democracy the
movement did not appear to have a singular leader or leadership structure.
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Mobilization: 1; Campaign for Popular Democracy.
• Organization: 3, 4, 5; Pre-existing Student Groups - SFT, Pre-existing Political
Parties, Pre-existing non-political movements - NGO’s.
• Structure: 0, the campaign was centralized within the CPD.
• Cohesion: 1; The movement coalesced around the CPD.
• Composition: 5; widespread public involvement.
• Movement Engagement: 0
Government Response:
• Government Engagement: 0
• Concession(s): 1; following the Nov. 19 protests, General Suchinda promised not
to accept the position of Prime Minister if offered to him, conceding a key
concern of the protesters.
• Concession Backfire: Following the election Suchinda went back on the
concession, leading to the campaign's escalation.
• Repression: 0
• Repression Backfire: NA
Sources:
1. Global Nonviolent Action Database: "Thai People Successfully Defend
Democracy Against Military Coup, 1992."
http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/thai-people-successfully-defenddemocracy-against-military-coup-1992 accessed 8/26/16.
2. Schock, Kurt, Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in
Nondemocracies, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2005,
3. Sharp, Gene. Waging Nonviolent Struggle. Boston, Porter Sargent. 2005.

MEC ID: 396/2764
Maximalist Campaign: Kosovo Albanian
Reformist Claim(s): In November 1988 Albanian miners in Kosovo led a series of
strikes and protests against the growing rule of Milosevic and his attempts to reduce the
rights of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. “At dawn that day, 3,000 miners from Trepça left
their pits and set off to march 45 kilometres (28 miles) to Prishtina. They were marching
not for an extension of Albanian rights, but in defense of Yugoslavia and the constitution
of 1974.” “Throughout Kosovo, other marches formed to join in – perhaps 300,000
people.” “In March 1989, the Kosovo Assembly, coerced by Yugoslav forces, voted for
constitutional amendments annulling key aspects of Kosovo’s autonomy. For the rest of
1989, protests started non-violently, but repeatedly degenerated into clashes between the
armed police forces and protesters throwing stones or petrol bombs and even using
firearms.” Over the next several months various other protests and street demonstrations
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would be held, as Kosovars continued to protest the denigration of their status and the
elevation of the Serbians, though these protests would not escalate until the secessions of
Croatia and Slovenia from Yugoslavia and their subsequent conflicts with Serbia.
Number of Reformist Claim(s): 2, social and political
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2764
Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 07/01/1990; As the rest of Yugoslavia
began to disintegrate the Kosovo Albanians began to demand secession of their own.
Movement Structure:
• Leadership: 1; There was not any unifying leadership during the initial periods of
the campaign, but as the LDK was formed its leader, President Ibrahim Rugove,
took over leadership of the movement
• Mobilization: 0; Following the spontaneous mobilization during the initial
protests the Democratic League of Kosovo was founded in December 1989, but it
is unclear what the extent of their role was during this period. According to
sources, the LDK failed to extend control over the entirety of the movement.
• Organization: 6; Pre-existing labor union - Miners Union
• Structure: 0; Prior to the escalation protest was largely decentralized, led by
various groups (miner’s strike) or began spontaneously (post-constitutional
reform protests).
• Cohesion: 1; Despite the lack of unified leadership or organization, most protests
were unified in the demand to uphold the right of Kosovo within the Yugoslavian
Republic.
• Composition: 5; The protest participants appeared to have come from a wide
breadth of Kosovian society.
Government Response:
• Government Engagement: 0; There is no indication that either the government
or movement attempted engagement with the other side.
• Movement Engagement: 0; There is no indication that either the government or
movement attempted engagement with the other side.
• Concession(s): 0; The government did not offer concessions to the movement.
• Concession Backfire: NA
• Repression: 0, targeted; 1, widespread; Following the initial strikes Serbian
police repeatedly used violence to repress the protests, which led to increased
violence on the part of protests and an escalation of the campaign.
• Repression Backfire: 1; increased mobilization
Sources:
1. Global Nonviolent Action Database, “Kosovo Albanians resist Serbian rule,
1990-1998” https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/kosovo-albanians-resistserbian-rule-1990-1998
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2. Clark, Howard. Civil Resistance in Kosovo. London: Pluto Press, 2000.
3. Judah, Tim. Kosovo : What Everyone Needs to Know®. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2008.
4. Rogel, Carole. "Kosovo: Where It All Began." International Journal of Politics,
Culture, and Society 17, no. 1 (2003): 167-82.

MEC ID: 416/2766
Maximalist Campaign: Serbian Republic of Krajina (Secession Campaign)
Reformist Claim(s): The Serbian National Council was created in response to Croatian
attempts to separate from Yugoslavia, with the intention of supporting union with the
Serbian-dominated state. Prior to Croatian independence, the party to pursue a policy of
supporting this union through both referendum and pro-union protest. Following a
breakdown of talks between Croatia and Yugoslavia, the SNC declared a policy of
secession in response to any Croatian Independence.
Number of Reformist Claim(s): 1
Demand Escalation (date and description): 12/21/1991; The movement escalated
following the secession of Croatia from Yugoslavia.
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2766
Movement Structure:
• Leadership: 1; The Krajina movement was led by the Serbian National Council
and its leader Milan Babic.
• Mobilization: 1; Mobilization was led by the Serbian National Council. [1]
• Organization: 15; No pre-existing organizations
• Structure: 1, Centralized
• Cohesion: 1, Cohesive
• Composition: 5; The movement was composed of ethnic Serbians from the
Krajina region of Croatia, with support from the Yugoslavian Army (JNA).
• Movement Engagement: 0
Government Response:
• Government Engagement: 1; The Croatian Government attempted to engage
with the Krajinans, who rejected these attempts
• Concessions: 0
• Concessions Backlash: NA
• Repression: 1, targeted; 0, widespread; The Croatian military fought multiple
engagements with Krajinan separatists who were aided by the JNA.
• Repression Backfire: 0, there is no indication that mobilization demonstrably
changed due to this repression.
Sources:
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1. "OTHER REPORTS ON CROATIA; Serbian Krajina leaders reject talks offer
by Croatian government". BBC Summary of World Broadcasts. January 10, 1991,
Thursday.
2. "Yugoslavia's Collective Presidency Meets, Without Croatian Chief". The
Associated Press. March 1, 1991, Friday, AM cycle.
3. Croatia Adopts New Constitution Authorizing Secession. The Associated Press.
(December 21, 1990, Friday, AM cycle).
4."Ethnic Serbs Say They Will to Secede from Croatian Republic". The
Associated Press. February 28, 1991, Thursday, AM cycle.

MEC ID: 28/2767
Maximalist Campaign: Bolivian anti-juntas (General Guido Vildoso)
Reformist Claim(s): In 1982, momentum grew in Bolivia to oust a series of dictators
ruling by military junta owing to widespread issues with the economy involving worker’s
wages and substantial increase in prices. By September, protests began in La Paz,
growing to demand full resignation of the ruling regime. By the 17th, the size of marches
had grown to over 100,000 participants. Eventually, the junta accepted the demands and
ceded power.
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 2 (Economic, Price/tax increase and Labor/wage
dispute)
Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2767
Demand Escalation (date and description): 9/7/1982, “On September 7, the
Revolutionary Left Movement (Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria, MIR) held
its own hunger march in La Paz, attracting crowds of tens of thousands (some of whom
went on to vandalize public buildings). Protesters rallied for three hours on La Paz’s
central avenue, waving orange and white placards and chanting slogans such as “Down
with misery, hunger, and the military dictatorship.””
Movement structure: “COB had to organize clandestinely, political parties had been
suppressed, and civil society organizations were weak, so many of the pro-democracy
initiatives were led by small groups, such as the mineworkers’ wives. During the
struggles in 1980, the movement was led primarily by CONADE, which included the
pro-democratic political parties, the COB, Christian base communities, and other smaller
groups. By 1982, the COB was playing a more central role in leading the struggle”
(Zunes 2018).
• Leadership: Yes, the Bolivian Workers’ Union (Central Obrera Boliviana,
COB) was the clear leader and mobilizer of this campaign.
• Mobilization: Yes, the Bolivian Workers’ Union (Central Obrera Boliviana,
COB) was the clear leader and mobilizer of this campaign
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Organization: 6 (the Bolivian Workers’ Union (Central Obrera Boliviana, COB))
• Structure: No evidence of hierarchy found; clusters, multiple organizations
• Cohesion: Yes, campaign was cohesive
• Composition: 5 (unions, students, laborers, miners, churches)
Government response:
• Government Engagement: 11/24/81, the military regime opened negotiations
with miners
• Movement Engagement: 11/24/81, the military regime opened negotiations with
miners
• Concession(s): 12/19/81, Torrelio agreed to recognize independent plant unions
within 3 months and promised to legalize the Bolivian Workers’ Union (COB)
within one year
• Concession Backfire (describe nature of backfire): none
• Repression (describe both targeted and widespread): Yes
• Repression Backfire (describe nature of backfire): NA
Sources:
1. Swarthmore Global Nonviolent Action database, “Bolivians successfully oust
military regime, 1982” retrieved 3/31/2020 from:
https://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/bolivians-successfully-oust-militaryregime-1982
•

MEC ID: 20/2769
Maximalist Campaign: Shanti Bahini
Reformist Claim(s): Following the independence of Bangladesh from Pakistan the new
government went about constructing a new constitution. Fearing a document which
instilled the domination of the majority Bengali group, a delegation from the Jumma
communities of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) led by Manobendra Narayan Larma
met with the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister rejected their demands for regional
autonomy and the Larma returned to CHT and formed the Parbatya Chattagram Jana
Samhati Samiti (PCJSS). Until 1975 the group attempted to gain minority rights through
constitutional pressure, with Larma being elected to parliament in 1973. Throughout this
period the Jumma people continued to be repressed by the Mujidar regime through the
heavy policing of these communities and the settling of Bengali people in the CHT
region. On January 25, 1975, the Prime Minister made Bangladesh into a one-party state,
forcing members into his recently created party or leave the parliament. In response
Larma returned to CHT and took the PCJSS underground, which alongside its armed
group Shanti Bahini as part of the maximalist campaign.
Number of Reformist Claim(s): 1
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Reformist Campaign: MEC ID 2769
Demand Escalation (Date and Description): 01/25/1975; On January 25 the Prime
Minister Sheikh Mujidar Rahman, the leader of Bangladesh, turned the country into a
one-party state. In response the parliamentary representative of the Chittagong Hill Tracts
returned home and formed the Shanti Bahini to fight for greater autonomy for the Jumma
ethnic minorities living in the region.
Movement Structure:
• Leadership: Clear; The movement was led by Manobendra Narayan Larma, the
sole parliamentary representative from the Chittagong Hills Tracts.
• Mobilization: Clear; Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS) founded
by Larma on March 7, 1972 following the failed constitutional attempts.
• Organization: Political party, 3
• Structure: Centralized; Clear hierarchy present in the PCJSS.
• Cohesion: Unified; Due to the centralized structure the movement was relatively
cohesive.
• Composition: Broad; The movement was made up of broad members of Jumma
social groups.
• Movement Engagement: In February 1972 a delegation from the Jumma
communities, led by Larma, met with the Prime Minister, who rejected their claim
for constitutional autonomy.
Government Response:
• Government Engagement: In February 1972 a delegation from the Jumma
communities, led by Larma, met with the Prime Minister, who rejected their claim
for constitutional autonomy.
• Concession(s): None
• Concession Backfire: None
• Repression: Widespread; The Bangladeshi government utilized two methods to
repress the Jumma people first by stationing military units in these communities
and second through the settling of ethnic Bengali’s in CHT.
• Repression Backfire: Unclear
Sources:
1. Panday, Pranab Kumar, and Ishtiaq Jamil. "Conflict in the Chittagong Hill
Tracts of Bangladesh 1: An unimplemented accord and continued violence." In
Ethnic Subnationalist Insurgencies in South Asia, pp. 143-160. Routledge, 2015.
2. Lailufar Yasmin. The Tyranny of the Majority in Bangladesh: The Case of the
Chittagong Hill Tracts, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 20:1. 2014. 116-132.
3. Bhumitra Chakma. 2010. The post-colonial state and minorities: ethnocide in
the Chittagong Hill Tracts, Bangladesh, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics,
48:3. 281-300.
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4. Islam, Syed Nazmul. "The Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh: Integrational
Crisis between Center and Periphery." Asian Survey21, no. 12 (1981): 1211-222.
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Appendix D – Case descriptions and coding decisions for the 39 non-escalated campaigns
(in numerical order by the reformist campaign ID)
MEC ID 493: Bangladesh Civil Servants Strike
Location: Bangladesh
Target: The Government of Bangladesh
Dates: 08/05/1991 - 08/27/1991
Outcome: Failure
Summary: Civil servants in Bangladesh campaigned for higher wages in August 1991,
presenting the first major challenge to 5-month-old Zia government. Although around a
million civil servants were involved in dispute although, only around 10,000 are reported
to actively join the demonstrations. The civil servants staged daily 3 hours strikes as well
as several 48 to 72 hour strikes over the course of 3 weeks. Furthermore, they staged
demonstrations.
Civil servants demanded an increase from 1,605 taka (45 dollars) with allowances, to
minimum of 2,400 taka (67 dollars). The government of Prime Minister refused the
demands of civil servants, citing lack of funds. The strikers returned to work on August
27th after the Prime Minister threatened to dismiss the strikers.
Several clashes occurred during the strike as the police forces tried to disperse
demonstrating civil servants with batons and tear gas. Furthermore, several leaders were
arrested.
Campaign: 1991 Bangladesh Civil Servants Strike
Reformist Claim(s): Economic - wanting higher wage
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 1. Leadership under Employee’s Action Committee
●
Mobilization: 1. Mobilization by Employee’s Action Committee
●
Organization: 6. Employee’s Action Committee = Labor union
●
Structure: 1. Centralized under the Employee’s Action Committee, which
is formed by four employees’ federations, but acts as a single cohesive entity with
its own centralized leadership structure. (Sources 2, 3)
●
Composition: 1. Government employees
●
Cohesive: 1. Cohesive demand of higher wage
●
Movement Engagement: 1. Requested meeting with President Zia which
was initially refused. Sources say unannounced talks were held with government
ministers on Friday August 23, 1991. Talks with the President were held on
Monday August 26, 1991. (Sources 1, 4)
Government response:
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●
Government Engagement: 1. Requested meeting with President Zia
which was initially refused. Sources say unannounced talks were held with
government ministers on Friday August 23, 1991. Talks with the President were
held on Monday August 26, 1991. (Sources 1, 4)
●
Concession(s): 1. Government offered to raise monthly salaries on a range
between 900 taka (25 dollars) and 10,000 taka (28 dollars), retroactive to July 1.
Civil servants at the bottom of the salary scale would still only receive a total of
1,605 taka (45 dollars) with allowances, short of the demanded minimum wage:
2,400 taka (67 dollars). Unclear on the exact date but likely August 19 or 20,
1991. (Sources 1, 4)
●
Concession Backfire: 1. Protesters rejected the offer and strike continued
with a daily three-hour token strike and planned for a 24-hour stoppage Thursday
●
Repression: 1. Targeted; 1. Widespread. Union leaders arrested; police and
paramilitary used baton-wielding police and paramilitary, as well as tear gas
●
Repression Backfire: 0. Protests dissipated soon afterwards.
Sources
1. Bangladesh civil servants fight police as strike continues, Agence France Presse,
August 24, 1991
2. Bangladeshi civil servants report to work after failed strike, Agence France
Presse, August 27, 1991
3. "Bangladesh government employees demonstrate for wage hike". Agence France
Presse -- English. August 5, 1991. https://advance-lexis-com.ezpprod1.hul.harvard.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3TDD
-SC30-0031-V15K-00000-00&context=1516831.
4. "Civil servants strike collapses after government's dismissal threat". Agence
France Presse -- English. August 26, 1991. https://advance-lexis-com.ezpprod1.hul.harvard.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3TDD
-S9G0-0031-V0T3-00000-00&context=1516831.

MEC ID 532: 2012 Patriotism Class Protest
Location: Hong Kong
Target: Hong Kong and Chinese Gov’t
Dates: 9/1/2012 – 9/8/2012
Outcome: Success
Summary: On September 1, around 40,000 students and parents demonstrated outside of
the government headquarters to force the government to scrap mandatory Chinese
patriotism lessons for students. Rallies continued every day, with hundreds protesting
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during the day and thousands joining them in the evenings. On September 7, the largest
crowd yet, estimated by organizers to be around 120,000 but by police to be 36,000,
rallied outside of government headquarters. On September 8, after days of protesting, the
government backed down on their plan for making the patriotism classes mandatory.
Campaign: Patriotism Class Protests
Reformist Claim(s): Other - highly context specific demand of removing mandatory
Chinese patriotism classes (1)
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 1. Leadership by Scholarism and the National Education
Parents’ Concern Group which held negotiations with government ministers
before the protests began.
●
Mobilization: 1. Mobilization by National Education Parents’ Concern
Group
●
Organization: 5 = student-led, 15 = National Education Parents’ Concern
Group
●
Structure: 0 - decentralized
●
Composition: 3 - teachers, students, and parents
●
Cohesive: 1 Cohesive demand of getting rid of mandatory patriotism
classes
●
Movement Engagement: 1. Education Minister met with National
Education Parents’ Concern Group, though negotiations broke down on July 28,
2012.
Government response:
●
Government Engagement: 1. Education Minister met with National
Education Parents’ Concern Group, though negotiations broke down on July 28,
2012. (1) The city's Beijing-backed leader, Leung Chun-ying, had rejected
demands to meet the students, saying he would not negotiate the withdrawal of
the policy he inherited from the previous government in July.
●
Concession(s): 1. Government conceded, and patriotism classes were no
longer mandatory. In a dramatic about face on the eve of the election, the Chief
Executive held a press conference late Saturday 8 September 2012 to say the
mandatory aspect of the policy had been scrapped
●
Concession Backfire: 0. Protests stopped after concession
●
Repression: 0. Targeted. 0 Widespread
●
Repression Backfire: 0. NA
Sources
1. AFP. 2012. “Thousands hold rally in Hong Kong against patriotism class,”
Agence France Presse – English, September 1.
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2. AFP. 2012. “H.K. students protest over ‘brainwashing’ classes,” Agence France
Presse – English, September 4.
3. AFP. 2012. “Hong Kong relents on patriotism classes on poll eve,” Agence
France Presse – English, September 8.

MEC ID 781: Anti-Police Bill Campaign
Location: Japan
Target: Government of Japan
Dates: 10/9/58 – 11/22/58
Outcome: Success
Summary: In October 1958 the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), holding a
majority in both houses of the Japanese Diet, began pushing a bill to greatly strengthen
the power of the police. Among other things, the bill would have given police greater
flexibility in dispersing labor strikes and political demonstrations and the power to make
preventive arrests. The bill was vehemently opposed by leftist forces in Japan. While the
Socialist Party delayed passage of the bill through obstructive parliamentary maneuvers,
leftist student unions and the powerful Sohyo federation of trade unions staged
demonstrations and a 24-hour strike in which over 4 million workers participated.
Because of the scale of popular opposition, on November 22nd PM Kishi of the LDP
agreed to drop the bill.
Reformist Claim(s): Social - greater restrictions on social behavior such as labor strikes
through increased police powers (1)
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 1. Leadership by opposition parties, student unions, and trade
unions
●
Mobilization: 1. Mobilization by opposition parties, student unions, and
trade unions
●
Organization: 3 = opposition parties, 4= ‘organizations of liberals and
intellectuals’, 5 = student unions, 6 = trade unions
●
Structure: 0. Decentralized alliance of various groups
●
Composition: 5 broad - politicians, students, various workers, general
sense of popular public support
●
Cohesive: 1. Cohesive demand calling for the prevention of the bill
proposing to increase police powers
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●
Movement Engagement: 1. Leaders of opposition parties represented the
movement and met with leaders of the government to reach a settlement deal on
November 22, 1958
Government response:
●
Government Engagement: 1. Leaders of opposition parties represented
the movement and met with leaders of the government to reach a settlement deal
on November 22, 1958
●
Concession(s): 1. Because of the scale of popular opposition, on November
22, PM Kishi of the LDP agreed to drop the bill
●
Concession Backfire: 0. Protests stopped after concession
●
Repression: 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread - police crackdown
●
Repression Backfire: 0. Repression was not cited as a cause for protest.
But this is ambiguous because the initial demand was related to increasing police
powers, which is linked to police crackdown repression.
Sources
1. Special to The New York Times “Kishi Challenged on Police Reform.” The New
York Times (1958, October 26).
2. “Japanese Fight Police Bill.” The New York Times (1958, October 29).
3. Trumbull, Robert. “Socialist Party Strikes in Japan.” The New York Times (1958,
October 10).
4. Trumbull, Robert. “Japanese Battle New Police Bill.” The New York Times
(1958, November 6).
5. Trumbull, Robert. “Kishi Drops Fight over Police Bill.” The New York Times
(1958, November 23).

MEC ID 874: 1972 Language Riots
Location: Pakistan
Target: Provincial Government of Sindh
Dates: 07/07/1972 - 07/14/1972
Outcome: Success
Summary: The Sindh Provincial Assembly passed a bill that recognized Sindhi as the
only official language. The bill led to widespread riots in the Urdu-speaking
communities, who wished that Urdu given the same status. The riots often led to lootings
and clashes between both communities as well as the police. During the week of rioting,
several towns were placed under curfew. Nevertheless, at least 60 people were killed,
most of them by police gunfire. After a week of riots, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
announced that Urdu and Sindhi will both be official languages.
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Reformist Claim(s): Social - ethnic language rights.
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 0. Unclear.
●
Mobilization: 0. Unclear.
●
Organization: 0. Unclear.
●
Structure: 0. Decentralized.
●
Composition: 5 - sense of general public involvement.
●
Cohesive: 1. Including Urdu as an official language.
●
Movement Engagement: 0. Unclear.
Government response:
●
Government Engagement: 0. Unclear.
●
Concession(s): 1. Urdu was included as an official language.
●
Concession Backfire: 0. Protests ended after concession.
●
Repression: 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread - police crackdown included at
least 60 deaths.
●
Repression Backfire: 0.
Sources
1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1972_Language_violence_in_Sindh
2. PAKISTANI TOLL 47 IN LANGUAGE RIOTS: 19 Reported Killed in New
Protests Over Sindh, New York Times ; Jul 11, 1972
3. Another Pakistani Town Put Under Curfew After Violence New York Times ; Jul
15, 1972

MEC ID 957: 2004-2006 Farmers Protest
Location: South Korea
Target: Government of South Korea
Dates: 11/13/2004 – 3/23/2006
Outcome: Failure
Summary: In November, some 15,000 angry South Korean farmers marched from
Seoul’s railway station to the City Hall in a protest against government plans to allow
foreign rice-producers a greater share of the domestic market. Following the march, about
3,000 farmers with bamboo sticks and bricks fought with riot police swinging sticks and
shields. Another violent protest erupted the following week, as South Korea and China
held talks in Beijing on rice market liberalization. Seoul has been engaged in rice talks
with China, the US, Thailand, Australia, and 5 other countries. Under a 1994 agreement,
South Korea limited rice imports to 4% of total domestic need for 10 years and while
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South Korea hopes to extend its annual import quota for another decade, other countries
want it to raise the quota or adopt a tariff system in 2005. In December, the police
detained some 300 farmers for staging illegal street protests and at the end of the month,
the government unveiled a trade deal under which it will double rice imports in return for
another 10-year grace period before fully opening up its agricultural markets. Protests
continued in 2005, with over 150,000 farmers in 90 areas dumping rice bags and farming
machines outside government offices on October 28. The day before, a national assembly
committee passed a rice import motion and forwarded it to the plenary session for
ratification. The government pledged greater financial benefits for the farming
community, but farmers say they will step up protests if the national assembly endorses
the rice deal. Violent rallies protesting the opening of South Korea’s rice market
continued in November and December, with farmers hurling stones and pummeling riot
police as police blocked roads with buses and sprayed water over the protesters. In March
2006, farmers clashed with riot police as the first shipment of foreign rice for sale to
consumers arrived in the port of Busan.
Reformist Claim(s): Economic - protest greater introduction of foreign rice-producers.
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 0. Unclear.
●
Mobilization: 1. Unions.
●
Organization: 6 = unions (e.g., Korean Peasant League, Korean
Confederation of Trade Unions).
●
Structure: 0. Decentralized.
●
Composition: 2 - farmers and workers.
●
Cohesive: 0. Workers/unions called on the government to abolish a labor
reform bill aimed at allowing employers to hire more temporary workers.
Farmers, meanwhile, are opposed to the opening up of the country's rice market to
foreign competition.
●
Movement Engagement: 0. None.
Government response:
●
Government Engagement: 0. None.
●
Concession(s): 0. None.
●
Concession Backfire: NA.
●
Repression: 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread - police crackdown.
●
Repression Backfire: 0. Repression not cited as a reason for continued
protest.
Sources
1. AFP. 2004. “South Korean farmers clash with police in protest against rice
import,” Agence France Presse, November 13.
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2. AFP. 2004. “South Korean farmers stage violent protests,” Agence France Presse,
November 19.
3. AFP. 2004. “South Korean police detain 300 farmers over rice demonstrations,”
Agence France Presse, December 20.
4. AFP. 2004. “South Korea unveils deal on doubling rice imports for 10-year grace
period,” Agence France Presse, December 30.
5. AFP. 2005. “South Korean farmers protest against rice import law,” Agence
France Presse, October 28.
6. AP. 2005. “South Korean farmers stage violent rally in Seoul against rice deal,
warn of more protests,” Associated Press, November 15.
7. AP. 2005. “South Korean rice farmers in battle for livelihood against plans to
open domestic market,” Associated Press, November 22.
8. AFP. 2005. “Angry South Korean farmers stage protest ahead of WTO talks,”
Agence France Presse, December 1.
9. AFP. 2005. “South Korean workers, farmers rally,” Agence France Presse,
December 4.
10. AFP. 2006. “US rice arrives in South Korea, farmers clash with police,” Agence
France Presse, March 23.

MEC ID 1037: Forum of the Poor
Location: Thailand
Target: Gov’t of Thailand
Dates: 3/30/1996 – 5/2/1997
Outcome: Success
Summary: On March 30, a coalition of various groups, including farmers, industrial
workers, slum dwellers, displaced villagers, and students, joined forces as the Forum of
the Poor. They began protesting in front of the Government House in Bangkok over land
rights, labor rights, and social services. On March 30, 6,000 protesters gathered, with that
number rising higher on March 31. By April 7, that number had risen to 13,000 and the
group threatened that even more demonstrators would join them if the government
continued to ignore their demands. Prime Minister Banharn spurned all their demands.
On April 8, at least 10,000 demonstrators remained, and leaders of the Forum of the Poor
said they would remain in front of the Government House until they were sure the
government was committed to addressing their grievances. Negotiations were set to
begin; however, the outcome of these negotiations was unknown and no further protests
were reported until January 1997. On January 25, thousands of rural protesters began
streaming into Bangkok to stage a sit-in in front of the Government House in Bangkok.
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By January 28, the number of protesters participating in the sit-in had grown to 20,000.
The group vowed to stay in front of the Government House until concrete action is taken
to address their demands. On January 29, 300 representatives of the protesters met with
government officials to discuss their concerns and demands. While little progress was
made, the protesters viewed the meetings as a positive sign, as they showed the
government’s willingness to listen to the people. Talks continued for at least 3 days, with
little concrete progress reported. Protests continued for 3 months, with up to 10,000
people camping out in front of the Government House. On April 29, the government
approved a 47-million-baht fund to compensate villagers displaced by infrastructure
projects. A spokesperson for the protest group said the government had addressed about
90% of their grievances. On May 2, after the prime minister created several committees
to follow through on their concerns.
Reformist Claim(s): Economic - land rights, labor rights, anti-poverty measures
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 1.
●
Mobilization: 1. Forum of the Poor.
●
Organization: 15 - Forum of the Poor.
●
Structure: 0. Decentralized coalition.
●
Composition: 5 = farmers, industrial workers, slum dwellers, displaced
villagers, and students.
●
Cohesive: 1. Cohesive demand for land/labor rights and social services.
●
Movement Engagement: 1. Movement leaders and government met on
unknown date(s) in 1996 and again on Jan 29, 1997 for at least three days.
Government response:
●
Government Engagement: 1. Movement leaders and government met on
unknown date(s) in 1996 and again on Jan 29, 1997 for at least three days.
●
Concession(s): 1. On April 29, the government approved a 47-million-baht
fund to compensate villagers displaced by infrastructure projects. A spokesperson
for the protest group said the government had addressed about 90% of their
grievances. On May 2, after the prime minister created several committees to
follow through on their concerns.
●
Concession Backfire: 0. Protests stopped.
●
Repression: 0. Targeted. 0. Widespread.
●
Repression Backfire: 0. NA.
Sources
1. AFP. 1996. “Thousands of poor protest against Thai government inaction,”
Agence France Presse – English, March 31.
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2. AFP. 1996. “Thousands in second week of protest at Thai Government House,”
Agence France Presse – English, April 7.
3. AFP. 1996. “Thousands of Thailand’s poor protest at government house,” Agence
France Presse – English, April 8.
4. AFP. 1997. “Thousands of Thai farmers converge on Government House,”
Agence France Presse – English, January 26.
5. AFP. 1997. “Up to 20,000 Thais join protest outside government,” Agence France
Presse – English, January 28.
6. AFP. 1997. “Protesting Thai villagers meet with government officials,” Agence
France Presse – English, January 29.
7. AFP. 1997. “Thai protesters meet with government officials,” Agence France
Presse – English, January 30.
8. AFP. 1997. “Thai protesters start third day of talks with government,” Agence
France Presse – English, January 31.
9. AFP. 1997. “Thai cabinet approves compensation fund for protesting poor,”
Agence France Presse – English, April 29.
10. AFP. 1997. “12,000 end three-month protest at Thailand’s Government House,”
Agence France Presse – English, May 2

MEC ID 1053: Civil Servant Strike
Location: Benin
Target: Gov’t of Benin
Dates: 2/16/1998-2/27/1998
Outcome: Success
Summary: Benin’s civil servants started a four-day general strike on February 16, 1998
to demand salary increases and better living conditions. Government workers across
most departments heeded the call to not go to work, although the private sector was not
affected. Most education facilities were closed. The strike was renewed on February 23,
after unions rejected the government’s offer to pay US$8.2 million of salary increases
accrued at the end of 1996. Benin has 37,000 civil servants. Some 37,000 workers
resumed work on February 27th after eight days of general strike. All the public services
opened their doors with the exception of schools and the national university. The workers
embarked on this strike to demand salary increases and to press for improved working
conditions. The trade unions and the government reached an agreement at dawn on
March 1st, after 14 hours of negotiation.
Reformist Claim(s): Economic - better pay and living conditions
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1
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Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 0. Unclear
●
Mobilization: 1. Mobilized by unions
●
Organization: 6. Unions
●
Structure: 0. De-centralized
●
Composition: 1. civil servants
●
Cohesive: 1. Cohesive economic demands for better pay
●
Movement Engagement: 1. On February 23, unions rejected the
government’s offer to pay US$8.2 million of salary increases accrued at the end
of 1996. The trade unions and the government reached an agreement at dawn on
March 1st, after 14 hours of negotiation. (Sources 3, 5)
Government response:
●
Government Engagement: 1. On February 23, unions rejected the
government’s offer to pay US$8.2 million of salary increases accrued at the end
of 1996. The trade unions and the government reached an agreement at dawn on
March 1st, after 14 hours of negotiation. (Sources 3, 5)
●
Concession(s): 1. On February 23, unions rejected the government’s offer
to pay US$8.2 million of salary increases accrued at the end of 1996. (Source 3)
●
Concession Backfire: 1. The strike was renewed after the initial rejection
of the government’s offer. (3)
●
Repression: 0. Unclear.
●
Repression Backfire: NA.
Sources
1. AFPR. 1998. “Benin’s Civil Servants Strike,” Agence France Presse, February
16.
2. AFPR. 1998. “Benin Opposition Calls for Dialogue as Civil Servants Strike,”
Agence France Presse, February 16.
3. AFPR. 1998. “Benin Civil Servants Renew General Strike,” Agence France
Presse, February 23.
4. "BENIN: STRIKING WORKERS END STRIKE, RESUME WORK". BBC
Monitoring Africa - Political Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring. February
28, 1998, Saturday. https://advance-lexis-com.ezpprod1.hul.harvard.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3W49
-6B80-00KJ-D089-00000-00&context=1516831.
5. "BENIN: GOVERNMENT, TRADE UNIONS REACH AGREEMENT ON
PAYMENT OF CIVIL SERVANTS". BBC Monitoring Africa - Political
Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring. March 3, 1998, Tuesday.
https://advance-lexis-com.ezp-
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prod1.hul.harvard.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3W49
-6BT0-00KJ-D2DY-00000-00&context=1516831.

MEC ID 1061: Soldier Mutiny
Location: Burkina Faso
Target: Gov’t of Burkina Faso
Dates: 4/14/2011-4/19/2011
Outcome: Limited success
Summary: Dozens of members of President Compaoré’s personal guard fired shots into
the air on April 14, 2011, in apparent protest in two army barracks. The shots were fired
in protest at outstanding housing subsidies that had been promised but not paid. The
initial shots were followed by a day of massive protests on April 15, and a night of rioting
by mutinous soldiers. Troops also set fire to the home of Compaoré’s chief of staff, and
the president dissolved his government on the 15th and named a new army chief, seeking
to reassert his authority. The mutiny continued on April 16, and by the 17th the army
revolt had spread to the southern parts of Burkina Faso, where soldiers seized a key
town. Students joined the violent protests on April 18, and a new Prime Minister was
named the same day as mutinous soldiers and police poured into the streets of several
towns. The goals of the riots came to encompass many of the grievances expressed
during the massive protests of April 8, to include government’s impunity over deaths
such as that of Norbert Zongo. In April, President Compaore dismissed his cabinet and
his army chief and calm appeared to return to the city’s streets. Campaign is coded as
“limited success” because housing subsidies were not reinstated (no reports in press), but
governors in all of its 13 regions were replaced.
Reformist Claim(s): Economic - unpaid housing subsidies. Eventually encompassed
political aims - impunity of deaths that the government was responsible for. More
economic demands were also added, protesting the rising cost of living by unions and
other people. (Sources 3, 8)
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 2
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 0. None
●
Mobilization: 1. Initially mobilized by dissatisfied soldiers, and later
included students
●
Organization: 7. Splintering of armed forces. 5. Students. 6. Trade unions,
National Coalition against the High Cost of Living (CCVC) = an alliance of trade
unions, consumer organizations, rights groups and small businesses (Source 2)
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●
Structure: 0. Initially centralized within the army but increasingly
decentralized with students and trade unions joining in
●
Composition: 5. Largely military but students, trade unions, rights groups,
small businesses, and a sense of the general public joining
●
Cohesive: 0. Initially cohesive demand of housing subsidies but
increasingly disparate with students and unions joining and evolving to
encompass generally rising cost of living and political aims of government
impunity
●
Movement Engagement: 1. On April 15 and 17, 2011, government and
armed forces met (Sources 2, 7)
Government response:
●
Government Engagement: 1. On April 15 and 17, 2011, government and
armed forces met (Sources 2, 7)
●
Concession(s): 1. On 16 April the president dissolved his government and
named a new army chief (Source 3)
●
Concession Backfire: 0. Protests continued after the initial personnel
changes though they were not cited as a reason for continued protests. Protests
stopped after further personnel changes
●
Repression: 0. Targeted. 0. Widespread.
●
Repression Backfire: 0
Sources
1. AFPR. 2011. “Presidential Guards in Burkina Faso Protest,” Agence France
Presse, April 14.
2. AFPR. 2011. “Burkina Faso Leader Battles Mutiny,” Agence France Presse,
April 15.
3. AFPR. 2011. “Burkina Faso Leader Dissolves Government Amid Mutiny,”
Agence France Presse, April 15.
4. AFPR. 2011. “Burkina Faso Mutiny Enters Third Day with Widespread
Looting,” Agence France Presse, April 16.
5. AFPR. 2011. “Burkina Faso Army Revolt Spreads to the South,” Agence France
Presse, April 17.
6. AFPR. 2011. “Burkina Faso Mutiny Spreads to Fourth City,” Agence France
Presse, April 18.
7. AFPR. 2011. “Youths Stage Violent Demo in West Burkina Faso,” Agence
France Presse, April 18.
8. AFPR. 2011. “Burkina Faso Gets New PM as Mutiny Spreads,” Agence France
Presse, April 18.
9. AFPR. 2011. “Soldiers Open Fire in North Burkina Faso but Calm Returns,”
Agence France Presse, April 19.
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MEC ID 1075: Oil Pipeline Strike
Location: Cameroon
Target: Dispute with Doba Logistics contracted under the Gov’t of Cameroon
Dates: 5/14/2002-5/28/2002
Outcome: Success
Summary: Thousands of Cameroonians working on the pipeline that would link oilfields
between Chad and Cameroon went on strike starting on May 14, 2002 to protest low
wages and poor working conditions. The workers were demanding health insurance for
themselves and for their families, the establishment of a solidarity fund, payments to the
national social security fund, and the payment of salary arrears. The workers returned to
work on May 28, 2002 after a deal was signed with the government whereby salaries and
working conditions would be brought into line with those practiced in the lucrative oil
industry. As many as 5,000 people worked on the construction of the oil pipeline.
Reformist Claim(s): Economic - better wages and working conditions.
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 0. Unclear - several unions involved without any figurehead
●
Mobilization: 1. By unions
●
Organization: 6. Unions
●
Structure: 0. Decentralized with several unions
●
Composition: 1. Oil pipeline workers
●
Cohesive: 1. Cohesive demand for better wages and working conditions
●
Movement Engagement: 1. On May 23, unions tried to engage the
government in complaining about their contractors, Doba Logistics
Government response:
●
Government Engagement: 1. Government agreed to a deal with
movement sometime between May 23-May 28
●
Concession(s): 1. Government agreed to a deal with movement sometime
between May 23-May 28
●
Concession Backfire: 0.
●
Repression: 0. Targeted. 0. Widespread
●
Repression Backfire: 0. NA
Sources
1. AFPR. 2002. “Work Resumes on Cameroon-Chad Pipeline after Strike,” Agence
France Presse, May 28.
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2. Gus Selassie. "Striking Workers End Action on Cameroon/Chad Pipeline". IHS
Global Insight. May 29, 2002. https://advance-lexis-com.ezpprod1.hul.harvard.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:497X4NX0-01DF-W2Y0-00000-00&context=1516831.

MEC ID 1111: 2006 Poverty Protests
Location: Conakry, Labe, Kindia & Pita, Guinea
Target: Guinean government and private sector employers
Dates: February 23, 2006 - June 16, 2006
Outcome: Limited
Summary: On February 23, 2006 two labor movements, The National Confederation of
Workers of Guinea (CNTG) and the Public Service Workers Union of Guinea (USTG)
called for a nationwide strike in protest against the government and private sector’s
indifference to poverty as prices of basic food commodities have risen beyond the reach
of the majority of the country's eight million people inhabitants.
Originally intended to be a five-day strike, but recurring in June 2006, the protest picked
up momentum attracting teachers and students alike; negatively impacting final examsreason for student protest. Campaign objectives included a demand in reduction of fuel
prices, reduction in food prices (specifically rice), and a four-fold hike in government
workers’ salaries.
Student clashes with the nation’s security forces resulted in 18 deaths, escalating from
retaliatory stone throwing, regime use of tear gas, and non-lethal measures to use of
force, and in some cases reportedly rape. Protest participants numbered 3,000 for
Unionists in Conakry and 6,000 for protesters in Conakry, but no numbers for nationwide
participants.
The limited success of the campaign can be attributed to union and government
agreement on salary hikes, but only promise of talks on fuel prices, and no mention of
food prices.
Reformist Claim(s): Economic - salary hikes, reduction in fuel and food prices, Other students and teachers protesting the cancellation of their exams
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 2
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 1. Leadership provided by National Confederation of Workers
of Guinea (CNTG) and the Public Service Workers Union of Guinea (USTG)
●
Mobilization: 1. Mobilization by National Confederation of Workers of
Guinea (CNTG) and the Public Service Workers Union of Guinea (USTG)
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●
Organization: 6 - labor unions; 5 - to a much smaller scale, students too
(Source 1, 7)
●
Structure: 0. An alliance between two organizations as well as the
inclusion of several smaller stakeholders like teachers and students
●
Composition: 3 - workers (by and large), students, and teachers
●
Cohesive: 0. By and large the workers had economic demands but different
parts of the movements (students and teachers) were protesting the cancellation of
their exams
●
Movement Engagement: 1. Ongoing dialogue between government and
unions during 13-16 June 2006
Government response:
●
Government Engagement: 1. Ongoing dialogue between government and
unions during 13-16 June 2006
●
Concession(s): 1. Accord was reached with government conceding some
demands on 16 June 2006
●
Concession Backfire: 0. None. Workers went back to work the next day
●
Repression: 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread. Violent clashes with police
resulting in at least 21 deaths
●
Repression Backfire: 0. Protests continued but repressions not cited as a
reason
Sources
1. "Guinean labour movements call for five day general strike." Agence France
Presse -- English. February 23, 2006 Thursday 10:06 PM GMT . Date Accessed:
2015/07/09. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
2. "General strike shuts shops, schools across Guinea." Agence France Presse -English. February 27, 2006 Monday 12:03 PM GMT . Date Accessed:
2015/07/09. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
3. "Guinea government calls on workers to end strike." Agence France Presse -English. March 2, 2006 Thursday 7:28 PM GMT . Date Accessed: 2015/07/09.
4. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
5. "Tensions high in strike-hit Guinea after student killed: witnesses." Agence
France Presse -- English. June 11, 2006 Sunday 5:06 PM GMT . Date Accessed:
2015/07/09. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
6. "Ten dead in clashes during Guinea teachers' strike." Agence France Presse -English. June 12, 2006 Monday 6:17 PM GMT . Date Accessed: 2015/07/09.
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
7. "Thousands of students protest suspension of exams in Guinea; Red Cross says 6
killed." The Associated Press. June 12, 2006 Monday 11:52 PM GMT . Date
Accessed: 2015/07/09. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
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8. "Guinea unions reject government pay offers." Agence France Presse -- English.
June 15, 2006 Thursday 4:40 PM GMT . Date Accessed: 2015/07/09.
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
9. "Accord reached to end Guinea strike." Agence France Presse -- English. June 16,
2006 Friday 9:14 PM GMT . Date Accessed: 2015/07/09.
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.
10. "Guinea forces raped, killed demonstrators, says rights group." Agence France
Presse -- English. July 6, 2006 Thursday 4:24 PM GMT . Date Accessed:
2015/07/09. www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.

MEC ID 1141: Protests Against Muluzi’s Reelection
Location: Malawi
Target: Gov’t of Malawi
Dates: 11/1/2002 - 1/31/2003
Outcome: Success
Summary: A series of demonstrations took place when it was announced that Bakili
Muluzi would seek an as-yet illegal third term as president. Protests remained largely
peaceful, however in one instance police fired on crowds and injured two participants.
Students in Blantyre staged a riot in response to the proposed third term, setting fire to
party offices and breaking windows in university buildings. Parliament met to consider
the bill that would allow Muluzi to run for a third term. The measure was not approved,
and after a great deal of internal and external political pressure Muluzi ceded power to his
successor in 2004.
Reformist Claim(s): Political - protesting an amendment to the political system that
would allow third presidential terms.
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1
Movement structure:
●
Leadership 0. Unclear
●
Mobilization: 1.
●
Organization: 3 = opposition parties, 4 = movements (Forum for the
Defense of the Constitution) 5 = students, 10 = Christian lobby groups (Public
affairs Committee) (1, 2)
●
Structure: 0. Decentralized
●
Composition: 5 - Broad with general public involvement
●
Cohesive: 1. Cohesive demand to stop a third presidential term
●
Movement Engagement: 0. Unclear
Government response:
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●
Government Engagement: 0. Unclear
●
Concession(s): 1. The bill that would allow a third presidential term did
not pass
●
Concession Backfire: 0. Protests stopped after the concession was made
●
Repression: 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread - largely peaceful but police shot
into crowds and injured at least two protesters
●
Repression Backfire: 0. Repression not cited as a reason for continued
protest
Sources
1. "Malawi lobby group plans demonstrations against Muluzi". Agence France
Presse -- English. January 26, 2003 Sunday. https://advance-lexis-com.ezpprod1.hul.harvard.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:47SRDPY0-00GS-K3M5-00000-00&context=1516831.
2. FELIX MPONDA. "Around 1,000 demonstrators in Malawi march against
Muluzi ATTENTION - UPDATES, INCORPORATES Malawi-parliamentdemo". Agence France Presse -- English. January 27, 2003 Monday.
https://advance-lexis-com.ezpprod1.hul.harvard.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:47SYDK90-00GS-K484-00000-00&context=1516831.

MEC ID 1203: 1955 Tax Riots
Location: Sierra Leone
Target: Gov’t of Sierra Leone
Dates: 12/1/1955 – 12/13/1955 (dates approximate)
Outcome: Success
Summary: In the early 1950s, Sierra Leone’s economy appears to enjoy a period of
economic boom with increases in the production of iron ore and diamond. However, the
economic benefits did not seem to be distributed equally throughout society and failed to
ameliorate the living conditions of the broad public. The result was a labor strike in
1955, followed by unrest in the northern parts of the country. The rioting affected in
large part those chiefs whose authority was more dependent on the British. Local farmers
refused to pay taxes, disobeyed orders to perform communal labor, and discontinued their
customary tributes to the chiefs who depended on the British for their security in
power. As the rioting progressed, chiefs’ properties around the country were destroyed.
The rioting eventually prompted far-reaching reforms in the existing system of local
governance. A new constitution in 1956 declared that representation in the House of
Representatives was to be by election. Newspaper reports from the time report that
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rioters were wounded and killed by police rifle fire in Freetown on December
22. Crowds of rioters reached 1,000. The dates of the campaign are approximate due to
lack of reporting.
Reformist Claim(s): Economic - equal distribution of the country’s wealth.
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 0. Unclear.
●
Mobilization: 0. Unclear.
●
Organization: 0. Unclear.
●
Structure: 0. Decentralized.
●
Composition: 5 - general public involvement.
●
Cohesive: 1. Cohesive economic demand.
●
Movement Engagement: 0. None.
Government response:
●
Government Engagement: 0. None.
●
Concession(s): 1. A new constitution declared a by-election for the House
of Representatives.
●
Concession Backfire: 0. Unclear.
●
Repression: 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread - police crackdown including
deaths.
●
Repression Backfire: 0. Repression not cited as a reason for continued
protest.
Sources
1. http://www.issafrica.org/Af/profiles/SieraLeone/Politics.html
2. Reuters. 1955. “Tax rioter killed in Sierra Leone,” The Washington Post and
Times Herald, December 23.

MEC ID 1265: Student riot over rising living cost
Location: Khartoum, Sudan
Target: Sudanese Government
Dates: 8/9/1979- 8/19/1979
Outcome: LIMITED
Summary: On August 9, 1979 “the government ordered the armed forces on alert
because of student riots over the rising cost of living, including gasoline prices”. The
students barricaded the streets in two sections of the capital, hurled stones at cars, burned
some of them and set fire to a filling station. No casualties were reported. “The price of a
gallon of gasoline has gone up more than 25 percent to $3”.
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August 11, 1979- Riots continue. Reports of some students being injured but no
casualties. The source says the riots started in Khartoum and also in Omdurman where
food and petroleum prices have risen dramatically. “Authorities closed three schools after
University and Secondary school students attacked gas stations and stoned automobiles”.
“Officials said special courts would be set up to try those involved in disturbance. “Extra
guards were placed around the government radio station in Khartoum, police trucks
patrolled the stares and police were assigned to protect service stations”.
August 13, 1979- Major General Gaafar al-Nimeiry took over the leadership of his
nation's only political party and promised tough punishment for what he called the
“Communist instigators” that led the student to protest. He announced he was reducing
the price of meat and fuel and limited the use of Government cars.
August 19, 1979- “President Gaafar al-Nimeiry” removed seven ministers and two top
advisors and brought the Moselm Brotherhood into his cabinet. This announcement was
followed by the Government lifting subsidies on basic commodities such as flour and fuel
which lead to 10 days rioting by students and workers.
Reformist Claim(s): Economic - rising living costs.
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 0. Unclear.
●
Mobilization: 1. Students.
●
Organization: 5 = student protest.
●
Structure: 0. Decentralized.
●
Composition: 1 - students.
●
Cohesive: 1. Cohesive protest against rising living costs.
●
Movement Engagement: 0. Unclear.
Government response:
●
Government Engagement: 0. Unclear.
●
Concession(s): 1. Temporary reduction of costs, several replaced cabinet
members.
●
Concession Backfire: 1. After the lifting of subsidies, riots began again.
●
Repression: 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread - police crackdown, closed
schools.
●
Repression Backfire: 0. Repression not cited as a cause for continued
protest.
Sources
1. The New York Times. 1979. “Sudanese Armed Forces on Alert as Students Riot
on Living Costs”.
2. The New York Times. 1979. “Sudan Leader Takes Over Party Saying He’ll
Punish Communists”. In The New York Times, August 14, 1979.
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3. The New York Times. 1979. “World News Brief”. In The New York Times,
August 19, 1979.

MEC ID 1279: African boycott against non-African goods/services
Location: Uganda
Target: British Protectorate Government
Dates: 03/07/1958 - 12/13/1959
Outcome: Unknown
Summary: A boycott by Africans in Uganda of Asian shops and some products and
services provided by whites took a heavy toll. It was promoted by the Uganda National
Movement, a young political organization, to demonstrate African dissatisfaction with the
Government, to emphasize a dislike of Asians and to encourage trade exclusively among
Africans. In the nine months since it began, it cost the British protectorate Government
nearly $2,000,000 in lost revenue from such sources as import duties and excise taxes.
Hundreds of Asian shopkeepers have been forced out of business and 10,000 African
workers have suffered unemployment. In response to the boycott a new law became
effective making it a serious offense to advocate or encourage a boycott. The boycott
only affected Buganda province.
Reformist Claim(s): Economic - demand for intra-African trade.
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 1. Led by the Uganda National Movement
●
Mobilization: 1. Mobilized by the Uganda National Movement
●
Organization: 5 = Uganda National Movement is a youth political
organization
●
Structure: 0. Promoted by the single entity of the Uganda National
Movement but the movement evolved to be a broadly public alliance
●
Composition: 1. Broad with a sense of general public involvement
●
Cohesive: 1. Cohesive protest against non-African economic activity
●
Movement Engagement: 0. Unclear
Government response:
●
Government Engagement: 0. Unclear
●
Concession(s): 0. None
●
Concession Backfire: 0. NA
●
Repression: 1. Targeted - Uganda National Movement banned; subsequent
groups founded by the UGM leaders also banned; eight leaders subsequently
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exiled from region. 1. Widespread - passed a law making it an offense to advocate
for or encourage boycotts
●
Repression Backfire: 0.
Sources
1. NYT. 1959. “African Boycott Costly to Uganda: Asian-Run Shops Forced to
Close -- Products Sold by Whites Affected,” New York Times, December 13.

MEC ID 1531: Student Riots
Location: France
Target: Central Government
Dates: 11/25/1986 - 12/7/1986
Outcome: Success
Summary: Students demand the abandonment of plans to overhaul French university
system; Chirac warns that Government will not tolerate interference by 'street toughs';
protests have developed into what many believe is worst social turmoil to hit France since
demonstrations and general strike of 1968; at least 68 people, including 58 policemen,
were injured in fighting this weekend and 28 people arrested. French Prime Minister
Jacques Chirac surrenders to key demand of protesting students and announces that
Government is withdrawing legislation to overhaul country's university system;
legislation provoked largest student demonstrations in France in almost 20 years. Chirac
cites 'risks of violence' as reason for withdrawing university plan, which led to street
protests by hundreds of thousands of students and created an atmosphere of crisis.
Thousands of students march in Paris on Dec 10 to mark student victory in three-week
confrontation with French Government and as act of bereavement for student who died
after being beaten by police
Reformist Claim(s): Other - context specific concerns against proposed changes to the
French university system.
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 0. Unclear
●
Mobilization: 1. Student mobilization (Source 1)
●
Organization: 5 - student movement
●
Structure: 0. Decentralized
●
Composition: 1. Students
●
Cohesive: 1. Cohesive demand to block changes to the university system
●
Movement Engagement: 0. Unclear
Government response:
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●
Government Engagement: 0. Unclear
●
Concession(s): 1. On 28 Nov, the proposed legislation was temporarily
shelved for further review (Source 5). On 5 Dec 1986, the government made an
initial concession to temporarily withdraw the most disputed parts of the
legislation, but was rejected. On 8 Dec 1986 Government eventually conceded
demands of the students and withdrew legislation. (Source 6)
●
Concession Backfire: 0. Protests ended
●
Repression: 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread. Police crackdown with arrests,
injuries, and at least one student death
●
Repression Backfire: 0. Repression not cited as reason for continued
protest although a victory march was held celebrating the concession and
commemorating the death of a student protester
Sources
1. RICHARD BERNSTEIN. Special to The New York Times. (1986, Dec 08).
CLASHES IN PARIS WORST SINCE 1968. New York Times (1923-Current
File).
2. RICHARD BERNSTEIN. Special to The New York Times. (1986, Nov 27).
Shades of '68 on campus? (yes, but not so red). New York Times (1923-Current
File).
3. "Students Protest University Plan; Some Clash with Police". The Associated
Press. December 4, 1986, Thursday, AM cycle. https://advance-lexis-com.ezpprod1.hul.harvard.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3SJDGRT0-0011-8076-00000-00&context=1516831.
4. "Student Protests Force Government to Retreat". The Associated Press.
November 29, 1986, Saturday, AM cycle. https://advance-lexis-com.ezpprod1.hul.harvard.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3SJDGTN0-0011-84FM-00000-00&context=1516831.
5. By RICHARD BERNSTEIN Special to the New York Times. "FRANCE TO
DROP PART OF UNIVERSITY PLAN". The New York Times. December 6,
1986, Saturday, Late City Final Edition. https://advance-lexis-com.ezpprod1.hul.harvard.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3S8G8G80-0007-H3Y3-00000-00&context=1516831.
6. By RICHARD BERNSTEIN, Special to the New York Times. (December 9,
1986, Tuesday, Late City Final Edition). STUDENTS PREVAIL IN FRENCH
DISPUTE. The New York Times. https://advance-lexis-com.ezpprod1.hul.harvard.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:3S8G8F40-0007-H2HF-00000-00&context=1516831.

265

MEC ID 1605: 1979 Bank Strike I
Location: Greece
Target: Gov’t of Greece
Dates: 7/5/1979 – 2/23/1980
Outcome: Limited
Summary: On July 4, banks in Greece closed as a result of an indefinite strike called by
the Federation of Bank Employees protesting an extension of working hours as an
energy-saving measure. Greek bank workers began an extended strike on January 18,
seeking pay increases and a return to former working hours, and what began as a 10-day
strike turned into a 6-week strike. Emergency staffs of management officials manned
central branches of Athens banks to serve the public and tourists. On February 22,
Greece’s 35,000 bank employees ended their strike after the Government partially
satisfied their demands for higher pay and better working conditions. An arbitration court
ruling increased their salaries by 11% and the banks’ management decided to introduce
staggered working hours earlier in the week.
Reformist Claim(s): Economic - better pay and work conditions.
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 1. Led by the Federation of Bank Employees
●
Mobilization: 1. Mobilized by the Federation of Bank Employees
●
Organization: 6. Bank union
●
Structure: 1. Centralized - organized by a single entity
●
Composition: 1. Bankers
●
Cohesive: 1. Cohesive economic demand for better work conditions and
pay
●
Movement Engagement: 0. Unclear
Government response:
●
Government Engagement: 0. Unclear
●
Concession(s): 1. Government conceded and partially satisfied demands of
better pay and better working conditions on Feb 22, 1980. An arbitration court
ruling increased their salaries by 11% and the bank's’ management decided to
introduce staggered working hours earlier in the week. (Source 3)
●
Concession Backfire: 0. Protests stopped.
●
Repression: 0. Unclear.
●
Repression Backfire: NA.
Sources
1. NYT. 1979. “Strike shuts Greek banks,” New York Times, July 5.
2. NYT. 1980. “Bank workers strike to paralyze Greece,” New York Times, January
18.
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3. NYT. 1980. “Greek Bank Strike Ends,” New York Times, February 23.

MEC ID 1728: Unity Protest
Target: Government of Moldova and Pro-Romanian activists
Dates: 04/04/2016 - 04/18/2016
Outcome: Limited
Summary: In April, thousands of people marched in Comrat in support of Moldova’s
statehood. The protest was organized by the Party of Socialists and by Our Party, which
created a new movement, called Statehood. On April 18, Statehood organized rallies
attended by 20,000 supporters in five towns across Moldova. The protesters also bitterly
criticized the incumbent authorities and asked for the organization of a snap
parliamentary election.
Reformist Claim(s): Social - statehood/self-determination of Moldova
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 1. Party of Socialists and Our Party
●
Mobilization: 1. Party of Socialists and Our Party
●
Organization: 3 = Party of Socialists and Our Party, 15 = Statehood,
which evolved out of the alliance two political parties
●
Structure: 1.Centralised under the Statehood movement
●
Composition: 5 - general public involvement
●
Cohesive: 1. Cohesive demand for the statehood of Moldova
●
Movement Engagement: 0. None
Government response:
●
Government Engagement: 0. None
●
Concession(s): 0. Unclear
●
Concession Backfire: 0. NA
●
Repression: 0. Targeted. 0. Widespread
●
Repression Backfire: 0. NA
Sources
1. BBC Worldwide Monitoring. 2016. “Anti-Romanian rally held in Moldova’s proRussian autonomy”, BBC Monitoring Kiev Unity, April 04.
2. BBC Worldwide Monitoring. 2016. “New movement against unification with
Romania created in Moldova”, BBC Monitoring Kiev Unity, April 07.
3. BBC Worldwide Monitoring. 2016. “Pro-Russian party stages anti-Romanian
rallies in five Moldova’s towns”, BBC Monitoring Kiev Unity, April 18
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MEC ID 1773: Anti-demolition Protests
Location: Serbia
Target: Gov’t of Serbia
Dates: 5/25/2016 – 7/11/2016
Outcome: Failure
Summary: Thousands of protestors gathered in Belgrade, Serbia on May 25, 2016 to
protest against the development of a $3 billion deal with an Arab developer to transform
part of Belgrade into an upscale housing and shopping complex. The protestors accused
the authorities of corruption and violence. Protests were held again on June 11, attracting
thousands more to Belgrade Organizers claimed that 15,000 people joined this second
march, while police put the number at closer to 4,000. The protestors also demanded the
resignation of a number of masked men who on the night of April 24, 2016 tore down old
buildings to make way for the development.
Reformist Claim(s): Other - protesting the building of a shopping complex.
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 0. Unclear.
●
Mobilization: 1. Organized by "Ne Davimo Beograd" (Don't Drown
Belgrade).
●
Organization: 15 = "Ne Davimo Beograd" (Don't Drown Belgrade).
●
Structure: 0. Decentralized.
●
Composition: 5. Sense of general public involvement.
●
Cohesive: 1. Cohesive protest to stop the building of a shopping complex.
●
Movement Engagement: 0. None.
Government response:
●
Government Engagement: 0. None.
●
Concession(s): 0. None.
●
Concession Backfire: NA.
●
Repression: 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread.
●
Repression Backfire: 0.
Sources
1. AFPR. 2016. “Thousands rally against demolitions in Serbian capital,” Agence
France Presse, May 25.
2. AFPR. 2016. “Thousands protest massive development in Serbian capital,”
Agence France Presse, June 11.
3. AFPR. 2011. “Belgrade demolitions deepen fears over waterfront plans,” Agence
France Presse, July 8.
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MEC ID 1835: March for Justice
Location: Ankara and Istanbul
Target: Government
Dates: 15/06/2017-07/09/2017
Outcome: Failure
Summary: On the 14th of June, an opposition MP, Enis Berberoglu, was convicted and
sentenced to 25 years in prison for providing journalists with footage suggesting that the
Turkish intelligence service had been smuggling weapons to Syrian Islamists. The next
day, the leader of the opposition Republican Peoples’ Party (CHP), Kemal Kilicdaroglu,
began a 425km march from the Turkish capital towards Constantinople. Kilicdaroglu
declared the march to be in favour of justice and in solidarity to Berberoglu and all those
purged—either jailed or killed—since the failed coup attempt in July 2016. Being the
leader of the opposition notwithstanding, Kilicdaroglu made general statements calling
for justice, due process, democracy, and the end of the state of emergency declared since
the coup attempt—but with no direct reference to Erdogan or explicit call for regime
change, maintaining the purpose of the protest rather ambiguous.
Thousands of people joined the march which eventuated in a demonstration
gathering of hundreds of thousands in Constantinople on the 9th of July. (Less than two
weeks later, Erdogan extended the state of emergency by another three months; and
Berberoglu remains in custody after a retrial appeal was struck down.)
Reformist Claim(s): Political - protest for democracy and corruption.
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 1. Led by the leader of the opposition.
●
Mobilization: 1. Mobilized by the opposition party.
●
Organization: 3 = Political party Republican People’s Party (CHP).
●
Structure: 0. Decentralized - people joined the protest as the march went
along.
●
Composition: 5 - general public involvement.
●
Cohesive: 1. Cohesive demand for justice and democracy.
●
Movement Engagement: 0. None.
Government response:
●
Government Engagement: 0. None.
●
Concession(s): 0. None.
●
Concession Backfire: 0. NA.
●
Repression: 0. Targeted. 0. Widespread.
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●
Repression Backfire: 0. NA.
Sources
1. The Associated Press. “Turkish Opposition Party Begins 265-mile ‘March for
Justice’”. AP. 15 Jun 2017.
2. Agence France Press. “Turkish Opposition Chief Enters Istanbul in ‘March for
Justice’”. AFP. 7 Jul 2017.
3. Agence France Press. “Turkish Opposition Leader Ends 25-day March, Rallies
Backers”. AFP. 9 Jul 2017.

MEC ID 1856: 1974 Ulster Strike
Location: United Kingdom
Target: Northern Ireland Provincial Government
Dates: 05/15/1974 - 05/29/1974
Outcome: Limited
Summary: Protestant workers started a widespread work stoppage and started delaying
essential service deliveries such as water, electric and sanitation in May 1974. Although
the strike was triggered by plans to create a Council of Ireland, a body designed to
provide official cross border links between Northern Ireland and Republic of Ireland, it
demanded that the Northern Ireland’s governing Assembly to step down and new
elections. The Assembly was a coalition of Catholics and moderate Protestants. Although
the British Government reaffirmed its support for the province’s executive after failed
negotiations on May 24th, the complete shutdown of the industry and service deliveries
forced the provincial government to resign on May 29th. In response, a direct rule by
London was established temporarily, which the strikers accepted as a major victory and
called off the work stoppages. Although paramilitary supporting and enforcing the
stoppages demanded a continuation of strikes until promise of early elections, the
Protestants started resuming work.
Reformist Claim(s): Electoral - new/early elections. Other - protesting against the
creation of a Council of Ireland - a body designed to provide official cross border links
between North Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. (1)
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 2
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 1. Sources cite protestant leaders in negotiations.
●
Mobilization: 1.
●
Organization: 2 = paramilitary, 6 = unions.
●
Structure: 0. Decentralized.
●
Composition: 2. Workers and paramilitary.
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●
Cohesive: 1. Cohesive demand for early elections and protest against the
Council of Ireland
●
Movement Engagement: 1. Negotiations occurred but failed on May 17th
and 24th, 1974.
Government response:
●
Government Engagement: 1. Negotiations occurred but failed on 17th
and May 24th, 1974.
●
Concession(s): 1. Government stepped down on May 29, 1974
●
Concession Backfire: 0. Strikers went back to work
●
Repression: 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread.
●
Repression Backfire: 0.
Sources
1. The Washington Post; May 18, 1974; Strike Negotiations Break Off in Belfast
2. New York Times ; May 25, 1974; British Bar Negotiations With the Ulster
Strikers
3. New York Times ; May 29, 1974; ULSTER COALITION RESIGNS AS STRIKE
CHOKES ECONOMY: Chief Minister
4. New York Times ; May 30, 1974; STRIKE IN ULSTER ENDED IN 15TH DAY;
LONDON WILL RULE: Protestant Group
5. The Washington Post; May 30, 1974; N. Ireland Militants End Strike: N. Ireland
Militants End 2-Week Strike

MEC ID 1872: 1968 Student Protests
Location: Yugoslavia
Target: Gov’t of Yugoslavia
Dates: 6/2/1968 – 6/11/1968
Outcome: Success
Summary: Students in Yugoslavia began protests for social reforms on June 3, 1968 in
Belgrade. A teach-in was held at Belgrade University on June 5, following two days of
clashes between rebellious students and the police. Students retained control of the
university, and about 30,000 attended meetings at colleges scattered throughout the
capital. Tito announced on June 10 that he would strive for solutions together with
students. The students eventually ended the sit-in at Belgrade University on June 11,
encouraged by President Tito’s remarks the day prior.
Reformist Claim(s): Political - police brutality and dismissal of relevant ministers and
police chiefs; Other - education quality like the quality of dorms, of teacher engagement,
and swelling class sizes.
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Number of Reformist Claims(s): 2
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 0. Unclear.
●
Mobilization: 1. Students.
●
Organization: 5 - Students.
●
Structure: 0. Decentralized.
●
Composition: 1. Students.
●
Cohesive: 1. Initially a range of demands on various aspects of student life
but evolved to a single demand for police corruption and brutality. (Source 4)
●
Movement Engagement: 0. Unclear.
Government response:
●
Government Engagement: 1. Tito promised to meet with students.
Unclear whether they actualized. (4)
●
Concession(s): 1. Tito promised to meet with students which was
perceived as a concession and protests stopped after that. (Source 4)
●
Concession Backfire: 0. Protests stopped.
●
Repression: 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread - student-police clashed.
●
Repression Backfire: 1. Police brutality became the leading demand for
protesters after repression.
Sources
1. AP. 1968. “Belgrade bans rallies after student riots: Police ring school list of
demands,” The Washington Post, June 5.
2. Reuters. 1968. “Teach-in at university,” The New York Times, June 5.
3. Shub, Anatole. 1968. “Tito says students demands are justified: Personal prestige
students meet Djila sympathetic,” The Washington Post, June 10.
4. Randal, Nathan. 1968. “University students in Belgrade end 8-day sit-in,” The
New York Times, June 12.

MEC ID 1873: Protest against Wage Freeze
Location: Yugoslavia
Target: Gov’t of Yugoslavia
Dates: 2/27/1987– 3/25/1987
Outcome: Failure
Summary: Thousands of wage workers went on strike in Yugoslavia beginning on
February 27, 1988 when the PM imposed a freeze on wages. At least 70 strikes occurred
throughout the country, with as many as 20,000 workers involved. PM Mikulic
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announced on March 22 that he would use the military to impose order as necessary. The
wave of strikes ended on March 25.
Reformist Claim(s): Economic - protest against wages.
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 0. Unclear.
●
Mobilization: 1. Workers.
●
Organization: 6 - unions.
●
Structure: 0. Decentralized.
●
Composition: 1 - workers.
●
Cohesive: 1. Cohesive protest against wage freeze.
●
Movement Engagement: 0. None.
Government response:
●
Government Engagement: 0. None.
●
Concession(s): 1. The national legislature amended the bill that would
implement wage freezes, 3/23/1987
●
Concession Backfire: 1. Protests continued with unions saying that the
amendments were still not enough.
●
Repression: 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread - threatened military crackdown.
●
Repression Backfire: 0. Protests stopped after repression.
Sources
1. Reuters. 1987. “Yugoslav leader warns dissenters,” The Washington Post, March
23.
2. Diehl, Jackson. 1987. “Yugoslavia awaits 2d wave of strikes,” The Washington
Post, March 25.

MEC ID 1899: Union Anti-Austerity/ Alfonsín Economic Plan
Location: Argentina
Target: President Alfonsín, Argentine Government
Dates: June 22, 1984 – May 14, 1989
Outcome: Limited
Summary: On June 22, 1984, 90,000 protesters marched in Buenos Aires, Argentina
against International Monetary Fund (IMF) austerity measures adopted by the Argentine
government. The General Labor Confederation (Confederacion General de Trabajadores,
CGT) led the first of 13 national strikes held during the Alfonsín presidency against these
measures on September 3, 1984. Smaller strikes and protests occurred on a near-daily
basis for the first months of 1985 and first months of 1986. In May 1989, at least 15
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Argentines were killed in a week of food riots that ended after arrests of some of the
leaders. The food riots led Alfonsín to create a new cabinet and implement emergency
economic measures.
Reformist Claim(s): Economic - IMF austerity measures
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 1. Led by the General Labor Confederation (Confederacion
General de Trabajadores, CGT) and its union leaders
●
Mobilization: 1. Mobilized by the CGT
●
Organization: 6. CGT is a labor union that represents the majority of
Argentine workers
●
Structure: 1. Centralized under the CGT
●
Composition: 1. Workers, albeit encompassing a variety of industries,
primarily in the form of strikes
●
Cohesive: 1. Cohesive
●
Movement Engagement: 0. None
Government response:
●
Government Engagement: 0. None
●
Concession(s): 1. President Raul Alfonsin swore in a new cabinet on May
27, 1989, to draft and carry out an emergency plan to prop up the battered
economy
●
Concession Backfire): 0. None.
●
Repression: 1. Targeted arrest of opposition leaders; 1. Widespread
repression in the form of riot police. Food riots in 1989 due to rising inflation left
15 people dead and about 80 wounded. In addition, about 1,700 people have been
arrested around the country. (Source 19)
●
Repression Backfire: 0. None
Sources
1. Edward Schumacher. “Defending Argentina’s New Democracy: Argentina.” The
New York Times. 10 June 1984.
2. NYT. “Argentine Protests.” The New York Times. 23 June 1984.
3. Edward Schumacher. “Alfonsin, in Turnaround, Calls for More Austerity.” The
New York Times. 28 June 1984.
4. Lydia Chavez. “Argentine Labor Movement Stages One-Day Strike.” The New
York Times. 04 September 1984.
5. WSJ. “Argentine Unions Stage Walkout for Higher Pay.” The Wall Street
Journal. 04 September 1984.
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MEC ID 1925: 1978 Hunger Strike
Location: Bolivia
Target: Government of Bolivia
Dates: 12/29/1977 - 1/19/1978
Outcome: Success
Summary: Around 1200 people, including students, journalists, religious leaders and
union members went on a hunger strike in December 29, to demand amnesty for people
banished for political or union activities. Although the government initially agreed to
negotiate with the strikers, it started to arrest the strikers in January 18. Around 600
strikers were arrested. However, the next day President Hugo Banzer declared a general
amnesty for all political prisoners and exiles.
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Reformist Claim(s): Political - release of political prisoners.
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 0. Unclear
●
Mobilization: 1. Some mobilization through unions and students
●
Organization: 5, 6. Student groups and Unions
●
Structure: 0. Largely decentralized
●
Composition: 5. Broad (students, miners, religious peoples, union
affiliates, journalists etc.)
●
Cohesive: 1. Unified demand for amnesty and release of political prisoners
●
Movement Engagement: 1. Negotiations between government and strikers
on 01/16/1978 (Source 1)
Government response:
●
Government Engagement: 1. Negotiations between government and
strikers on 01/16/1978 (Source 1)
●
Concession(s): 1. On January 19, 1978, President Hugo Banzer declared
amnesty for all political prisoners. The president also called on all political parties
to join in preparations for general elections in July. Banzer said a new civilian
president will be chosen in a return to constitutional rule after more than a decade
of military governments. (Source 2)
●
Concession Backfire: 0. None
●
Repression: 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread; on Jan 18 1978, just 24 hours
before declaring the general amnesty, Banzer had ordered police in La Paz and in
10 other Bolivian towns to arrest scores of persons participating in the strike.
(Source 2)
●
Repression Backfire: 0. None. Repression was withdrawn and concessions
were made the very next day.
Sources
1. The Washington Post; Jan 18, 1978; “Bolivia Moves to Break 20-Day Hunger
Strike”
2. The Washington Post; Jan 19, 1978; “Bolivian Agrees to Amnesty Demanded in
Hunger Strike”

MEC ID 1938: 1994 Workers Strike
Location: Bolivia
Target: Government of Bolivia
Dates: 4/4/1994 - 4/28/1994
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Outcome: Unknown
Summary: The Bolivian Workers Confederation's (COB), the umbrella group that
represents almost all of the nation’s worker went on strike in April 4, demanding higher
salaries. The strikes occurred without incidents during the first three weeks, but clashes
started in April 22 when strikers attempted to blockade railways and highways. In
addition, more than 2000 union leaders went on hunger strike. In response the
government deployed troops to railroads and highways to prevent blockades and arrested
several union leaders. Furthermore, there were daily clashes between the police forces
and protesters, where the police used rubber pellets and tear gas to disperse the marches.
Although the government offered a wage increase of 8 percent, it fell short of the 600
percent increase that the unions demanded. It is unknown whether the unions later
accepted the offer or not.
Reformist Claim(s): Economic - higher wages.
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 1. Led by Bolivian Workers Confederation union
●
Mobilization: 1. Mobilized by union
●
Organization: 6. Labor union = Bolivian Workers Confederation
●
Structure: 0. Decentralised, a confederation/umbrella group
●
Composition: 1. Workers
●
Cohesive: 1. Unified demand of higher wages
●
Movement Engagement: 1. Negotiations planned for April 28, 1994.
(Source 2)
Government response:
●
Government Engagement: 1. Negotiations planned for April 28, 1994.
(Source 2)
●
Concession(s): 1. Government proposed an 8% increase in wages, a far cry
from the 600% demanded by protesters. (Exact date unclear, sometime in April
1994)
●
Concession Backfire: 0. Unclear if concessions were accepted or not
●
Repression: 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread. Involving police with rubber
bullets and tear gas and arrests
●
Repression Backfire: 0. Protests continued but repression was not cited as
a reason for continued protest
Sources
1. Agence France Presse, April 28, 1994, “Bolivian strikers try to block highways,
railways”
2. Associated Press, April 28, 1994, “Bolivia Mobilizes Armed Forces to Prevent
Labor Unrest from Spreading”
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MEC ID 1982: Transit Price Protests
Location: Brazil
Target: Brazilian Government
Date: 6/7/2013 - 11/5/2013
Outcome: Limited
Summary: Protests began in Brazil over a seven percent increase in bus, metro, and train
tickets. Prices went from $1.50 to $1.60. Protesters called for lower bus fares, as well as
free fares for students. While the increase in transit cost was the initial cause of the
protests, demonstrators took the opportunity to voice anger about Brazil’s poor education,
health, and transport systems. Around 2000 protesters marched through the streets, some
burning trash cans and vandalizing bus stops. Police fired rubber bullets and tear gas at
protesters to break up demonstrations. Demonstrations continued, with some protesters
smashing windows and throwing petrol bombs. Police continued to respond with rubber
bullets and tear gas, and some protesters were arrested. Protesting took place in various
cities throughout Brazil. Protests continued to escalate. Tens of thousands of protesters
demonstrated to express their anger over the transit price hikes, poor education and health
care systems, and the government’s excessive spending on hosting the World Cup. In
response to the protests, transit costs were decreased. Despite the fact that the demand
was met, protests continued. Protesters were still angry over corrupt government acts and
poor infrastructure. Protesters began to demand higher spending on education and health,
a cut in salaries for public officials, and an end to political corruption. The number of
people protesting grew to over one million. One protester was killed in clashes between
protesters and police. The president addressed the nation, promising to improve public
services and crackdown on corruption. However, protests continued. Some protesters
continued to press for free transit passes. In response to the protests, the president
promised to spend $23 billion more on public transportation, push for political reform,
and will focus on five core areas to improve government services - fiscal responsibility
and controlling inflation; political reform; health care; public transport; and education.
After this announcement, protests continued but took place on a smaller scale and only in
a few cities. The president went ahead with her push for political reform despite the
continued protests. Rousseff met with youth leaders in charge of organizing the protests
in order to work out some of the demands of the protesters. Additionally, the president
advocated for reforms to be approved by congress by October 2013. Due to the reform
efforts, most protests ended. However, small protests did continue in Rio de Janeiro and
Sao Paulo, usually led by radical groups. Protests became increasingly violent, with
protesters vandalizing property and looting stores.
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Reformist Claim(s): Economic → Economic/Political/Social
Number of Reformist Claims(s): Initially 1 (transit price hike) but eventually 3 - a
broad set of demands that included economic (better budgeting of state resources and free
public transport), political (corruption), and social (better healthcare, education). (Source
7)
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 0. Unclear
●
Mobilization: 1. Some mobilization by groups
●
Organization: 3, 4, 5, 6; Political parties, Trotskyist Unified Socialist
Workers' Party, Free Pass Movement, Students, Labor groups (Source 5)
●
Structure: 0. Decentralized
●
Composition: 5. Involving over a million people, it encompassed the
general public. (Source 15)
●
Cohesive: 0. Incohesive - several demands with dynamic and different
demands.
●
Movement Engagement: 1. On June 29, 2013, the president and education
minister met with youth leaders (Source 27)
Government response:
●
Government Engagement: 1. On June 29, 2013, the president and
education minister met with youth leaders (Source 27)
●
Concession(s): 1. On June 19, 2013, the government lowered transit costs
as per the initial demand. (Source 8). On June 24, 2013 Rousseff promised $23
billion on urban public transport and reform in several areas such as public
transportation, healthcare, and corruption. (Source 23)
●
Concession Backfire: 0. Protests continued after the first set of
concessions lowering the cost of transit but stopped after promising more reform.
Concessions were not cited as a cause for protests continuing (Source 18)
●
Repression: 0. No targeted; 1. Widespread with arrests, rubber bullets, and
tear gas. Countless injuries and one death (Source 15)
●
Repression Backfire: 0. Although protests continued, repression was not
cited as a reason for continued protest.
Sources
1. AFP. 2013. “Brazil hit by protests over rising mass transit prices,” Agence France
Presse, June 8.
2. AFP. 2013. “Sao Paulo hit by worst protest over higher transport prices,” Agence
France Presse, June 12.
3. AFP. 2013. “Rail strike adds to Sao Paulo's transport unrest,” Agence France
Presse, June 13.
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4. AFP. 2013. “Hundreds arrested in Brazil transport protests,” Agence France
Presse, June 14.
5. AFP. 2013. “Brazilians back on the street against high travel fares,” Agence
France Presse, June 14.
6. AP. 2013. “Brazil protesters promise more demonstrations soon,” The Associated
Press, June 14.
7. AFP. 2013. “Brazil shaken by largest protests in 20 years,” Agence France Presse,
June 18.
8. AFP. 2013. “Sao Paulo, Rio roll back transport fare hikes,” Agence France
Presse, June 19.
9. AFP. 2013. “Brazilians protest ahead of Mexico match,” Agence France Presse,
June 19.
10. AP. 2013. “Brazil protesters keep up pressure on government,” The Associated
Press, June 19.
11. AFP. 2013. “Rio protest draws 300,000, police fire tear gas,” Agence France
Presse, June 20.
12. AFP. 2013. “10 days of unrest in Brazil,” Agence France Presse, June 20.
13. AFP. 2013. “Brazil fare hikes rolled back in victory for protests,” Agence France
Presse, June 20.
14. AFP. 2013. “Rousseff to address the nation on street protests,” Agence France
Presse, June 21.
15. AFP. 2013. “One killed as more than a million protest in Brazil,” Agence France
Presse, June 21.
16. AFP. 2013. “Brazil protests ramp up, with 800,000 in streets,” Agence France
Presse, June 21.
17. AP. 2013. “1M Brazilians fill streets with protest, violence,” The Associated
Press, June 21.
18. AFP. 2013. “Fresh protests erupt in Brazil despite Rousseff speech,” Agence
France Presse, June 22.
19. AFP. 2013. “Three quarters of Brazilians back protests: poll,” Agence France
Presse, June 23.
20. AFP. 2013. “Brazil's protest group to fight on for free transport,” Agence France
Presse, June 24.
21. AFP. 2013. “More protests as Brazilian street speaks,” Agence France Presse,
June 24.
22. AP. 2013. “Brazil sets $23B hike for transit after protests,” The Associated Press,
June 25.
23. AP. 2013. “Brazil protests back despite proposed reforms,” The Associated Press,
June 25.
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24. AFP. 2013. “Street protests in Brazil ahead of Confed semi-final,” Agence France
Presse, June 26.
25. AFP. 2013. “Brazil's Rousseff pushes plebiscite amid new protests,” Agence
France Presse, June 27.
26. AP. 2013. “Brazil protesters, police clash near match,” The Associated Press,
June 27.
27. AP. 2013. “Brazil president meets youth representatives,” The Associated Press,
June 29.
28. AFP. 2013. “Brazil leader readies reforms to defuse social unrest,” Agence France
Presse, July 1.
29. AP. 2013. “Brazil protesters give Rousseff tenuous truce,” The Associated Press,
July 2.
30. AFP. 2013. “Brazil's president backs key demand of demonstrators,” Agence
France Presse, August 10.
31. AFP. 2013. “Scores arrested in violent Brazil transportation demo,” Agence
France Presse, October 26.
32. AP. 2013. “Police: Brazil protesters beat up officer,” The Associated Press,
October 27.
33. AP. 2013. “Brazil protests turn violent after police shooting,” The Associated
Press, October 29.
34. AFP. 2013. “Brazil protest groups call fresh demos,” Agence France Presse,
November 5.

MEC ID 2051: 1959 Bus Fare Riots
Location: Colombia
Dates: 1/1/1959 to 3/4/1959
Target: Government of Colombia
Outcome: Unknown
Summary: One thousand protesters, mostly students, demonstrated for over two months
to strike back against the increase of urban transport fares. At least 50 protesters were
arrested, nightsticks and tear gas were used by police in an effort to dispel rioters. The
outcome is unknown.
Reformist Claim(s): Other - bus fare.
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 0. Unclear leadership
●
Mobilization: 1. Students
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●
Organization: 5, 6. Largely student mobilization and unions
●
Structure: 0. De-centralized
●
Composition: 2. Largely students (around 80%) and some workers
●
Cohesive: 1. Cohesive protest against bus fares
●
Movement Engagement: 0. Unclear
Government response:
●
Government Engagement: 0. Unclear
●
Concession(s): 0. Unclear
●
Concession Backfire: NA. Unclear if concessions were made.
●
Repression: 0. Targeted; 1. Widespread. Arrests, nightsticks, and tear gas
under modified martial law.
●
Repression Backfire: 0. Repression not cited as a reason for protest.
Sources
1. New York Times, “50 Held in Colombian Protest”, January 13, 1959
2. New York Times, 1,000 STAGE RIOTS IN BOGOTA STREETS, March 4,
1959.
3. "Students Riot, Battle Police in Colombia." 1959.The Washington Post and Times
Herald (1954-1959), Mar 04, 1. http://search.proquest.com.ezpprod1.hul.harvard.edu/docview/149261822?accountid=11311.

MEC ID 2093: 1993 Teachers Strike
Location: Ecuador
Target: Government of Ecuador
Dates: 10/04/1993 - 12/06/1993
Outcome: Success
Summary: In October 4th 1993, about 120,000 teachers started a strike, demanding 50
percent wage increase. Initially, the President Sixto Duran has offered a 15 percent raise,
which the strikers refused. In addition to the walk-out, 100 of the teachers went on a
hunger-strike in late November. In the beginning of December, a state of emergency was
declared which gave the government the right to ban public meetings, restrict press
freedom, arrest union activists and fire striking teachers. Moreover, the army was
mobilized to take control of state schools. Two teachers were killed in separate incidents
and several teachers were arrested.
The teachers returned to work on Monday December 6th after the National Educators
Union announced that they had reached a deal with the government over the weekend, in
which the government had accepted their demands.
Reformist Claim(s): Economic - 50% increase in wage
282

Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 1. National Educators Union (Source 2)
●
Mobilization: 1. National Educators Union (Source 2)
●
Organization: 6 - National Educators Union
●
Structure: 1. Centralized - under the single structure of the National
Educators Union (2)
●
Composition: 1. Teachers
●
Cohesive: 1. Cohesive economic demand of increased wages
●
Movement Engagement: 1. Talks with government over 4 Dec 1993,
which eventually led to a deal
Government response:
●
Government Engagement: 1. Talks with the government over 4 Dec
1993, which eventually led to a deal
●
Concession(s): 1. Government initially offered a 15% wage raise which
was rejected. Later the government agreed to meet demands. (Sources 1, 2)
●
Concession Backfire: 0. Protesters accepted the deal
●
Repression: 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread. A state of emergency was
declared which gave the government the right to ban public meetings, restrict
press freedom, arrests union activists and fire striking teachers. The army was also
mobilized to take control of state schools. Two teachers were killed. (Sources 2)
●
Repression Backfire: 0. Protests continued but not because of the
repression.
Sources
1. Associated Press November 30, 1993, “State of Emergency Declared over
Teachers’ Strike”
2. Associated Press December 6, 1993, “Ecuador Teachers Call off Strike”

MEC ID 2099: 2006 Oil Strike
Location: Ecuador
Target: Government of Ecuador, Oil Companies
Dates: 02/07/2006 - 02/23/2006
Outcome: Limited
Summary: Inhabitants of Baeza in Napo province took over a state-controlled pumping
station to protest against the US group Occidental Petroleum in February 7th 2006 and
demand bigger cut of the country's oil profits. In addition, the protesters also blocked the
highways throughout the region and took some 24 workers hostage. In response to the
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protests, the government of Ecuador declared a state of emergency and deployed troops
to the region. The protesters threw rocks and dynamite to the security forces, which led to
the serious injury of two soldiers. The protests were backed by regional leaders such as
mayors and governors, and two of them as well as some local officials were arrested.
The leaders demanded that government spend $40US million to build two highways and
an airport. The projects had been promised by former President Lucio Gutierrez, a native
of the region, who was forced out of office in April 2005.
The protests ended in February 23rd after the leaders agreed on a truce with the
government. As a part of the truce, the government forces took control over the stations
and arrested leaders were released. However, the actual signing of the agreement was set
for a later date in the capital.
Reformist Claim(s): Economic - better allocation of oil profits to the public good of the
region. This included a project to build two highways and an airport (Source 2)
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 1. Napo Regional Governor Gina San Miguel acted as the
truce broker although earlier reports don’t suggest that she was the leader (Source
2).
●
Mobilization: 0. Unclear
●
Organization: 0. General public.
●
Structure: 0. Decentralized
●
Composition: 5. Sense of general public involvement
●
Cohesive: 1. Cohesive demand for better allocation of oil profits
●
Movement Engagement: 1. On February 23, 2006, a truce between
protesters and the government was agreed upon (Source 4)
Government response:
●
Government Engagement: 1. On February 23, 2006, a truce between
protesters and the government was agreed upon (Source 4)
●
Concession(s): 1. On February 23, 2006, a truce between protesters and the
government was agreed upon
●
Concession Backfire: 0.
●
Repression: 0. Targeted. 1 Widespread. A state of emergency and
deployed troops to the region. Some local/regional officials who had supported
the protests were arrested but not in a targeted fashion. For instance, the regional
governor had been arrested during the state of emergency for breaking curfew.
(Source 2, 4)
●
Repression Backfire: 0. Protests continued but repression not cited as
reason for continuing protest
Sources
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1. Agence France Presse 7 February 2006, “Ecuador shuts off oil pipeline amid
unrest”
2. Agence France Presse 22 February 2006 “Ecuador declares state of emergency,
deploys troops amid oil protests”
3. Associated Press International 22“Violence surges as Ecuador seeks release of oil
workers, pumping station”
4. Agence France Presse 23 February 2006 “Ecuador government negotiates truce
with oil protesters in eastern jungle”

MEC ID 2105: Natives March Over Land Rights
Location: Guatemala
Target: Government
Dates: 03/19/2012-03/28/2012
Outcome: Limited Success
Summary: About 10,000 Maya natives and peasants marched for over nine-days from
their home region of Coban to the capital, Guatemala City. The marchers are protesting
for an end to government mining operations on their land and the cancellation of $100
million in government loans the natives used to purchase the land. The marchers, under
the leadership of the Peasant Unity Committee (CUC), stretched for six kilometers as
they made their way to Constitution Square at the heart of the city. The newly elected
President Perez agreed to meet with a delegation from the protesters and recommended a
panel of “high-level” government representatives began negotiations with them.
Reformist Claim(s): Economic - land rights
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 1. Leadership of the Peasant Unity Committee (CUC)
●
Mobilization: 1. Mobility by CUC
●
Organization: 6. CUC is a labor organization
●
Structure: 1. Centralized into a single organization
●
Composition: 1. Indigenous peasants
●
Cohesive: 1. Cohesive demand against the mining of the land.
●
Movement Engagement: 1. Meet with the president. Date unclear sometime after March 28, 2012
Government response:
●
Government Engagement: 1. Meet with the president. Date unclear sometime after March 28, 2012
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●
Concession(s): 1. High-level government panel for negotiations. Date
unclear - sometime after March 28, 2012
●
Concession Backfire: 0. None
●
Repression: 0. None.
●
Repression Backfire: 0. NA
Sources
1. Agence France Press. 2012. “Guatemalan natives protest over land rights.” In
Agence France Press, March 28, 2012.

MEC ID 2159: Doctors Strike for Higher Pay
Location: Nicaragua
Target: Government
Dates: 02/27/1998-Unknown
Outcome: Unknown
Summary: On 02/27/1998, public sector doctors went on strike demanding a 1,000
percent pay raise. The strikers later lowered the demand to 200 percent paid out
immediately, with rest of the increase paid out over the subsequent two years. The
Government offered the physicians a 100 percent raise, stating they lacked the funds to
fully accommodate the demands. The strike limited public hospitals to providing only
emergency care, forcing the Government to pay private clinics for other services.
Several demonstrations during the protest turned violent when police clashed with
demonstrators. On 05/12/1998, several physicians were hurt after being beat by police
during a protest. The demonstrators had blocked traffic in several parts of Managua,
Masaya, and Granada. Several protesters were arrested. On 06/02/1998, more than 24,000
health workers began a series of rotating work stoppages in support of the doctors. Talks
between the doctors and the Government were being mediated by Managua Archbishop
Miguel Obando y Bravo. There is no reporting on the outcome of the campaign.
Reformist Claim(s): Economic - pay raise.
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 1. Source cites leaders calling for more protest
●
Mobilization: 1. Doctors
●
Organization: 6 = unions
●
Structure: 0. Decentralized
●
Composition: 2. Doctors, then later joined in support by health workers
●
Cohesive: 1. Cohesive demand for higher pay
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●
Movement Engagement: 1. Talks between the doctors and the
Government were being mediated by Managua Archbishop Miguel Obando y
Bravo. Date unclear
Government response:
●
Government Engagement: 1. Talks between the doctors and the
Government were being mediated by Managua Archbishop Miguel Obando y
Bravo. Date unclear
●
Concession(s): 1. The government offered the physicians -- who make
between 50 and 200 dollars per month -- a 100-percent raise, saying it lacked the
resources to give the doctors what they want
●
Concession Backfire: 1. Movement rejected this and recommenced
protests
●
Repression: 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread - police clash with protesters,
president orders to clear the streets, arrests
●
Repression Backfire: 0. Repression not cited as reason for protests
Sources
1. Agence France Press. 1998. “Nicaraguan riot police break up striking doctor
protests”. In Agence France Press, May 12, 1998.
2. Agence France Press. 1998. “Nicaraguan health workers strike in support of
doctors”. In Agence France Press, 06/02/1998.

MEC ID 2232: Proposed Referendum Prompts Protest
Location: Venezuela
Target: Government
Dates: 10/23/2007-12/03/2007
Outcome: Success
Summary: A protest campaign over President Hugo Chavez’s proposed changes to the
constitution began on 10/23/2007. Police used tear gas to break up thousands of bottlethrowing students demonstrating against Chavez’s proposal. In addition to clashing with
police, opposition protesters also fought with pro-Chavez demonstrators. The campaign
was launched over a referendum to be held on 12/02/2007 that would amend almost 70
constitutional articles and allow Chavez to remain in office indefinitely. Additionally, the
reforms would grant the President authority to restrict civil liberties in a state of
emergency, regulate monetary policy and promote members of the armed forces, among
other powers.
One week later, led by university students, tens of thousands of protesters
demonstrated outside the electoral agency’s office. Protesters threw rocks and bottles at
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police. Some removed and threw metal barricades against police holding riot shields. The
protest dispersed when police used tear gas, water cannons, and rubber bullets to break up
the demonstration. At least six were reported wounded in the demonstration. On
11/29/2007 hundreds of thousands marched through the streets of Caracas in a final
protest over the impending referendum. Demonstrators blew whistles and waved
placards. One protester was quoted as saying, “There can’t be a communist Venezuela,
and that’s why our society is reacting this way.”
Announced on 12/03/2007, Venezuelans rejected the proposal and Chavez
accepted the outcome. Chavez tried to bolster his supporters, stating they had only lost by
a slim margin. According to the National Electoral Council the final tally was 51 percent
“no” and 49 percent “yes.” Stopping the acceptance of the proposed constitutional
amendments, the largely non-violent campaign was a success.
Reformist Claim(s): Political - protesting constitutional amendments that would give the
president more power.
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 0. Unclear.
●
Mobilization: 1.
●
Organization: 5 - students.
●
Structure: 0. Decentralized.
●
Composition: 5 - general public involvement.
●
Cohesive: 1. Cohesive protest against increasing presidential power.
●
Movement Engagement: 0. None.
Government response:
●
Government Engagement: 0. None.
●
Concession(s): 1. Referendum was called to gauge public opinion and it
did not pass, so the constitutional amendments did not pass.
●
Concession Backfire: 0. Protests stopped.
●
Repression: 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread - police with tear gas.
●
Repression Backfire: 0. Repression not cited as a reason for continued
protest.
Sources
1. Agence France Press. 2007. “Venezuela police clash with students protesting
constitutional reforms”. In Agence France Press, October 23, 2007.
2. The Associated Press. 2007. “Venezuelan troops use tear gas, water cannons to
break up protest against Chavez reforms”. In The Associated Press, November 02,
2007.
3. The Associated Press. 2007. “Venezuelan students protest, ask supreme court to
postpone vote on Chavez reforms”. In The Associated Press, November 07, 2007.
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4. The Associated Press. 2007. “Hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans protest
Chavez’s referendum”. In The Associated Press, November 29, 2007.
5. The Associated Press. 2007. “Tens of thousands of Venezuelans protest Chavez’s
referendum”. In The Associated Press, November 30, 2007.
6. Agence France Press. 2007. “Venezuelans reject constitutional change, Chavez
accepts”. In Agence France Press, December 03, 2007.

MEC ID 2242: Protests over Fraud in Municipal Elections
Location: Algeria
Target: Gov’t of Algeria
Dates: 10/27/1997 – 11/12/1997
Outcome: Failure
Summary: On October 27, 1997, thousands of demonstrators in Algiers protested against
alleged fraud in municipal elections that took place on October 23. The march was
organized by the leading opposition party (Socialist Forces Front), and was also
supported by the banned FIS, the National Liberation Front, and the Islamist Movement
of Society for Peace. Protests in Algiers swelled the following day, with some sources
reporting as many as 100,000 demonstrators. The series of demonstrations was unique in
that, for the first time since 1989, it united the country’s Islamic parties, which had
otherwise remained divided. In addition to street demonstrations, opposition party
supporters also organized daily sit-ins at the ruling party headquarters in a bid to force the
government to cancel election results. In a first public response to protestors, Algerian
president Zeroual announced that only the country’s judiciary would be able to settle the
controversy. Riot police eventually responded on November 3, 1997 in a move to
prevent student protests, but no violence was reported on either side. On November 9,
Zeroual announced the decision to move forward with elections to the second house of
parliament on December 25, effectively ignoring protestors’ demands. The protests lost
steam around November 12, 1997 not having achieved any concessions from the
government.
Reformist Claim(s): Electoral
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 1. Leadership by opposition party, the Socialist Forces Front
(FFS)
●
Mobilization: 1. Mobilization by opposition party, the Socialist Forces
Front (FFS), and 3 other political parties
●
Organization: 3, 5. Opposition party the Socialist Forces Front (FFS), the
National Liberation Front (FLN), the Islamist Movement of Society for Peace
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(MSP), and the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD), Islamic Salvation Front
(FIS); Student groups
●
Structure: 0. Alliance among different political parties that have
traditionally been fractured
●
Composition: 5. General public involvement with protest leaders citing as
many as 100,000 protesters
●
Cohesive: 1. Unified demand calling for fair elections
●
Movement Engagement: 0. None
Government response:
●
Government Engagement: 0. None
●
Concession(s): 0. None
●
Concession Backfire: NA
●
Repression: 0. No violence reported
●
Repression Backfire: 0. None
Sources
1. AFPR. 1997. “Demonstration against electoral fraud in Algiers,” Agence France
Presse, October 27.
2. Ganley, Elaine. 1997. “Political economies join in protest against Algerian
government,” The Associated Press, October 30.
3. AFPR. 1997. “Algerian president leaves vote-fraud protests to judges,” Agence
France Presse, October 31.
4. AFPR. 1997. “Anti-riot police deploy to foil student protest,” Agence France
Presse, November 3.
5. AFPR. 1997. “Algerians ignore general strike call,” Agence France Presse,
November 12.
6. APRS. 1997. “Police bar national march to protest election fraud,” The
Associated Press, November 13.
7. AFP. 1997. "Algerian riot police muzzle opposition protest protest protest".
Agence France Presse, November 13.

MEC ID 2290: 2007 Constitutional Amendment Protest
Location: Egypt
Target: Government of Egypt
Dates: 3/18/07 – 3/25/07
Outcome: Failure
Summary: Opposition MPs, primarily independents associated with the banned Muslim
Brotherhood, boycotted parliamentary proceedings and held a demonstration outside of
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the Egyptian parliament building to condemn proposed amendments to the Egyptian
constitution which the opposition claimed would further tighten President Mubarak’s grip
on power. After the amendments passed through parliament the Muslim Brotherhood
organized further protests on university campuses and organized a boycott of a
referendum to approve the amendments. The protests failed to prevent passage of the
amendments.
Reformist Claim(s): Political - constitutional amendments that allegedly strengthened
the president’s power.
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 0. Some leadership by the Muslim Brotherhood because it
made up the majority of the protesters but encompassed other opposition MPs
(Source 2)
●
Mobilization: 1. Muslim Brotherhood and other opposition parties (Source
2)
●
Organization: 3 - opposition and independent parties (Source 2); 5 - 3,000
student protesters also joined (Source 3)
●
Structure: 0. Decentralized bringing together different political groups
including the Muslim Brotherhood.
●
Composition: 2. Politicians and students.
●
Cohesive: 1. Cohesive demand of constitutional amendments.
●
Movement Engagement: 0. None
Government response:
●
Government Engagement: 0. None
●
Concession(s): 0.
●
Concession Backfire: 0. NA
●
Repression: 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread - regular police crackdowns.
(Source 2)
●
Repression Backfire: 0. Protests continued but repression was not cited as
reason (Source 2).
Sources
1. “Egypt Opposition MPs Boycott Constitutional Debate.” Agence France Presse
(2007, March 18).
2. Abou el-Magd, Nadia. “Egyptian Opposition Boycotts Parliament Talks on
Constitutional Amendments.’” Associated Press Newswires (2007, March 18).
3. Abou el-Magd, Nadia. “Egypt’s Opposition Group Boycotts Vote.” Associated
Press Newswires (2007, March 21).
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MEC ID 2468: Libyan Protest against extending transition government
Location: Libya
Target: Libyan transitional government
Dates: Feb 07, 2014 - Feb 16, 2014
Outcome: Success
Summary: Thousands of Libyans took to the streets to protest the decision of the interim
parliament (General National Congress) which voted to extend their mandate until the
end of the year. While not formally organized there were a number of armed groups
backing the protesters. For a second consecutive Friday, Libyans took to the streets to
protest the interim government’s decision to extend its mandate. Libya’s parliament
yielded to pressure from protesters and agreed to hold early elections.
Reformist Claim(s): Electoral - protesting against the delaying of elections
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 0. Unclear
●
Mobilization: 1.
●
Organization: 2 = a militia of former rebels. (1) 4 = Alliance of National
Forces, a liberal grouping and non-party political force
●
Structure: 0. Decentralized
●
Composition: 5. Broad with public involvement
●
Cohesive: 1. Cohesive protests against the delaying of elections
●
Movement Engagement: 0. Unclear
Government response:
●
Government Engagement: 0. Unclear
●
Concession(s): 1. Government conceded demands and held the elections
early on 16 Feb 2014
●
Concession Backfire: 0. None
●
Repression: 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread - military crackdown supported by
ex-rebel militias.
●
Repression Backfire: 0. Repression was not cited as a reason.
Sources
1. Libya braces for protests against protracted transition (Agence France Presse -English) Feb 07, 2014
2. Libyans protest against protracted transition (Agence France Presse -- English)
Feb 14, 2014
3. Libya MPs 'agree on early elections' (Agence France Presse --English) Feb 16,
2014
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MEC ID 2482: Labor strike protesting President Alvarado’s fiscal plan
Location: Costa Rica
Dates: 9/10/2018-12/7/2018
Target: Costa Rican Government
Outcome: Failure
Summary: On September 10, a public sector strike was launched in opposition to the
fiscal reforms proposed by President Alvarado. Thousands protested in the streets the
following weekend, including limited clashes with police. Participation in the strike was
initially in multiple sectors, but various court rulings left just the teachers union.
Negotiations continued without success for three months. This strike lasted until
December 7, when the teachers voted to end the strike without reversing the reforms.
Reformist Claim(s): Economic - the president’s proposed fiscal plans.
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 0. Unclear.
●
Mobilization: 1. Various public sector unions
●
Organization: 6. Public sector unions
●
Structure: 0. De-centralized coalition of public sector unions
●
Composition: 1. Just the public sector
●
Cohesive: 1. Protest against fiscal plan
●
Movement Engagement: 1. “On 9 November, the Association of
Secondary School Teachers (APSE), together with two other bodies, denounced
the government of Costa Rica to the Committee on Freedom of Association of the
International Labour Organization (ILO) for violations of freedom of association,
collective bargaining rights and the right to strike. In a video, teachers’ union
ANDE (the National Association of Educators) denounced multiple abuses and
the lack of openness to dialogue.” (Source 3)
Government response:
●
Government Engagement: 0
●
Concession(s): 0. No concessions were made
●
Concession Backfire: NA. No concessions were made
●
Repression: 1. Targeted; 1. Widespread. Court rulings against particular
sectors to stop their strikes; clashes with police
●
Repression Backfire: 0. Repression not cited as reason for continued
protest.
Sources
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1. AP. 2018. “Costa Rica shaken by rare and unruly unrest, labor strike”, September
15.
2. APSE. 2018. “APSE AGREES TERMINATION OF STRIKE BY
AUTONOMOUS AND DEMOCRATIC DECISION OF ITS BASES”, December
7.
3. Equal Times. 2018. “In just seven months in power, Costa Rica’s new
government has experienced three months of confrontation with public sector
unions”, December 14. (retrieved 3/28/2018 from: https://www.equaltimes.org/injust-seven-months-in-power?lang=en#.XJz4EyhKhPZ)

MEC ID 2688: Health Sector Strike of 2018
Location: Algeria
Target: Gov’t of Algeria
Dates: 11/01/2017 to 06/28/2018
Outcome: Unknown
Summary: Some 1,000 striking trainee doctors took to the streets of Algeria's capital
Monday to demand the scrapping of compulsory public service in defiance of a ban on
protests in the city. The demonstrators -- wearing black armbands or surgical masks
emblazoned with "angry doctors" -- managed to gather for a sit-in in the heart of Algiers
despite a heavy deployment by the security forces. Surrounded by riot police the
protesters chanted for "dignity" as they push for an end to mandatory work placements
after they qualify and exemption from military service. Demonstrations have been banned
in the capital of tightly controlled Algeria since 2001 and are usually quickly dispersed.
Police violently put down a protest by trainee doctors in the city on January 3, wounding
20 people according to demonstrators. Roughly 13,000 doctors undergoing the residency
stage of their graduate studies have been on strike for some three months despite the
courts declaring their action illegal last month. They are calling for an end to compulsory
public service once they finish studying, which can see doctors obliged to spend up to
four years working in often remote areas.
Reformist Claim(s): Other. Highly context-specific concern for trainee doctors
protesting against mandatory public service after the end of their education
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 1. Led by Autonomous Collective of Algerian Medical
Residents (CAMRA)
●
Mobilization: 1. Mobilized by Autonomous Collective of Algerian
Medical Residents (CAMRA)
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●
Organization: 6. Independent union of resident trainee doctors =
Autonomous Collective of Algerian Medical Residents (CAMRA)
●
Structure: 1. Centralized in one organization
●
Composition: 1. Resident doctors only
●
Cohesive: 1. Unified demand of removing mandatory public service for
doctors
●
Movement Engagement: 1. Thirteen meetings between the Ministry of
Health and CAMRA have failed to agree on any satisfactory way to end the
strike. On 29 April, CAMRA announced that it would boycott dialogue with the
ministry on the grounds that the meetings are futile (Source 2)
Government response:
●
Government Engagement: 1. Thirteen meetings between the Ministry of
Health and CAMRA have failed to agree on any satisfactory way to end the
strike. On 29 April, CAMRA announced that it would boycott dialogue with the
ministry on the grounds that the meetings are futile. The Ministry of Health has
called upon the residents to return to normal working patterns and the dialogue
sessions with the government. (Source 2)
●
Concession(s): 0. None
●
Concession Backfire: NA
●
Repression: 0. Targeted; 1. Widespread. Ministry of Health’s dismissal of
800 medical residents in several government hospitals because of the strike
action.
●
Repression Backfire: 0. No effect on campaign. Campaign progressed as
it had.
Sources
1. "Striking trainee doctors brave ban to protest in Algeria". Agence France Presse - English. February 12, 2018 Monday. https://advance-lexis-com.ezpprod1.hul.harvard.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:5RM
R-X461-DY93-M22C-00000-00&context=1516831.
2. "Ongoing Health Sector Strike Is The Longest Protest In Algeria’S History".
2018. Middle East Monitor. June 20, 2018.
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180620-ongoing-health-sector-strike-isthe-longest-protest-in-algerias-history/.

MEC ID 2702: 2017 Labour Reform Protest
Location: France
Target: French Government
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Dates: 9/12/2017 - 10/19/2017
Outcome: Failure
Summary: Over 220,000 protesters marched against President Emmanuel Macron's
flagship economic reforms in 9/12/2017, in the first major demonstrations opposed to his
pro-business agenda. The day of strikes and rallies were seen as a key test for the young
French leader as he stakes his presidency on overhauling the sluggish economy. About
4,000 strikes and 180 protests were called by France's biggest trade union, the CGT, with
rail workers, students and civil servants urged to join the demonstrations against changes
to the country's rigid labor laws. France's interior ministry said 223,000 people joined
marches nationwide, with 13 arrests made. The Communist-backed CGT, for its part, put
the total at 400,000. The protests were overwhelmingly peaceful despite isolated clashes
between anarchists and police in Paris, where teargas was fired. "It's a first one and it
looks like it's a success," the head of the CGT, Philippe Martinez, told reporters in Paris.
Attendance was being scrutinized as a measure of the resistance to Macron's economic
agenda, which is intended to help bring down stubbornly high unemployment. Thousands
of protesters took to the streets of France on Oct 19, 2017 to denounce President
Emmanuel Macron's planned labor reforms, but low turnouts suggested the resistance is
running out of steam. Numbers have steadily dwindled from a peak of around a quarter of
a million who protested nationwide on September 12, the first major demonstration
against Macron's reform agenda seen as pro-business.
Reformist Claim(s): Economic - protesting President Macron’s pro-business policies
Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 0. Unclear - a collection of unions and other parties
●
Mobilization: 1. Some mobilization by unions
●
Organization: 6. Mostly union organized
●
Structure: 0. Decentralized
●
Composition: 2. Primarily workers and students
●
Cohesive: 1. Cohesive demand for economic reform
●
Movement Engagement: 0. None
Government response:
●
Government Engagement: 0. None
●
Concession(s): 0. None
●
Concession Backfire: 0. NA
●
Repression: 0. Targeted. 0 Widespread - presence of police but not
repression per se.
●
Repression Backfire: 0. NA
Sources
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1. "Thousands protest Macron labour reforms in France". Agence France Presse -English. September 12, 2017 Tuesday.
2. "The Latest: Paris protesters: Labor changes favor employers". The Associated
Press. September 12, 2017 Tuesday.
3. "French labour reforms: why workers are protesting". Agence France Presse -English. September 12, 2017 Tuesday.
4. "Turnout down in second French protest against Macron's labour reforms".
Agence France Presse -- English. September 21, 2017 Thursday.
5. "New protests as France set to enshrine labour reforms". Agence France Presse -English. September 21, 2017 Thursday.
6. By ANGELA CHARLTON. "French marchers fill Paris streets to protest new
work rules". The Associated Press. September 23, 2017 Saturday.
7. "French left stages street showdown over Macron reforms". Agence France Presse
-- English. September 23, 2017 Saturday.
8. "French truck drivers block roads to protest labor changes". The Associated Press.
September 25, 2017 Monday.
9. "French truckers block motorways, fuel depots". Agence France Presse -- English.
September 25, 2017 Monday.
10. By PHILIPPE SOTTO and SYLVIE CORBET. "French public sector strike
disrupt schools, hospitals". The Associated Press. October 10, 2017 Tuesday.
11. "French public workers in the street over Macron reforms". Agence France Presse
-- English. October 10, 2017 Tuesday.
12. "The Latest: French protesters express fear of more cutbacks". The Associated
Press. October 10, 2017 Tuesday.
13. "Protests on the wane against Macron's labour reforms". Agence France Presse -English. October 19, 2017 Thursday.

MEC ID 2723: 2000 Farmer Tax Protest
Location: Jiangxi, China
Target: Jiangxi Government
Dates: 8/17/2000 – 8/23/2000
Outcome: Failure
Summary: 20,000 Farmers throughout Jiangxi Province protested over the course of 10
days in response to increasing taxes on top of existing fees. The protests were stopped by
the Chinese riot police who dispersed the largest crowds. Ultimately, many protesters
were killed and over 100 injured ending the protests without significant changes.
Reformist Claim(s): Economic - tax increase
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Number of Reformist Claims(s): 1
Movement structure:
●
Leadership: 0. Unclear
●
Mobilization: 0. Unclear
●
Organization: 0. Unclear - farmer protesting but no organization cited
●
Structure: 0. Decentralized, unclear
●
Composition: 1. Farmers
●
Cohesive: 1. Cohesive protest against tax hike
●
Movement Engagement: 0. None
Government response:
●
Government Engagement: 0. None
●
Concession(s): 0. None
●
Concession Backfire: 0. NA
●
Repression: 0. Targeted. 1. Widespread - riot police broke up the crowds
(Source 1)
●
Repression Backfire: 0. Protests stopped after successful repression
Sources
1. "Chinese police presence strong after rioting by 20,000 farmers". Agence France
Presse -- English. August 30, 2000, Wednesday.
2. Elisabeth Zingg. "China confronts increasing rural unrest". Agence France Presse
-- English. August 31, 2000, Thursday.
3. By KATHERINE ARMS. "Farmers in China protest high taxes". United Press
International. August 29, 2000, Tuesday. https://advance-lexis-com.ezpprod1.hul.harvard.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn:contentItem:41331HS0-00RC-82K9-00000-00&context=1516831.
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Appendix E – List of interviewees
Alias 197

Description of Interviewee

Interviewee 1

Hong Kong-based international news
correspondent

Interviewee 2

Professional Media Consultant and Public
Intellectual in Hong Kong

Interviewee 3

Pro-democracy activist and protest
participant

Interviewee 4

Former legislator and Hong Kong
government official

Interviewee 5

Former member of the Royal Hong Kong
Police Force

Interviewee 6

Hong Kong scholar on Hong Kong culture
and politics

Interviewee 7

Hong Kong scholar on contentious politics in
Hong Kong, protest participant

Interviewee 8

Lawyer and on the ground observer of HK
protests

Interviewee 9

China specialist and professional consultant
with government experience

Interviewee 10

Communications specialist and former
consultant to HK government

196F

197

All interviewees are de-identified to maintain their anonymity
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